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Abstract 
Abstract 
This research has shown how the nature of the construction project has become 
increasingly complex and has highlighted how project management decision-making 
has been supplemented with the use of risk management strategies. Subsequently the 
use of risk management strategies in construction project execution has had some of its 
weaknesses exposed, namely the failure of such strategies to consider the role of the 
individual within the risk management process. Consequently this research has 
undertaken an investigation to ascertain and understand the nature and impact of 
individual decision-makers upon the decision-making process. The attributes of and 
influences upon individual decision-making, risk and uncertainty perceptions and 
preferences have been explored and discussed in some detail. From those the `risk 
prism', a metaphor for the perception and preference of risk and uncertainty, was 
developed to explore the manner in which these decision-making attributes function. 
An investigation was undertaken to replicate the `risky shift' phenomenon in decision- 
making groups populated by construction project management professionals. The 
results of this investigation ascertained the influence of the group environment upon 
construction management decision makers, namely that individuals were influenced to 
accept greater uncertainty in a group decision environment. Subsequently a case study 
investigation of an organisations attempt to introduce a new risk management strategy 
was undertaken from which an enhanced understanding of the group discussion and 
decision-making environment was ascertained. 
As a result of these investigations an improved risk management process was 
developed and is presented within this dissertation. 
"Thestor's son, the clearest by far of all the seers 
who can scan the flight of birds. He knew all things that are, 
all things that are past and all that are to come, 
the seer who had led the Argive ships to Troy" 
Homer, The Iliad. 
"Alexander suddenly found himself passionately eager to 
visit the shrine of Ammon.. one reason was his 
wish to consult the oracle there, as it had a reputation for 
infallibility.. he put his question to the oracle and received 
(or so he said) the answer which his heart desired. " 
Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Research 
1 Introduction to Research 
1.1 Problem Domain 
This thesis describes research undertaken in the construction industry examining the 
nature of decision-making within the execution of project risk management strategies. 
The construction industry has adopted risk management strategies to manage the 
increasing uncertainty associated with construction projects (Williams, 1999; 
Baccarini, 1996; CIRIA, 1983). However risk management practitioners and those 
organisations utilising such strategies remain ignorant of the influences that 
phenomena such as risk propensity and perception exert upon group and individual 
decision-makers. This omission prompted Edwards & Bowen (1999) to call for greater 
consideration to be given to this area of project risk management. 
This research examined the nature of risk management, group and individual decision- 
making under uncertainty. The conclusions derived from this research will ultimately 
assist in the improvement of risk management strategies by facilitating greater 
understanding and management of the influential cognitive processes that affect group 
decision-making. 
1.2 Background to Research 
As a result of the literature reviews and interviews with project management 
professionals a void in the knowledge regarding risk management was identified. This 
void concerned the role and potential impact of the individual and groups upon 
structured risk management processes as a result of their failure to acknowledge or 
incorporate those attributes of decision-makers. Therefore to address this void in 
knowledge the research was initiated to investigate the domain of individual decision 
preferences under uncertainty and their impact upon group decision-making. 
1.3 The Nature of Construction Projects 
The construction industry is project driven; clients demand bespoke assets to meet 
their organisational objectives, the purpose of which is to bring about beneficial 
change (Turner et al, 1996). Therefore construction projects are never repetitive, they 
are always unique endeavours via which unique objectives are achieved (Smith, 1999; 
Woodward, 1997). Consequently the construction industry experiences project design, 
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production and management processes of an iterative and complex nature that are 
distinct from those experienced by other industries such as manufacturing. 
Risk management strategies in any industry are concerned with minimising the 
uncertainty associated with a decision domain by allowing a conceptualisation of the 
potential outcomes of any identified situation. Such strategies include the generic 
processes of identification, assessment and management within a bespoke framework 
tailored to suit the needs of the host organisation. The entire process is iterative, and is 
reliant upon the knowledge held by participating individuals. 
1.4 Research Purpose 
The nature of decision-making has been explored and documented within an accepted 
body of literature that details cognitive influences such as heuristics and their inherent 
biases, individual rationality, motivational and mood issues. However a thorough 
review of construction risk management literature has shown that, with exceptions 
such as Flanagan & Norman (1993), the industry remains ignorant to their effects of 
these cognitive influences, if not their existence. The cause for this can be argued to 
reside in the industry's nature to examine only the more tangible issues that concern its 
undertakings, as can be evidenced in the lack of literature concerning the political 
issues of project management (Pinto, 2000). Contrast this with the plethora of work 
undertaken in areas such as scheduling and information management (Themistocleous 
& Weame, 2000). In a review of topic coverage within the International Journal of 
Project Management the area of risk management was one of the highest researched 
areas, but omitted any investigation into the subjectivity of the process 
(Themistocleous & Wearne, 2000). 
Therefore one objective of this research was to redress this balance. Consequently the 
review of literature and subsequent investigation highlights the subjective nature of 
decision-making and the effect of the group decision-making environment on 
individual perception and choice. The literature shows how present risk management 
processes fail to consider the impact of the individual and group effects on decision- 
making. Consequently the two questions that are revisited throughout this thesis are: 
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What is the cumulative effect, if any, of factors such as mood, motivation, 
rationality and complexity upon individual and group decision-making? 
and: 
How do individuals manage the information required to interpret their 
environment? 
However the justification for this research is founded in the notion that by failing to 
recognise the impact of individuals and group environments on the decision-making 
process contemporary risk management is failing to achieve the stated objectives of 
opportunity realisation and hazard avoidance. 
1.5 Aims and Objectives of Research 
The principal aim of the research is: 
Al Establish a risk management process that addresses the impact of individual 
and group reactions to risk and uncertainty. 
The research objectives are summarised below: 
01 Ascertain the contemporary position of risk management strategies and 
determine the impact of individual and group reactions to uncertainty upon the 
execution of the risk management process. 
02 Conceive an approach that allows individual uncertainty preferences, 
perceptions and assumptions to be rationalised in a group decision-making 
environment. 
1.6 Methodology 
The methodology has been designed to assess the subjective nature of the decision- 
making environment and thereby to highlight and make accessible the process of 
deliberation undertaken by construction project management groups. Therefore the 
methodology comprises: initial investigation, by literature review and preliminary 
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interview; testing of theory by replication of an established study and case study 
research to test the findings of the study against the contemporary position of risk 
management decision-making within one organisation. The use of discourse analysis 
was chosen for the case study analysis as it allows insight into the discussion process 
and also encourages presentation of the research data for peer review within the 
analysis. 
The need to design a replicable methodology was of primary concern. Therefore 
chapter 2 describes the methodology in greater detail. 
1.7 Main Findings 
The findings and conclusions of this research should assist in the formulation of more 
effective risk management strategies that consider the impact of individuals and groups 
in the deliberation and decision-making processes, as stated in the primary aim of this 
research. 
Also it is hoped that this research will act as a platform from which further research 
can be based with two primary aims. Firstly to replicate this work and thereby 
establish its generality and secondly to provide the impetus for a more far ranging 
discussion on the topics raised within the construction industry and also the 
construction management research community. The following detail the main findings 
of this research. 
1.7.1 Risk Management Process 
Contemporary risk manage processes fail to recognise the impact of individualistic 
reaction to risk and uncertainty as a result of the complexities associated with the 
decision environment. Therefore a risk management strategy has been proposed to 
redress this omission. 
1.7.2 Risky-Shift Phenomenon 
Construction management decision-making groups are subject to influence from the 
risky shift phenomenon as described in chapter 4. Consequently they are accepting 
greater risk and uncertainty than are the individuals that comprise the group. 
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1.7.3 Use of Rhetorical Strategies in Group Discussions 
During group discussions regarding risk identification and assessment individuals 
resort to the use of a rhetorical strategy as described in chapter 6. The strategy is 
employed to convince other group members of the validity of their proposition by 
explaining often-hypothetical situations to the other group members that conveyed the 
desired position. 
1.7.4 Use and Acceptance of 50/50 Propositions 
Group members prefer to use 50/50 linguistic constructs of probability rather than 
numerical percentile expressions when they are unable to discern a meaningful 
difference between the prescribed forms of available options. Cohesive groups accept 
this interpretation of probability on a far greater number of occasions than do less 
cohesive groups. 
1.7.5 Role of the Devils Advocate in Group Discussions 
The inclusion within the group of an individual who is prepared to question the 
accuracy of the group's propositions enhanced the group decision-making process by 
encouraging their fellow group members to ask `what if? ' questions which forces a 
reconsideration and discussion of the proposition in question. 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
1.8.1 Chapter 1: Introduction to Research 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research. It outlines the background to the 
research area and the justification for the research endeavour. The aim and objectives 
of the research are stated together with the methodology designed to achieve them. 
Finally the main findings of the research are outlined in brief. 
1.8.2 Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology 
Chapter 2 discusses the philosophical background to the design of the research 
methodology employed to execute this research. It also introduces the methods of data 
collection and analysis together with their strengths and limitations. Comparisons are 
made between the methods used and those that were considered inadequate for the task 
with justification for their inclusion or omission. 
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1.8.3 Chapter 3: Management of Uncertainty 
Chapter 3 introduces the `risk prism', a metaphor for individualistic reaction to 
uncertainty and risk. This chapter hosts a discussion concerning the nature and 
philosophy of risk and risk taking behaviour, of complexity, information and 
contemporary risk management strategies. 
1.8.4 Chapter 4: Risk and Decision-Making 
Chapter 4 discusses rationality and the theories of decision-making, the nature of group 
and individual decision-making and the influences on decision makers such as mood 
and motivation. The effect of group discussion upon risk preference is described 
together with its ramifications. The subjectivity of risk management and how it relates 
not only to the individualistic nature of bespoke risk management processes but also to 
the qualitative methods used to identify and manage risk is noted. 
1.8.5 Chapter 5: Group Effect upon Individual Decision-Making Preferences 
This chapter describes a replication of the Wallach et al (1962) study using the original 
choice dilemma questionnaire. The chapter also outlines the method adopted to 
implement the current study and examines the results obtained from construction 
project management decision-making groups together with the analytical statistical 
tools used. 
1.8.6 Chapter 6: Case Study Investigation 
Chapter 6 describes the practicalities of data collection and the purpose of the case 
study investigation. This chapter reports on the findings derived from the case study 
investigation of construction risk management decision-making groups and presents 
the data, the method of data collection and analyses the results. 
1.8.7 Chapter 7: Discussion 
This chapter revisits the research aim and objectives and presents a proposed risk 
management process. A discussion is held regarding the literature and case study. 
1.8.8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
This chapter reports the performance of the research with regards to the achievement 
of the research aim and objectives. The conclusions and recommendations of this 
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research are discussed in light of their limitations together with recommendations for 
risk management practitioners. 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the research by examining in brief the research domain, 
purpose, aim, objectives and methodology. The main findings derived from the 
research have also been included. An outline of the thesis is included to show the logic 
of the approach undertaken to deliver this research. 
7 
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2.0 Research Design and Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the philosophical background to the design of the research 
methodology employed to execute this research. It also introduces the methods of data 
collection and analysis together with their strengths and limitations. Comparisons are 
made between those methods adopted for use and those that were considered 
inadequate for the task with justification for their inclusion or omission. 
2,2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The principle aim and the objectives of the research are re-stated here to facilitate clear 
comparison with the adopted methodology and its design. The principal aim is: 
Al: Establish a risk management process that addresses the impact of individual 
and group reactions to risk and uncertainty. 
The research objectives are summarised below: 
01: Ascertain the contemporary position of risk management strategies and 
determine the impact of individual and group reactions to uncertainty upon the 
execution of the risk management process. 
02: Conceive an approach that allows individual uncertainty preferences, 
perceptions and assumptions to be rationalised in a group decision-making 
environment. 
The research aim and objectives define a focused line of reasoning around which the 
methodology can be designed and the research methods applied. It was considered 
necessary to identify the relevant data points with respect to the causal mechanisms 
that resulted in influential affect, to include these within the research objectives and to 
design the research methodology accordingly. Fenn (1997) stated that a replicable 
methodology is crucial to the execution of any research undertaking. Consequently the 
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methodological framework as shown in figure 2.1 was designed, the focus of which 
was the individual decision-maker and their performance within a group environment. 
Method 
" Literature 
Review 
" Semi-structured 
Interview 
" Experiment 
I 
Case Study 
Conversation 
Analysis 
Semi-Structured 
Interview 
1 
" Semi-Structured 
Interview 
Outcome 
Established 
grounding for theory 
Experimentally 
established 
plausibility of theory 
within construction 
management groups 
1 
Identified causal 
mechanisms 
4 
Developed theory 
i 
Conclusions and 
recomendations 
Figure 2.1. Research methodology 
Aim and Objectives met/satisfied I 
Al: Theoretically justified in the Literature review 
01: Theoretically justified in the Literature review 
02: Identified in Literature review 
03: Formed upon the conclusions drawn from 
the Literature Review 
01: Established Risky-Shift as active within construction 
management groups 
03: Justified the formation of the approach conceived 
initially upon the basis of literature review 
Al Identified and validated the recommendations 
& for normalising individual decision-making 
03 with desired organisational perspective 
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) propose that any methodology relating to 
phenomenological research should be able to satisfy the following three criteria: 
" Validity - has the researcher gained full access to the knowledge and means of 
the informants? 
" Reliability - will similar observations be made by different researchers on 
different occasions? 
" Generalisability - how likely is it that ideas and theories generated in one 
setting will also apply in other settings? 
These criteria have been considered and designed into the methodology and are 
included within the following discussion. 
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2.3 Introduction to Research Design 
To facilitate effective and replicable research a bespoke research methodology that 
rationalises the process of investigation by establishing the "principles and procedures 
of logical thought processes" (Fellows & Liu, 1997) is necessary. 
2.3.1 Research as a Learning Process 
Root (2001) has defined academic research as "nothing more than a formalisation of 
the learning process". Therefore the epistemological position, detailed within the 
research methodology, should make explicit which part of the learning process is under 
consideration. Garfinkel (1967) deems that social actors utilise models that minimise 
the uncertainty and enhance the predictability of daily life in order to make sense of 
their environment. In terms of Kolb's (1986) learning cycle, which is founded upon 
the notion that all learning needs to be grounded in experience, the individual gains 
experience, reflects upon it, conceptualises that experience and subsequently 
experiments with that conceptualisation of the original encounter to produce further 
experience and so on. Within this dissertation the experiment undertaken in chapter 5 
provides a model of a particular human environment, group decision-making, which is 
then compared against a perception of the reality of group decision-making as 
achieved by the execution of the case study in chapter 6. The product of the research 
is information and consequently knowledge, the derivation of which Rosen (1982) 
defined the `dialectic triad', the notions of thesis, (the originator), antithesis, (the 
refuting counter-thesis) and synthesis, (the unity of thesis and antithesis). An 
idealisation of the research typology consists of three forms: 
" pure research that leads to the development of theories; 
" applied research that answers specified problems; and 
" action research whereby the researcher interacts with the phenomenon in an 
attempt to change and thereby understand it. 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) 
In practice it is unusual to find that any one of the three forms, which contain those 
research strategies contained in table 2.1, is strictly adhered to at the exclusion of the 
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others. Consequently the purpose of research is to provide the order and predictability 
by which to navigate the uncertainty associated with ones environment. 
2.3.2 Positivism and Phenomenology 
The positivist approach to research assumes that the world exists as a set of hard and 
fast rules; something only exists if it can be measured, and assumes that an observer's 
interaction with their environment will not influence the pattern of observed events. 
Conversely the phenomenological approach is that the reality of the world is socially 
constructed and that the observer is indistinguishable from their environment. 
Form of research Requires control Focuses on 
Strategy question over behavioural contemporary 
events? events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how No Yes 
many, 
how much 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how No Yes / No 
many, 
how much 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Table 2.1. Relevant situations for different research strategies (Yin, 1994) 
Therefore by strict definition positivism applies purely deductive reasoning whereas 
phenomenology adopts an inductive approach. However any research may be biased 
towards one approach but is likely to remain a combination of the two. Easterby- 
Smith et al's (1991) comparison of the two approaches is shown in table 2.2. Popper's 
(1982) notion that the comparison of theory with reality and the subsequent assessment 
of the differences between predicted and actual constitute the only source of `realist' 
knowledge is a fundamentally positivist view. 
In essence Popper (1982) states that whilst there may be many instances that uphold a 
theoretical position none will ever be conclusive therefore it is more productive to seek 
the refuting evidence. In essence this is the position that has been adopted by the 
construction management research community; a dominant positivist rationality has 
emerged (Seymour and Rooke, 1995; Root et al 1997). However the failure of the 
rationalist approach to satisfy the needs of the construction research community has 
11 
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led to introduction of social science research methodologies that clearly exhibit a 
phenomenological bias (Root, 2001). 
Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Basic Beliefs: The world is external and objective The world is socially constructed and 
subjective 
Observer is independent Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is value free Science is driven by human interest 
Researcher Should: Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
Look for causality and fundamental Try to understand what is happening 
laws 
Reduce phenomena to simplest Look at the totality of each situation 
elements 
Develop ideas through induction from 
Formulate hypothesis and then test data 
them 
Preferred Methods Operationalising concepts so that Using multiple methods to establish 
Include: they can be measured different views of phenomena 
Small samples investigated in depth over 
Taking large samples time 
able 2.2. Comparison of phenomenological and objectivist positions (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) 
Consequently many researchers have combined these two methodological approaches 
into a pragmatic approach (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). As Runeson (1997) and 
Raftery et al, (1997) have made clear, phenomenology has developed in response to, 
and acknowledges the existence of, the positivist approach that in turn does not 
necessarily acknowledge the position of the other. Consequently when viewed, as in 
Kolb's' (1986) depiction, the learning cycle is viewed as a cyclic and iterative process 
whereby the positivist approach is concerned with the testing of models and the 
phenomenological approach is more concerned with the generation of those models. 
There is a sense that the two approaches deliver information that is different in kind 
(Popper, 1982) however Quine (1992) defines the difference as one of degree as 
opposed to kind. Similarly Easterby-Smith et al (1991) consider the differences 
between the two to be philosophically incompatible. Nonetheless no aspect as the 
learning cycle may be viewed as absolute; each has some form of reliance upon the 
other as depicted by the iterative nature of the cycle. 
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The following discussion in chapter three regarding the nature of risk and uncertainty 
will ground the establishment of `risk' as an inter-subjective realisation and one that 
does not sit easily as either an objective nor subjective phenomenon. Consequently the 
phenomenological approach, whilst acknowledging that social phenomena exist, seeks 
to establish their presence by ascertaining their nature rather than their number, a 
difference founded upon emphasis and not kind (Root, 2001). This research reflects 
the iterative nature of the learning cycle and uses tools borne of both methodological 
positions in a complimentarily manner to establish a more rounded interpretation of the 
phenomena, as advocated by Loosemore & Dainty (1996). 
2.3.3 Deductive and Inductive Reasoning 
The logically derived conclusions of deductive reasoning are considered immutable. 
The top-down approach of deductive reasoning tests the original hypothesis against 
gathered data enabling comparisons between hypothesised reality and actual reality 
that will either confirm or refute the original theory. Accordingly deductive reasoning 
is useful to establish cause and effect and focuses a theory into a testable hypothesis 
(Trochim, 2001; Graham, 2000). Whilst deductive reasoning is logically justifiable, 
inductive reasoning is not. Conversely inductive reasoning is founded in probability 
theory and works from `the small to the large'; it operates on the premise that 
generalisations may be made with regards to the nature of a particular phenomenon 
(Arthur, 2001). 
Consequently inductive reasoning is used to make subjective inferences about ones 
environment generalised from the observers prior experience and is therefore 
susceptible to criticism on the grounds of various well detailed psychological 
phenomenon such as bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a). However these relative 
positions have been established as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive as in 
the discussion surrounding the qualitative and quantitative debate. 
2.3.4 Quantitative versus Qualitative 
Quantitative research compares factual data with theory, `how much? ' and `how 
many? ' questions, whilst qualitative research seeks to determine individual 
conceptions of reality and their interaction with their environment by asking `how? ' 
and `why? ' questions (Walker, 1997). Qualitative research therefore forms the basis 
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for theory building and is often a precursor for quantitative research (Fellows & Liu, 
1997). Contemporary construction management research has benefited from a 
discussion regarding the merits of both of these approaches (Seymour & Rooke, 1998, 
1995; Seymour et al, 1997,1998; Runeson, 1997; Harriss, 1998 and Wing et al, 1998). 
One benefit derived from this debate was the recognition that construction 
management is as much a social process as a technological one and therefore choosing 
one approach whilst discounting the other would be counter productive (Raftery et al, 
1997). Consequently the information generated by the quantitative research reported 
in chapter five informed and gave direction to the qualitative case study reported in 
chapter six. 
2.3.5 Risk Prism 
The risk prism in figure 2.2 is a metaphor that has been designed by the author to 
present the concepts and problems that are considered throughout the thesis. It is 
utilised to illustrate the differences between the problematic philosophical concepts 
regarding the objectivity and subjectivity of risk. Consequently the prism is used to 
represent these conflicting views of risk as afforded by risk management processes and 
individual decision makers respectively. 
HIGH 
RISK RISK PRISM 
HIGH 
RISK 
4 
DESIRED RISK PERCEPTION 
FROM ORGANISATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
LOW - LOW 
RISK RISK 
Figure 2.2. Risk prism 
The depiction of risk to the left of the prism is not intended to convey a definite and 
objective notion with regards to the `reality' of that risk. The risk has to be depicted if 
the metaphor is to function, and can only be shown in a fixed position within the two 
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dimensional figure. Consequently its position within the figure is a compromise that 
allows the metaphor to function. 
2.4 Literature Review 
Published literature constitutes the most accessible font of peer-reviewed knowledge 
from which to start any investigation; the research question in this instance was 
distilled from an initial literature review. The critical review of literature was 
concerned with the topic of risk, uncertainty and risk management from which 
omissions in existing knowledge were identified from literature reporting a specific 
perceived lack of understanding regarding the role and influence of the individual 
within risk management. The literature review commenced by reviewing the literature 
within the construction management discipline but quickly extended beyond that into 
the disciplines of social science and psychology. 
As the body of literature available was unlikely to be anything other than voluminous a 
keyword list was compiled to limit the number of search items. This list was never 
considered finite or in any way complete, but was constantly updated and reviewed by 
adding and removing items as new literature highlighted concepts and theories that 
might have been applicable. In this manner the literature remained manageable 
ensuring that the review did not ramble or meander too far from the topic area. The 
critical review of literature contributed in three respects to the research: 
" it allowed gaps in contemporary knowledge to be identified; 
" it ensured that the most current `thinking' and theories were considered and 
included within the research; and 
" it went some way to ensure that the research was not a duplication of previous 
work. 
Consequently the review theoretically satisfied the requirements of research objective 
01. The validity of this position with regards to objective 01 is reliant upon having 
conducted a thorough survey and review of the most current literature, as a literature 
review is inherently historical. However it allows the most current published, peer 
reviewed thinking to be ascertained, and therefore conveys the recognised current 
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position of the construction industries approach to risk and project management. The 
review therefore validated the principal aim Al of the research. The theoretical 
background established by the review allowed the remaining objective 02 to be 
fulfilled. 
The literature review identified the risky-shift theory that predicts groups will be 
happier to live with greater uncertainty than the individual group members, and 
identified a number of causal group mechanisms responsible for the change in 
individual preferences. However the phenomenon had never been established in 
professional decision-making groups whose members had a prior occupational 
acquaintance, for example members of the same construction organisation, team or 
project. 
2.5 Experimental Design 
The identification of an industrial collaborator and the method of pilot testing the 
research instrument, implementation and subsequent analysis of the instrument are 
detailed in chapter 5. The Wallach et al (1962) CDQ, the tool originally used to 
identify the risky shift phenomenon, was implemented in this research to test the 
premise of objective 02 in construction management decision-making groups. The 
subsequent identification of the risky shift within the professional decision-making 
group and confirmation of its validity contributed the following to the research: 
a) this was the first instance that the phenomenon had been identified as active 
within construction management decision-making groups; and secondly 
b) the findings concluded that construction management professionals could be 
influenced to alter their decision preferences. 
Therefore practicing professional construction management groups were highlighted as 
a source of contemporary phenomenological data with regards to the causal influential 
mechanisms. 
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2.6 Case Study Design 
The case study is concerned with ascertaining the dynamics of the individual and 
group deliberation processes. The method of case study execution is detailed in 
chapter 6 therefore this section will restrict its self to a discussion of the rationale 
behind the design of the case study methodology. Yin's (1994) case study definition 
encompasses one of the primary benefits of case study research over experimental 
design in that the study investigates "a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context". Accordingly case study research has many benefits that are difficult to 
incorporate into experimental design such as: 
" individual's do not feel constrained by observers and are therefore able to react 
and display emotional responses that are not outside that normally experienced; 
and 
" the studies allow the causal links between true to life interactions to be 
identified (Yin, 1994). 
Conversely an experiment: 
" purposefully removes a phenomenon from its naturally occurring environment 
to focus upon a restricted number of variables that may be controlled (Yin, 
1994); 
" may constrain individuals to exhibit behaviour that reflects their perception of 
what the experimenter may expect, desire or require in terms of answers and 
responses; consequently 
" individuals may be under the impression that there are correct and incorrect 
answers, and answer accordingly. 
However Gummesson (2000) highlights three criticisms often levelled at case study 
research; these are: 
" they lack statistical reliability and validity; 
" they may generate rather than test hypothesis; and 
" they cannot be generalised. 
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These criticisms whilst valid are applicable more to the misuse of case study research 
consequently the first two can be addressed in this instance by examining the purposes 
of this case study research. The study would allow observation of the contemporary 
events within the training workshop whereby a new approach to risk management was 
being introduced. Therefore the intention of the case study was two-fold; firstly to 
develop the findings of the literature and experimentation that contributed to the 
development of aim Al and objective 02. The second intention was to identify the 
causal mechanisms and impact of group influence and to provide support to the 
epistemological grounds of the principal aim Al and objective 02 of this research 
from which a theory may be derived. A three-stage case study methodology was 
developed to achieve this, figure 2.3. Yin (1994) addresses the final, criticism that 
case studies cannot be generalised, by asserting that the conclusions should be 
generalised to theory rather than between studies. 
Stage 
Stage A 
Stage B 
Stage C 
Element 
Pre-Workshop 
Workshop 
Post-Workshop 
Intention 
Establish organisational 
objectives and attendee pre- 
conceptions 
Observe how organisational 
obejectives are comunicated 
and understood by attendees 
Comparison of desired 
organisational perspective with 
actual employee interpretation 
of training objectives 
Figure 2.3. Three-stage case study methodology 
The methodology was broken down further into seven procedures (see figure 2.4) that 
would facilitate data collection. The seven procedures were designed to ascertain the 
organisational objectives, process of organisational communication, employee 
interpretation of the organisations communication and the transposition of the 
organisations objectives into working practices by the employees. Whilst some of the 
seven procedures could be executed concurrently some were logically dependant upon 
others. For example employees had to be interviewed to ascertain their understanding 
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of the organisations proposed risk management strategy prior to their attendance at the 
workshop. 
The solid lines between the stages of the case study in figure 2.4 denote the logical 
flow of the investigation whereas the interrupted lines between stages denote the 
process of data comparison, contained within procedure D1. Table 2.3 shows the 
stages of the case study, the procedures, the timing of their execution with regards to 
the workshops and the resultant data that was collected. 
Organisational 
Objective 
'Ascertain explicit' 
aims of workshop/ 
training programme 
Al 
Establish 
Analysis of hard \/ organisational 
content of 1_ [strategy for promoting 
programme; Jl concept of Total Risk 
paperwork /\ Management. 
A2 
ý: ý_ 
RN. 
_-. 
Current Employee 
Perception No 
\\ ' ý/- 
// \ 
\\ \\ 
\ //\- S. 
\\ ý/ \ 
ý// \ 
`\ý\\ 
-00- 
Workshop - Adopt a 
non-participant data 
collection approach. 
Figure 2.4. Schematic of case study methodology 
na 
Analsysis and ' 
compsariosn of data 
D1 
2.6.1 Interviews 
Interviews in this instance are deemed to have occurred where the researcher and one 
other discussed issues relating to the research objectives with the intention of eliciting 
information from the interviewee. There are possibly two main categories of 
interview, the informal interview that may be conducted as opportunity permits or the 
formal, pre-arranged interview (Gummesson, 2000). Informal interviews demand a 
more probing, spontaneous and unstructured technique governed by the situation rather 
than by the topic of interest (Gummesson, 2000). Within these two categories fall the 
interviewing techniques defined by Fellows & Liu (1997) as: 
" structured; 
" semi-structured; and 
" unstructured interviews. 
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Formal interviews tend mostly to be structured and follow a pre-determined and 
structured course of questioning and will not deviate from the prepared questions. 
Item Method Data Gathered 
A Pre-Workshop 
Al Ascertain explicit aims of workshop/training Historical information relating to the 
programme via interviews with designers of purpose and rationale behind TRM. 
programme. 
A2 Analysis of hard content of programme; Contemporary data used to 
paperwork - how is it being sold/marketed etc. communicate desired organisational 
perspective. 
A3 Establish organisational strategy for promoting Historical and contemporary data from 
concept of Total Risk Management (TRM). semi-structured interviews and 
published articles etc. 
A4 Determine what attendees expect of the training Pre- workshop semi-structured 
programme. interviews by telephone or in person to 
establish attendees' pre conceptions. 
B Workshop 
B1 Adopt a non-participant approach. Audio recordings of group 
conversations over the duration of the 
training programme. 
C Post workshop 
Cl Establish attendees perceived outcomes of Post-workshop semi-structured 
programme. interviews. 
D Analysis 
D1 Analysis and comparison of data. Adopt an emergent approach as 
opposed to content analysis of training 
programme. 
Table 2.3. Constituents of the proposed case study methodology 
Similarly they may be semi-structured and follow a defined course of questioning but 
one that is not prescriptive and allows deviation from the defined path to allow 
exploration of areas of interest that may be highlighted by the interviewee. All three 
interviewing techniques may include recorded audio recording that allow a more 
complete transcription and further analysis at a later date however in isolation this 
method does not capture symbolic information such as that conveyed by body 
language (Gummesson, 2000). Therefore written notes should also be kept to 
supplement the audio recordings. 
In this instance where formal interviews were arranged they followed a semi structured 
interviewing technique, with audio recordings on mini-disk combined with written 
notes. Some interviews were informal and held over the telephone; these followed a 
semi structured approach and were recorded, again on mini-disk, with the permission 
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of the interviewee. All interviews were subsequently transcribed for purposes of 
analysis. 
Steele (2000) highlights several strengths and weaknesses associated with interviews 
as detailed in table 2.4. In response to these issues the interview questions were 
founded in the research aims and objectives, but were not prescriptive or suggestive in 
their composition. Finally whilst no formal training in interview techniques was 
undertaken, texts such as Brenner et al (1985) and Gummesson (2000) were consulted 
to establish good interviewing technique. 
2.6.2 Discourse Analysis 
The primary intention of the discourse analysis was to establish how the group 
members interpreted the message being communicated and how they arrived at a 
shared group understanding of that message. To accomplish this discourse analysis 
combined with conversation analysis of the transcribed conversations was undertaken, 
as the two approaches independently would not show the whole picture. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Interviews allow both parties to explore the The interviewer must train in order to achieve 
meaning of the questions and answers involved. adequate results. This means that the investment 
In this way the responses can be negotiated. of time into the design of i) a suitable questioning 
structure; ii) an effective interviewing technique; 
and iii) a data collection programme (as they 
apply to the interview). 
Any misunderstanding on the part of the Owing to the fact that there is face-to-face contact 
interviewer or interviewee can be checked between interviewer and respondent, there is an 
immediately in a way that is not possible with opportunity for bias to occur. 
questionnaires or tests. 
Interviews facilitate rapid (immediate) response. Verbal data, by virtue of its quality and varying 
This gives directness to this method of degrees of structure, are particularly susceptible to 
information gathering. error in interpretation. 
Table 2.4. Strengths and weaknesses of interviewing (Steele, 2000) 
The two approaches provided the following data: 
" Conversation Analysis discloses the structure of the discussion between the 
group members. The practice also provides an accepted transcription 
procedure and notation glossary. 
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" Discourse Analysis allows the process of understanding to be highlighted and 
discussed. This was important in highlighting how the group members 
established a position with regards to the problem at hand. 
Conversation analysis (CA) was developed by Harvey Sacks (c1964) in response to a 
request made by a medical institution for help in soliciting the names of callers to a 
counselling service (Sacks, 1992). CA has developed into a systematic social 
hermeneutic study and analysis of naturally occurring conversation, `talk-in- 
interaction', the purpose of which is to understand the tacit, organised reasoning 
procedures inherent in how individuals understand one another (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998; Have, 1999). The methodology of CA is qualitative in nature and shies away 
from the contents analysis of the frequentist approach in order to ground theories in 
naturally occurring behaviours as exhibited by participants talk-in-interaction (Markee, 
2000). Therefore the methodological foundation of CA has been described by 
Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998) as: 
" talk -in-interaction is systematically organised and deeply ordered; 
" the production of talk-in-interaction is methodic; 
" the analysis of talk-in-interaction should be based on naturally occurring data; 
and 
" analysis should not initially be constrained by prior theoretical assumptions. 
From an ethnomethodological perspective society and cultures are constructed by a 
collection of communications (Littlejohn, 1992). Consequently CA attempts to 
identify the sequential organisation inherent in conversations that lead to a shared 
understanding of the environment (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Littlejohn, 1992). This 
view underpins CA's rejection of the functionalist perspective and is more akin to 
Garfinkel's (1967) view that individuals are sufficiently cognisant and rational to 
account for their own actions. Therefore, whilst society may communicate desired 
values these are not simply accepted and internalised to be replicated in perpetuity. 
Rather they are established through inter-subjective agreement between individuals 
whose collectivisation of values establishes cultures and norms of behaviour. 
Therefore CA is an ideal method to ascertain how the transposition of communicated 
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organisational `values' are understood, internalised and implemented, in this instance 
by construction management professionals. 
Whilst the method of data collection and analysis are discussed in chapter 6 there are 
several methodological considerations that must be considered when utilising this 
manner of information elicitation for the purposes of constructing theory. Firstly the 
talk-in-interaction data must have occurred naturally and not in response to an 
artificially structured investigation such as an interview (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; 
Have, 1999). In this instance the data was collected using mini-disk audio recorders, 
placed as unobtrusively as was practicable, within the two group discussion rooms. 
The researcher was introduced to the assembled attendees who were informed of the 
purpose but not the objectives of the research, subsequently permission was obtained 
from the attendees to make audio recordings of the conversations. However as the 
groups were aware that their conversations and deliberation processes were being 
recorded the validity or purity of the recorded data may have been compromised 
because of one or a combination of the following: 
" the group members may not have appreciated the confidentiality of the 
recorded material; 
" they may have perceived that the researcher was looking to identify a 
preconceived correct answer; 
" failure to provide this correct answer may make them look foolish; and 
" their inability to provide the correct answer may be reported to their employer 
(confidentiality issue) and result in some form of punitive response. 
The aggregation of these factors implies that there is a possibility that the discussions 
and responses may not have been as forthcoming as they may otherwise have been in 
order to avoid the ramifications detailed above. As it is necessary to obtain permission 
from participants before recording conversations these criticisms are unavoidable and 
such considerations must be levelled at similar methods of data collection. Also the 
groups presented the findings and conclusions of their discussions to their peers 
directly after their group discussions. Therefore whilst the presence of recording 
equipment may have influenced their discussions, the `threat' of peer review arguably 
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provided sufficient motivation. Similarly the group participants were not asked to 
provide any additional explanations or to comment upon the originally recorded text as 
self-report data may reconstruct and reinterpret original behaviour as opposed to 
explain it (Markee, 2000). 
Secondly whilst it is imperative that the research findings communicate the 
participants rather than conversation analyst's perspective relative to the phenomenon 
the recorded material may still be subjectively and intuitively explained by the analyst 
(Markee, 2000). This difficulty may be overcome by adopting the following two 
methods: 
" provide data samples together with the analysis for the reader to `judge' for 
authenticity; and 
" provide a triangulation of data sources together with counterexamples in order 
to facilitate replication of the study by other analysts (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998; Markee, 2000). 
In this instance two sources of data were considered sufficient (Fellows & Liu, 1997) 
to provide a triangulation (sic) of sources; transcriptions of audio recordings together 
with their analysis and `hard' copies of presentation materials produced by the groups 
concurrent with their discussions. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the rationale behind the design of the implemented research 
methodology. The conclusions drawn from this research are to be distilled into a 
theory that will inevitably be limited because of the following two factors: 
" the data was solely collected from a single organisation; and 
" the observed sample size was small in relation to the construction industry 
employment total. 
However in essence the case study research constitutes a pilot study to ascertain the 
validity of initial proposition contained within aim Al and to identify the options for 
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proliferating the identified manipulation effect as included within objective 03. 
Consequently the theory derived from this research will inform the subsequent 
investigations that will endeavour to replicate and generalise from the work started 
here. To that end the conclusions and recommendations will reflect the need for 
further, wider ranging, research to establish the validity of the theory and conclusions 
contained herein. The nature and execution of this methodology has allowed 
conclusions and recommendations to be reported in this thesis that are both verifiable 
and replicable. 
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3 Management of Uncertainty 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the philosophy of risk and risk taking behaviour, complexity, and 
the types and nature of uncertainty. Their cumulative impact upon decision-makers is 
investigated together with how information is used to minimise this impact. The 
structured risk management processes used to model the decision/problem 
environment are then examined in light of their objectivity. 
The literature review will show that there is a body of knowledge that recognises the 
impact of personal experience, the use of judgemental heuristics, leadership influence, 
problem familiarity, culture and motivation upon individual risk preference. However 
many risk management processes seek to objectify risk by providing structure to the 
process. This structure encourages the use of such processes by organisations at both a 
project and strategic level and engenders the notion that the resultant outputs of such 
processes are definitive and certain. It is proposed that organisations view the 
structure of the process as a buffer that normalises the differing perceptions and 
preferences of risk management professionals around a desired organisational 
perspective, expressed within the bespoke nature of the structured risk management 
process. However this research shows that the processes fail to achieve this and 
instead offers a different process for the normalisation of group and individual 
perceptions and preferences, in chapter 7. 
3.2 Defining Uncertainty 
Within the scope of this review uncertainty can be considered to have two separate 
interpretations derived from the same definition. The chosen `generic' definition of 
uncertainty is the one provided by the Collins English Dictionary (1995), which 
defines the term `uncertain' as "not able to be accurately known; liable to variation, 
changeable". The first interpretation states that uncertainty is only concerned with our 
prediction of future events, which is a concern of risk management. The second is 
uncertainty of a subjective nature, a state of mind, which relates to a lack of 
understanding relating to a particular system or event (Cohen & Christensen, 1970), 
which is an issue that risk management processes also attempt to address. Similarly 
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Edwards & Bowen (1999) treat uncertainty as a personal and therefore subjective 
response to a situation that is lacking clarification, information; lacking predictability 
and understanding and thereby inducing doubt. 
Within the scope of risk management uncertainty is usually regarded in terms of the 
doubt associated with predicting the occurrence of the multiple possible ramifications 
of a decision (Smith, 1999). Uncertainty may therefore be associated with the 
unpredictable nature or possibility of realising one of a set of future possible states. In 
this instance uncertainty carries a descriptive, taxonomic aspect (Rowe, 1977) 
uncertainty as to what a `thing' actually is, how to label it and to discern its' function, 
purpose and other attributes. An understanding of the how, why and when of the 
`thing' is necessary before a prediction can be made as to its' possible future 
movements. This is a definition that is intrinsically risk management and one that 
provides a basis for the analysis, evaluation and control of uncertainty (Baker et al, 
1999). In order to reduce the descriptive uncertainty, attempts can be made to learn 
more about the underlying processes that govern that system; i. e. the sources of 
information that act as a basis for decision making, and the mechanism by which 
decisions are made. By establishing these governing factors, measurement criteria can 
be established. 
Christensen (1979) deems uncertainty to be intrinsic in an individuals inability or 
failure to accurately predict the reaction of our environment to our interaction with it, 
implying that there is nothing unpredictable about the world only our comprehension 
of it. Nonetheless the effect of uncertainty depends upon the individual's estimate of 
their own skill at the task at hand and their estimate of chance affecting the outcome 
(Bell, 1979). However there are many chaos theorists who will argue that an 
individual's environment is the archetypal irregular and dynamic system (Lorenz, 
1960). Consequently to minimise the uncertainty associated with any system or event 
information is required to clarify the state of the system at any one time. 
3.3 Defining Risk 
Popper (1982) describes an indeterministic world by using the analogy of rolls of film, 
the stills from which show possible future states and `interactions' yet to be completed. 
The sensitivity of indeterministic systems such as construction projects to initial 
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conditions implies that observations further into the future on any chosen roll of film 
will have greater discrepancy between predicted and actual futures, consequently the 
closer the view to the present the more accurate will be the prediction. The prediction 
of future events is in essence risk management and the perceived uncertainty 
associated with achieving that future state is the concept of risk. 
March & Shapira (1992) note that there are two different connotations to risk, the first 
revolves around the notion that a decision outcome may be other than was intended. 
The second centres on the level of certainty of achieving any one, or a combination, of 
those identified possible future states. All attempts to define and agree upon an 
acceptable generic definition of risk have proven to be a fruitless exercise (Doderlein, 
1987). Professionals who are charged with managing a risk management process treat 
risk as an objective reality the nature of which may be quantifiably defined. To non- 
professionals risk is the term adopted in everyday life to describe a future state whose 
certainty of outcome is not known but is perceived by the decision maker to be non- 
beneficial (Beck, 1986). 
3.3.1 Risk as Loss or Gain 
In everyday language and in professional risk lexicons it is the realisation that a 
situation may induce `harm' that inspires the recognition of risk in association with a 
hazard. Beck (1986) suggests that risk is the philosophy concerned with systematically 
understanding and managing the nature of harm or loss associated with a hazard. 
Edwards & Bowen (1999) define risk as " the probability that an adverse event occurs 
during a stated period of time". Similarly Chicken & Posner (1998); the Royal Society 
(1991; 1983); Cooper & Chapman, (1987) and Beck (1986) are in agreement that for 
risk to exist there must be some exposure to probable financial or physical loss. 
Jackson & Dutton (1988) concluded that individuals were more inclined to 
acknowledge threats than opportunities, however their research may have identified the 
organisational response to threats and opportunities by asking questions relating 
specifically to occupational issues. 
There is however a growing trend within risk management for the inclusion of 
opportunity, expressed as the probable exposure to either physical or financial gain, to 
be included within the remit of risk management (Hillson, 2001; Kahkonen, 2001; 
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Cooper & Chapman, 1987). The notion of beneficial aspects of risk revolves around 
the scientific objective view that risk is a measure of uncertainty associated with one of 
an identified set of future states. This view is in contrast to the present cognitive 
approach that defines risk as the term most apt to describe the cognitive processes 
underlying decision-making relative to a perceived non-beneficial decision outcome 
without regard for any opportunity or benefit that may arise (Glendon, 1987). 
3.3.2 Probability and Risk 
The Royal Society (1991; 1983) defines risk statistically as the probability that an 
adverse event will occur within a certain time frame. The probabilistic quantification 
of risk is reflected in BS4778,1991 Part 3 that defines risk as a "combination of the 
probability, or frequency, of the occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of 
the consequences of the loss". Chicken & Posner (1998) define risk in terms of the 
outcome of a hazard multiplied by exposure to the hazard. These probabilistic 
frequentist interpretations seek to establish risk as an objective reality the substance of 
which is contained within the level of potential loss and perceived exposure to the loss- 
incurring hazard. The assessment of both these variables is included within the risk 
assessment stage, but forms only one part of, the risk management process. 
Nonetheless the quantification techniques used to predict the likelihood of occurrence 
and potential impact are often thought to objectify the assessment and eliminate the 
subjective elements of the process (Kasper, 1980). This objective view of risk is 
expressed in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Objectivity of risk 
29 
Chapter 3 Management of Uncertainty 
The risk is deemed to `exist' as a definite article and subsequently an individuals' 
perception is also supposed to reflect this objectivity. This view of risk and 
uncertainty is reflected in the risk management processes used by many organisations 
that utilise frequentist probabilistic interpretation of the decision domain. The 
respective probabilities of occurrence are founded upon individual intuitive derivation 
yet viewed as objective as they are an output of an objective and structured process. 
As a consequence the risk management processes become a mechanism to control the 
individuals' view of their environment that removes the subjectivity inherent in their 
decision-making that is prevalent outside of the process. However chapter 6 will 
illustrate the subjective nature of the risk assessment process in construction project 
management. 
As great emphasis and reliance is placed upon the frequentist probabilistic 
interpretation of the decision domain by the risk management process it is necessary to 
consider the nature of frequentist probability theory. The following discussion will 
show that there are primarily two fundamental problems when using probability theory 
for risk management purposes. Firstly individual decision makers do not understand 
the nature of frequentist probability theory and secondly the theory is founded upon 
mathematic determinism and not real world indeterministic environments. 
Individuals, including professionals with higher degrees (Bruine et al, 2000), 
misrepresent probability and rarely if ever consider probabilistic interpretations of 
events as such, similarly: 
"independent events may be treated as related, preferences may be expressed where 
there is no mathematical justification, and concepts like hope, pessimism, or 
fairness may intrude" (Bell, 1979). 
A probability can be defined as "a measure of the degree of confidence one may have 
in the occurrence of an event" (Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1995). Two of the 
fundamental axioms of probabilistic calculation state that probabilities are expressed as 
values >0 and <1 and that the sum of the probabilities associated with the variables 
should sum to unity. Consequently to calculate a probability an exhaustive list of 
variables, which Shackle (1969) defines as `distributional uncertainties', must be 
30 
Chapter 3 Management of Uncertainty 
constructed. These are generally obtained from a sample population within which the 
variables are believed to be distributed in a random fashion. A sample is chosen at 
random and tested, the results from which are used to predict the relative frequency of 
the event, but without stating exactly on which of the next one hundred occasions it 
will occur. Therefore fulfilment of any statistical prediction is contributable to co- 
incidence (Hansel, 1979). 
Any objective probabilistic quantification of risk must be based upon observed and 
recorded historical events of a similar nature to the ones identified as possible future 
outcomes of the present decision option. Whilst it would be pedantic to insist that the 
inimitable nature of human affairs renders historical comparisons to be specious there 
must be a close resemblance between the historical and the potential future states. 
However the more precisely an event is defined the fewer the recorded occurrences of 
similar events will be and hence any estimate of frequency placed upon it will be 
increasingly unreliable (Cohen, 1979). To truly predict a hazard in probabilistic terms 
an all-encompassing, holistic view is required of the decision domain in which the 
event is due to take place. This is possible in a mathematical phase space where 
probabilities are bounded philosophically and restraints such as system stability and 
determinism can be inferred. However this is not a practicable assumption in any real 
world dynamic environment where events are non-deterministic and uncertain and 
where an exhaustive list of variables cannot be identified. To illustrate this argument 
Singleton & Hovden (1987) have stated that the probability associated with any given 
situation changes as new information comes to light and acknowledge that there are 
very few instances where the extent of the information available to a decision-maker is 
ever complete. However Shackle (1969) states that when probability is founded upon 
knowledge and is deemed to be objective there could be no uncertainty as knowledge 
and uncertainty are mutually exclusive: 
"When we are discussing uncertainty we cannot qualify or specify its degrees by a 
variable whose values are knowledge of the kind which answers the question about 
which we are uncertain. This is fundamental" (Shackle, 1969). 
Shackle is implying that when there is knowledge there is no uncertainty, however 
probabilities never express certainty in any real world situation because the relevant 
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information is never wholly accessible or `knowable'. The frequentist interpretation of 
probability does not allow subjective experiential knowledge to figure in probabilistic 
calculation. However the determination of subjective probabilities is based upon 
experience, the sum of the information available, analogy and symmetry of present 
events to those of the past (Spjotvoll, 1987). 
Bruine et al (2000) state that it is often impossible to choose a precise probability for 
unfamiliar risks. However individuals who are required to do so often make 
statements for which they lack supportive evidence. Therefore calculated probabilities 
based upon observed relative frequencies of phenomena outside of controlled 
environments are liable to be incomplete whether through ignorance or error. 
Consequently probability theory applied in real world dynamic environments 
constitutes a possibilistic approximation of what is to occur without true certainty. 
Adams (1995) is of the opinion that precise quantification of uncertainty is an 
unattainable goal and that more could be done to manage uncertainty if the emphasis is 
shifted from probabilistic quantification to possibility for guidance. Consequently the 
use of probabilistic interpretation in project risk management has recently been 
criticised by Al Jaafari (2001). 
3.3.3 Expressions of Confidence 
A great deal of reliance is placed upon a frequentist probabilistic approach to risk 
assessment, which has had its failings outlined in the previous discussion. Another 
criticism that may be levied against the use of subjectively derived probabilities resides 
in their derivation. 
Probabilities are numerical expressions of the confidence that any given prediction will 
be either correct or incorrect, for this reason a 50/50, or 50% expression of confidence 
is meaningless. However Bruine et al (2000) have shown that even professionals with 
advanced degrees use 50/50 expressions when answering questions in their own field 
of expertise. The authors reconcile this inconsistency by differentiating between 
singular responses, which relate to a specific individual event or occurrence, and 
distributional responses that relate to a broad spectrum of instances, but which relate to 
the same classification of event. Kahneman & Tversky, (1982b) concluded that 
individuals place too much reliance upon the veracity of singular information; 
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consequently too little importance is placed upon distributional information. Decision 
makers often rely upon singular information of the most salient or memorable instance 
of the event. The saliency of those events encourages the individual to consider only 
that instance and not the overall class of events to which it belongs. Ultimately this 
will lead to a conflict with the objective perspective of the structured risk management 
process as prospectively greater, or lesser, possibilities of occurrence will be identified 
that will be greater than is warranted based upon the available distributional data. 
The popularity of numerical expressions of uncertainty is understandable considering 
the `precise' and normative nature of numerical expression. Group members can place 
their perceptions upon an ordinal scale allowing comparison of `predictions' and 
enabling communication from the same `base line' to be undertaken. However there is 
a danger that numerical quantification, especially where used to arrive at an inter- 
subjective interpretation of reality, may exacerbate the sense of certainty inherent in 
the structured process where there is none. 
The preceding discussion highlights the uncertainty inherent in probabilistic prediction 
of risk; the following discussion will highlight how many scholars maintain a 
distinction between uncertainty and risk. 
3.3.4 Uncertainty and Risk 
The two schools of thought with regards to uncertainty and risk attempt to either 
divorce one from the other or to assimilate the two. Tversky & Fox (1995) 
characterise risk under the umbrella of uncertainty as a known probability distribution 
at one end of a knowledge scale whilst ignorance resides at the opposite end where 
"decision-makers are unable to quantify their uncertainty". Arguably ignorance is 
expressed by 50/50 propositions indicating that the decision maker effectively has no 
knowledge of the decision environment. Smith (1999) defines risk as a decision 
expressed by a range of possible outcomes with attached probabilities and uncertainty 
as a state where there are ranges of possible outcomes but no assumed probabilities. 
Pender (2001) distinguishes between risk as the form of incomplete knowledge where 
the future can be predicted through the laws of chance, and uncertainty where the 
probability of future outcomes cannot be constructed. Seale et al (1995) whilst 
defining risk and uncertainty independently of one another acknowledge that there are 
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very few situations where "true uncertainty", or ignorance (Tversky and Fox, 1995), 
reside. Smith (1999), Seale et al (1995) and Pender (2001) assume that there is 
something definite and certain about any probabilistic interpretation or prediction. 
Dichotomously Hertz & Thomas (1984) have suggested that: 
".. risk means uncertainty and the results of uncertainty.. risk refers to a lack 
of predictability about problem structure, outcomes or consequences in a 
decision or planning situation". 
Similarly Niehans' (1959) position is that when there is more than one possible future 
state there is uncertainty. Further Gunning (1999) claims that any attempt to 
distinguish risk from uncertainty will be spurious. Risk and uncertainty would 
therefore appear to be irreducible. Consequently any discussion regarding risk must 
address the consequence of the decision maker's intuitive reaction to the subjective 
and environmental uncertainty upon the decision-making process. 
3.3.5 The Wicked Problem 
Rarely is a decision maker in a position whereby they have all the information they 
require when considering any decision environment. For any system that exhibits 
irregular characteristics, prior observation will not provide pertinent information with 
regard to its nature as it currently stands. The sum of the data/information available 
will be insufficient to allow an absolute description of that system. Therefore being 
uncertain means being in an unsure state of mind arising from this incomplete 
definition/description. To be uncertain one must be in a state where information is 
lacking, information that would allow one to accurately `know', describe and measure 
the degrees of freedom of a system and allow the prediction of any variation or change. 
Consequently the ramifications of any decision may not be immediately obvious to the 
decision-maker. 
The implications of having to make decisions in this type of project environment 
combined with the need to compromise reflect the nature of the wicked problem as 
defined by Rittel & Webber (1973), a problem for which the answers are not true or 
false only good or bad. This premise of the wicked problem is founded entirely in the 
notion that due to the reciprocal nature and ramifications of any one decision, 
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consensus is unlikely to be achieved with regards to the choice of decision alternatives 
amongst stakeholders. The concept of the wicked problem arises with open systems 
where the solution to the immediate problem will have ramifications for those 
operations linked with that solution via the project organisation and complicated by the 
relationships of the project processes and systems (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
Accordingly it may not always be possible to identify one future state that satisfies all 
parties to the decision realm. Consequently any prediction of the ramifications of a 
decision must consider the bias inherent in individual and group contribution to the 
process. 
3.3.6 Possibility and Risk 
Managing project risk implies the management of uncertainty and by definition where 
there is uncertainty there is a lack of information and knowledge. The decision-maker 
can reduce the uncertainty by controlling the problem environment and restricting the 
given situational variables by using judgemental inference and assumption (Edwards & 
Bowen, 1999). The decision maker's experiential knowledge and expectations, which 
may be expressed as possibilities as opposed to probabilities, will influence their 
perception of the problem domain and will dictate the form the assumptions take. 
The notion of the possible in terms of risk management has two important attributes. 
Firstly what is possible lays the foundations for quantifying the probable allowing 
experience to play a role in the determination and expression of the possible (Spjotvoll, 
1987; Cane & Goldblatt, 1979). However utilising experiential knowledge ".. is a long 
way from the kind of situation in which a frequency probability may be calculated" 
(Christensen, 1979). Secondly the notion of the possible fills the void left by the 
approximation of what is probable (Galtung, 1979). Shackle's (1969) concept of 
`potential surprise' reconciles the apparent contradiction in this seemingly 
(economically) irrational `gambling' behaviour. The individual may not be surprised 
should they not win the lottery but a little more surprised if they were to win. The 
degree of surprise experienced at either outcome is a true measure of the initial belief 
in the original propositions, "zero potential surprise expresses zero disbelief (Shackle, 
1969)". 
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Potential surprise allows individuals to attach equal weightings to more than one 
identified future outcome that cannot be achieved using probabilities. For example an 
individual who would feel no surprise if any one of four possible future states were 
achieved would have to attach equal probabilistic weightings of 25% to each which 
may not reflect the possibility that they feels is warranted. However, when expressed 
as a possibility the individual may consider that each of the four has a 90% 
potentiality, the measure of possibility becomes non-distributional, which 
distributional probability cannot express. Similarly when dealing with individual 
levels of aspiration for goal achievement and motivation, many possible future states 
may be identified which cannot be expressed probabilistically (March & Shapira, 
1992). 
In summary, risk is irreducible from uncertainty. Furthermore it is normally the 
detrimental effects of uncertainty that lead to the identification of risk. Expressions of 
probability are often found to be illogical which implies that most expressions are 
based on the notion of the possible as opposed to the probable. The concept of 
potential surprise is ignored by current risk management processes but offers an insight 
into the mechanisms at work in the subjective conceptualisation of likelihood in 
decision-making under uncertainty. Similarly the weaknesses of the frequentist 
approaches to the interpretation of uncertainty have been discussed and highlighted the 
need for a more reliable measure of uncertainty for risk management processes. 
Consequently the risk management process proposed in chapter 7 proposes the use of 
possibilities as opposed to probabilities as the measure by which certainty may be 
expressed. 
3.4 Risk-Taking Behaviour 
Individual and organisational risk-taking behaviour encompasses the deliberation 
processes that exhibit their risk acceptability. At one moment this acceptance may 
exhibit averse and the next acceptance behaviour (Isaac & James, 2000). This may be 
in part because what is deemed acceptable to the individual and organisation is often 
only defined after deliberation and comparison of their actual status with that which is 
desired (Rasmussen, 1987). Therefore risk-taking behaviour may be considered as 
behaviour relative to the achievement of specific objectives whether they are the 
attainment of beneficial goals or the avoidance of hazards. Consequently organisations 
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utilise structured risk management processes to achieve organisational objectives 
whilst individuals utilise unstructured cognitive processes to achieve desirable 
outcomes. 
T 
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Figure 3.2. Subjective perception of risk 
Figure 3.2 shows how the subjective perception of risk differs between individuals. 
The risk prism contains those individual attributes such as risk propensity, experience, 
problem familiarity and intuition. These individual attributes interact and influence the 
uncertain decision maker to produce a subjective interpretation of the decision domain. 
This subjective estimation may not be comparable, and may conflict with an 
organisations view of the hazard or opportunity as dictated by the objectivity proposed 
by the organisations structured risk management processes. Risk A' and B' are the 
independent perspectives of two different individuals. They are measured against 
subjective scales relative to the individual as either high or low risk. They are valued 
by gauging the possibility of occurrence against the desirability of the potential 
outcome; their relationship is evidenced as risk taking behaviour. 
Weber and Milliman (1997) define risk-taking as decisions for which skill and 
information are assumed to reduce uncertainty and influence outcomes. Many of the 
previously quoted definitions of risk apply equally to risk-taking behaviour 
highlighting the consequential relationship between behaviour and risk; see March & 
Shapira (1992); Glendon (1987) and Beck, (1986). 
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There are three constituents of risk-taking behaviour commonly referred to as risk 
perception, propensity and preference (Vlek and Stallen, 1980). A fourth term, 
`acceptance', is subsumed within risk preference as they describe the same end state 
i. e. what is acceptable is reflected in the individuals preference. Sitkin & Pablo (1992) 
and Sitkin & Weingart (1995) view both risk propensity and perception as filters 
through which situational determinants are viewed, shown in figure 4.1. Although risk 
preference is omitted from figure 3.2 `risky decision-making behaviour' could be 
considered an individuals risk preference. 
3.4.1 Risk Perception 
Perception involves inferring the structure and nature of the environment from specific 
stimuli (Chater & Oaksford, 2001). Glendon (1987) believes that experience with 
uncertainty can alter ones perception and ultimately reaction to it as expressed by 
Kolb's (1986) learning cycle. Therefore perception of risk can be considered as 
having three differing attributes; firstly there are the situational specific phenomena 
that incline an individuals perception to change as the decision domain alters as 
communicated by external sources (Sitkin, 1992). Secondly there are those same 
situation specific attributes that are gauged internally without external intervention 
against the individual's experiential knowledge. Consequently our perceptions and 
reactions to risk may be learned. 
The Royal Society (1983) makes a distinction between objective risk as identified by 
experts and perceived risk as identified by non-experts. The discrepancies between the 
expert, the scientific, rational and objective measurements, and non-expert, the 
irrational, subjective and intuitive approaches, often render one unable to identify with 
the others perspective (Glendon, 1987; Beck, 1986). However it is the structured 
process of identification and quantification that lends risk the notion of objectivity and 
not the subjective views of the `scientists' and professionals who populate those 
processes. The professionals retain their subjective perception of uncertainty that 
would otherwise be deemed to be so if it they were not generated via the structured 
process of risk management. Greenwood (1997) and Brehmer (1987) have contested 
the objectivist interpretation of the term `risk perception' for the implication that there 
is some tangible, physical attribute of risk. They instead prefer the notion that risk 
perception is actually a more apt description of an individual's unique and intuitive 
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appreciation of any given decision domain. Conversely Loewenstein & Mather (1990) 
consider risk as a tangible threat or hazard and report that there is no relationship 
between perceived and actual risk aiding to further alienate the subjective and 
objective approaches to risk management. There is a tendency to assume that 
professionals are not susceptible to subjective interpretations of risk and that it is only 
the non-professionals who make risk judgements non-objectively. However there are 
similarities in how both the scientific and the non-scientific communities will arrive at 
their own notion of objectivity regarding risk. Chapter 6 will show how risk 
management professionals also, via dialogue and comparison with peers, agree to what 
is in actuality an inter-subjective reality by way of a resolution and aggregation of their 
own individual perceptions. 
3.4.2 Risk Propensity 
Risk propensity, defined by Adams (1995), Sitkin & Weingart (1995); Sitkin & Pablo 
(1992) and MacCrimmon & Wehrung (1990) as an individual's tendency to court 
greater or lesser uncertainty, is ignored by the structured risk management processes. 
Importantly Sitkin & Weingart (1995) have shown that risk propensity limits the 
individuals search for information and biases their evaluation of the decision domain 
and their risk perception, ultimately pre-conditioning that individuals risk preference. 
Adams (1995) believes that decision-making in uncertain environments constitutes a 
cognitive balancing act between risk perception and risk propensity whereby ones view 
of the environment is balanced against ones intrinsic desire to court or avoid 
uncertainty. The outcome of this balancing act rewards the individual with their risk 
preference that is translated directly into action in the form of decision-making. 
Figure 3.3 has been described as a modest model representing an individuals risk 
thermostat, a metaphor describing an individuals desire to live with uncertainty at any 
one moment in time (Adams, 1995). Figure 3.3 shows how the perception of danger 
and the potential for reward in any decision domain are balanced against the 
individual's propensity to take risks. Their propensity is in turn influenced by their 
prior experience (the `accidents' element) with the decision domain currently faced, 
encouraging the recognition of risk propensity as an unstable personality trait that is 
open to influence. 
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The balancing behaviour can be considered to represent the individual decision makers 
`risk preference' at any one moment in which the individual's perceptions concerning 
any possible loss and/or gain are weighed against the expected utility of the outcome. 
Raftery et al (2001) also determined that risk attitudes change over time and in 
reaction to stimulus, attitudes in this sense can be considered to replicate risk 
preferences, which have been shown to be an amalgamation of perception and 
propensity. 
Slovic (1972; 1962) advocates the dominance of situation specific factors, such as 
economic climate, over the influence and indeed the existence of risk propensity as a 
stable personality trait. Similarly Kozielecki (1974) found that environmental factors 
in conjunction with other personality traits, such as aggressiveness and platitude, 
interact to determine situational specific risk behaviour and consequently argued that 
risk propensity could not be established as a stable personality trait. 
However Sitkin & Pablo (1992) are of the opinion that risk propensity is of more 
influence in decision making than has been previously realised and have established 
risk propensity as the dominant influence upon decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty. As propensity changes over time it becomes an emergent feature of the 
decision maker that, as experience is accumulated, will be less influenced by 
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situational specifics allowing greater cross-situational consistency (Sitkin & Weingart, 
1995). 
The theory of risk compensation predicts that each individual has a set level of 
uncertainty or risk, their propensity, that they are willing to live with and will regulate 
their lifestyle accordingly (Duilisse, 1997; Adams, 1995; Mcarthy & Talley, 1999). 
The assumption is that the notion of experience and familiarity bring enhance the 
perception of control over future events. Consequently structured risk management 
strategies will magnify the perception and compensating behaviour of the individual by 
translating an already underrated threat or over rated opportunity into an objective 
reality. 
3.4.3 Risk Preference 
Sitkin & Pablo (1992) consider risk preference to be an individual's personality trait 
that either attracts of repels them from risk. There are three widely accepted terms 
used to describe an individual's attitude towards uncertainty, or their risk preference. 
Firstly individuals who thrive on and court uncertainty are deemed risk seeking, whilst 
those individuals that shun uncertainty are deemed to be risk averse. Thirdly there are 
those individuals who are indifferent towards uncertainty, and are described as being 
risk neutral. As propensity has been shown to be liable to change, so has risk 
preference. Subsequently it is unwise to label an individual with any of the preceding 
three preferences. This can be further illustrated by examining figure 3.3, which 
shows how perception and propensity interact to produce a risk preference. As both 
perception and propensity are liable to change so is the individual's risk preference. 
Nonetheless Weber & Milliman (1997) sought to establish risk preference as the stable 
personality trait determining individual choice. The authors are of the opinion that 
differing preferences are as a direct result of the differing cognitive perceptions of a 
problem domain and remain distinct from the emotional response that governs risk 
preference. Therefore a person's perception of the decision domain may be influenced 
but not their underlying risk preference. There are however similarities between the 
dichotomous views of risk seeking and risk averse individuals. Maehr & Videbeck 
(1968) observed that a certain amount of uncertainty of outcome increases the saliency 
of the task for both high and low risk-taking subjects. 
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In summary, risk perception is a subjective view of the decision domain whilst risk 
propensity is the desire to either seek or avoid uncertainty in those circumstances. 
Both an individuals risk perception and risk propensity are likely to fluctuate as the 
situational variables change. If an individuals risk propensity becomes more stable as 
their experience grows it is likely to be specific to the phenomenon to which the 
experience relates. 
Adams (1995), Sitkin & Pablo (1992), Sitkin & Weingart (1990) and McCrimmon & 
Wehrung (1990) believe risk propensity to be an aspect of the individual's personality 
that influences their desire to either take or avoid risks. However Weber & Milliman 
(1997) have shown that risk preference is a stable personality trait, positioning it in the 
previously determined role of risk propensity, albeit open to influence via the 
individuals perception of the problem domain. All of the previous authors agree that 
the cognitive function of risk perception is the one factor that can be manipulated to 
produce differing decisions. As both the differing views of propensity and preference 
believe that they constitute the malleable personality traits that influence decision- 
making, their relative positions would appear to be based upon semantic 
differentiation. 
3.5 Risk Management Processes 
Ordonez and Benson (1997) have shown how decision-makers switch to using more 
simple decision evaluation strategies when under pressure of time constraints therefore 
timely provision of information by clients, stakeholders and the project team will 
facilitate more efficient decision-making. Risk management processes seek to satisfy 
this demand by providing a structured framework for information provision and 
deliberation that in turn exemplifies the objective view of risk as expressed in figure 
3.1. The purpose of the process is to provide a model of the decision environment so 
that weaknesses in understanding may be defined and consequently solutions designed. 
They attempt to do this by utilising techniques that quantify risk and hence provide an 
objective and definite view of the decision domain. Similarly they seek to remove the 
subjectivity from the execution of what is designed to be a replicable process. 
Consequently as project management professionals utilise risk management strategies 
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in order to obtain a better understanding of the decision-environment in which they 
operate, the results and outputs of these processes are treated as objective and definite. 
In the construction industry the use of risk management processes is made necessary 
by the increasing complexity of contemporary construction projects which place 
demands upon the project management team that may not have been encountered 
before (Smith, 1999; Edum-Fotwe & McCaffer, 2000). Consequently the project 
management team must establish a bespoke and iterative risk management framework 
within which project uncertainty will be managed (Akintola & McLeod, 1997). 
Information such as progress reports, risk analyses, cost projections and historical 
project data in conjunction with individual knowledge is then used to inform and 
facilitate prompt decision-making by the project management team within the risk 
management framework. However there are a number of problems associated with the 
use of this type of information with regards to quantitative risk management. These 
problems are associated with the inimitable nature of construction projects that renders 
cost comparisons, at anything other than a superficial level, spurious. 
3.5.1 Objectivity in Risk Management Processes 
There are many pre-defined risk management (RMgt) processes available all of which 
comply with the generic framework for the management of risk and uncertainty. Such 
a generic framework is shown in figure 3.4 which details Raftery's (1994) visualisation 
of the RMgt cycle. 
Risk Identification 44 ý 
1 
Risk Analysis He 
I 
Risk Response 
Figure 3.4. Risk management cycle (Raftery, 1994) 
Risks are identified, recorded and assessed qualitatively and quantitatively and a 
response devised relative to the perceived potential impact should the risk be realised. 
43 
Chapter 3 Management of Uncertainty 
The Project Risk Analysis and Management guide (PRAM, 1997) uses the same three 
steps as the core to its risk management cycle as does Laxton's (1996) process, figure 
3.5. The principle remains the same for the Risk Analysis and Management for 
Projects guide (RAMP, 1998) whereby risks are identified, recorded and assessed, 
mitigation plans prepared then assessed and the most suited is then implemented. 
Laxton's (1996) acknowledge the reciprocal nature of the process by noting that 
residual risks, those that arise as a result of the implemented mitigation plans, need to 
be assessed in the same manner as the original risk. The PRAM guide (1997) and Hall 
(1998) expand upon the aforementioned risk management processes by introducing a 
`gap analysis'. 
Figure 3.5. Laxton's (1996) risk management process 
This analysis arises as a result of contrasting current status of identified sources of risk 
with a desired status after the implementation of mitigation plans, an area that Laxton's 
(1996) fail to mention specifically within their guide. It is fair to conclude that the 
majority of the risk management processes available are based upon the same 
foundations and are in essence mechanistic, prescriptive (Chapman, 2001). The depth 
of detail entered into in some guides varies but the messages and the approaches are 
basically the same; identify, assess, manage and monitor risk. These processes are 
often viewed simply as metaphors to focus attention, and to a certain extent control the 
subjective execution of the process (Raftery, 1994). 
The objectivity of these processes is implied within their structure and execution. 
They assume that the individuals who contribute to its execution have the same 
Chapter 3 Management of Uncertainty 
understanding and perception of the decision-making environment. It is assumed that 
the contributors to the process are rational, have developed a clear and shared 
understanding of the decision environment, have established common goals and 
objectives and are using these shared understandings as a base from which to execute 
the process. Similarly it is assumed that the knowledge, beliefs and perceptions held 
by the contributors is complimentary and when undertaken from a perspective of a 
shared understanding will effect a full and objective interpretation of the decision 
environment. However often the beliefs and perceptions of participants are in conflict 
with one another's and work to alter rather than compliment those of their fellow 
participants as evidenced by the risk shift phenomena (Wallach et al, 1962). Whilst 
Clarke (1997) has highlighted the need to manage the perceptions and preferences of 
project decision makers in order to deliver successful projects the area of subjective 
decision-making has been largely overlooked by construction management research. 
Instead research has concentrated on the more objective issues of risk management, 
such as risk quantification using statistical analysis and the methods adopted to do this 
(Edwards & Bowen, 1999; Raftery, 1994). Consequently it is argued throughout this 
thesis that no structured risk management process addresses the issues of the subjective 
nature of decision-making and the potential impact upon the execution and output of 
that process. Figure 3.6 proposes the risk management processes at the next degree of 
detail highlighting the subjective nature of many of the sub processes. 
3.5.2 Subjectivity in Risk Management 
Project team members' intuition, judgement and experience comprise the three distinct 
sources of information relied upon by construction management to inform the risk 
management process (Akintola & McLeod, 1997). This subjectivity is reflected in the 
individual's willingness to live with uncertainty and is reflected in any decision- 
making environment. The subjective interpretation of risk implies that there is no 
objective scale by which uncertainty can be measured; risk is not a definite article but 
exists primarily because it is recognised. This implies that for groups to react to risk, a 
shared group understanding of what that risk is, what its impact may be and how likely 
it is to occur is required. 
45 
Chapter 3 
H Risk Identification 
Management of Uncertainty 
Subjective Identification Prompted Subjective 
(Brainstorm) Identification 
(Brainstorm with prompts) 
F--º 
I 
Historical Documentation 
Agreement via 
Discussion 
(Inter-Subjective Reality) 
b 
-ý 
Risk 
Assessment C> 
Subjective 
Probabilities 
Subjective 
Impacts 
(Time/Cost/ 
Quality/Scope) 
H 
Measured Against 
Pre-Defined Scales 
Simulated Output 
(Objective) 
Checked for Validity 
(Inter-Subjective) 
b 
y Risk Response 
Formulate Plans 
and Reassess for 
Residual Risk 
and Impact 
Figure 3.6. Proposed conceptualisation of contemporary risk management processes 
This amounts to the establishment of an inter-subjective social reality that is entirely in 
contradiction of the scientific objectivity encouraged by the risk management process. 
The establishment of a group social understanding relies on the establishment and 
understanding of the measurement uncertainty (Rowe, 1977), which relates directly to 
the manner and measure of value of those taxonomically defined variables under 
consideration in the decision-domain. The measurement criteria are implicit within the 
taxonomic definitions but may remain difficult to quantify. They are strictly a 
subjective measure on behalf of both the originator and the recipient and so to apply 
requires agreement by both parties as to what is acceptable demanding as a 
precondition a common language in communication and an agreed rationality. This is 
in part what objective risk management processes seek to establish, but do so by 
prescriptive as opposed to descriptive methods. 
It is arguable that individual perceptions have the greatest potential for impact in the 
identification and assessment stages of the risk management process. This is primarily 
because, as chapter 6 will show, the assessment and identification processes are 
inherently subjective. The identification of risk and sources of uncertainty are 
bounded only by the assessors' imagination and experience. Similarly the assessment 
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stage is likely to reflect the assessors' feelings and interpretation regarding the 
previously identified risks. The process of proposing management strategies and 
monitoring is subsequently restricted to the choice of more tangible and tried 
management practices. Therefore whilst it is difficult to dismiss any proffered source 
of uncertainty and risk because it is uncertain, it is much easier to visualise and 
identify a management strategy that that reflects a more realistic decision option. 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the contradiction in the use of an ostensibly 
objective process, one that visualises the decision domain as defined and definite. It is 
assumed that the contributors to the execution of the process reflect this objectivity in 
their shared understanding and perceptions. However the process is populated by 
decision-makers who are only able to perceive the decision domain as subjective and 
are not afforded the opportunity to arrive at a shared understanding before engaging in 
that process. This is by virtue of the objectivity implied in the process execution, 
which relegates the need to arrive at a shared understanding before undertaking the 
process, as communicated in figure 3.7 below. 
The left hand element shows the implied objective perceptions of the participants as 
they converge on the organisations distinct and objective interpretation of the decision 
environment. The right shows the subjective perceptions of the participants both 
converging and diverging dependant upon the effects of various influences within the 
execution of the process. The alteration in the perceptions of the participants is 
brought about by a culmination of group influence on the individual (the risky-shift), 
leadership influence and problem familiarity etc. 
Consequently the output of the subjective interpretation of the process is the more 
realistic, i. e. the output is an amalgamation of the subjective views of the participants. 
The following discussion introduces some of the causal mechanisms that induce a 
sense of uncertainty, and hence the subjective perception of the decision environment 
by groups and individuals. 
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Figure 3.7. Participation in the risk management process 
Management of Uncertainty 
3.6 Complexity 
Complexity is usually defined as having many `parts'; singular objects inspire a view 
of simplicity. Therefore it is the number of the parts and their interactions with one 
another that comprise the whole that inspire the notion of complexity (Gregoire & 
Prigogine, 1989; Baccarini, 1996). Gidado (1996) defines two aspects from which 
project complexity may be viewed: the management of the processes required to 
deliver the product, and the operative and technical complexities associated with the 
need to execute the project delivery processes. This definition expresses the view of 
complexity associated with a project organisation where ownership by differing 
organisations discriminates the many varied parts from one another by their ownership 
and the interrelated nature of their dependencies. 
3.6.1 Characteristics of Complexity 
Cambel (1993) argues that because of the many different forms that complexity may 
take there is no encompassing definition available, but what may be formulated is an 
operational definition, the characteristics of which are: 
" purpose and function; e. g. the product type and intended use; 
" size and configuration; e. g. a microchip or a building brick and their interaction 
with the whole; 
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" structure, (composition and makeup); e. g. proportion of size to number of 
components and their interactions, new, old, tried or untried technology(ies); and 
" type of dynamics. 
Cambel (ibid) argues that not all four factors are necessary for complexity to result. It 
is the comparison of one or more of these aspects with its environment that constitutes 
a subjective view/assessment of complexity. Baccarini (1996) expands upon this 
perspective by defining project complexity as two distinctly separate elements; the 
discrimination of the parts as the differentiation complexity and the interrelated nature 
of their dependency as their interdependency. The complexity of the product may also 
influence the project complexity; the more complex the product the more complex the 
project required to deliver it. As a consequence of complexity the decision maker 
introduces uncertainty into the decision domain by virtue of the subjective 
interpretation of that environment. 
3.6.2 Subjectivity of Complexity 
Complexity may also be described as having a perceptual phenomenon, the state where 
a system or object becomes indiscernible or indescribable to the observer; where the 
interactions of a system's constituent parts lie beyond complete comprehension. It is 
in this area that the risk management processes fail to afford a shared understanding of 
the decision environment and instead exacerbate the cumulative effects of the 
subjective interpretations. Similarly in a situation where one cannot truly discern the 
nature of the phenomena, object or system under scrutiny the ensuing lack of 
understanding ensures there is complexity. By acknowledging the existence of the 
subjective nature of complexity the contradiction and conflict between the objective 
and subjective views of risk and uncertainty is substantiated. 
Klir's (1985) position on the subjective nature of complexity is that; "the complexity 
of an object is in the eyes of the observer" reliant upon the observers ".. interests and 
capabilities" and the observers ultimately incomplete interaction with that object, i. e. 
".. based on a limited... number of attributes that the observer is capable of 
distinguishing on the object". This is similar to the perspective forwarded by Hansel 
(1979) who states that the observer's behaviour or state of mind regarding an event is 
dependent upon the experience that the individual has had with an event of a similar 
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nature. Experience associated with the event, or an event of perceived similarity, may 
reduce the subjective complexity by providing references from which information can 
be drawn, which Ashby (1973) finds ".. the only workable way of measuring 
complexity". The representative and availability heuristics work in a very similar way. 
The former allows the decision maker to make a cognitive short cut by making 
reference to a similar problem or prior occurrence whilst the later encourages which 
previous occurrence is considered. It is the results of these cognitive short cuts that the 
structured risk management processes attempt to convert in an objective reality by a 
process of probabilistic quantification. In direct contrast Baccarini (1996) has stated 
that subjectivity is not a reliable measure of complexity. Nonetheless a measure of 
complexity derived from the number of interactions, their nature, etc. may well provide 
an approach that restricts the subjective interpretation within the defined limits thus 
stabilising the parameters within which the complexity is seen to exist. 
The management of projects fundamentally revolves around solving non-routine 
problems that may possess multiple solutions as a direct result of this complexity. 
Consequently problems may be ill structured and variable making it impossible to 
comprehensively identify all of the degrees of freedom associated with any given 
problem (Li & Love, 1998). Similarly Gunning (1999; 1996) agrees that construction 
managers face complex problems due to the inherent uncertainty of contemporary 
construction projects for which rational solutions are unavailable. These factors make 
formulating prescribed responses to construction problems almost impossible therefore 
project management professionals, by necessity, must rely upon experiential 
knowledge to derive solutions. Similarly, because of the complex and non-linear 
relationships between many project processes there are multiple solutions available to 
project managers. This often results in decision compromises (Li & Love, 1998) and 
assumptions being made that may not reflect the objective maximising behaviour 
expected of them by the structured risk management processes. The assumptions that 
are made allow the decision-makers to minimise the complexity and uncertainty 
regarding their environment. It is these assumptions, which shape the individual 
perception and understanding of the environment, that require addressing before the 
process of risk management is undertaken. 
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It therefore follows that by allowing participants in the decision-making process to 
arrive at a shared understanding of the decision environment, and minimise some of 
the complexity and uncertainty, the process will begin to eliminate some of the 
subjectivity to which it is currently prone. Consequently the risk management process 
proposed in chapter 7 includes such a function in its execution. 
3.6.3 Social Interaction 
One other element of project delivery that structured risk management processes are 
failing to manage is the interaction between the project team members. Project 
professionals have choice and decisions are made that reflect this, decisions that are 
made utilising the often-incomplete information available at the time, making their 
behaviour unpredictable. However the objectivity of the risk management process 
assumes that the entire spectrum of information has been collated and rationalised. 
Consequently any decisions are made as a result of deliberation and consideration of 
the information provided by the process. The outcome becomes rational and objective, 
however any two individuals who make a decision based upon the same information 
may not arrive at the same decision; and if they do so it may be for different reasons. 
This unpredictability contributes to the irregular nature of non-regulated social systems 
where the actors have freedom of choice. This uncertainty is not wholly undesirable, 
without uncertainty there is no need for innovation, and without innovation there is no 
progress (Dalchar, 1993). 
The effect of this internally generated perturbation upon the project system will remain 
unclear. As with any complex dynamical system, the project will be extremely 
sensitive to initial conditions; i. e. the system state at the outset will quickly manifest 
itself in changes from what will be predicted using historical data of systems that did 
not exhibit the same initial conditions. As individuals base decisions partly on 
reactions to experience they may not take the path most trodden, but will exhibit 
freedom of choice and exercise that choice that will in theory take them closer to 
realising their own agenda. 
".. the adaptive possibility of societies is the main source allowing them to survive 
in the long term, to innovate of themselves, and to produce originality" 
(Gregoire & Progogine, 1989). 
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Consequently the risk management processes attempt to control the social system by 
confining the decision-making of individuals to within rational and objective 
parameters hence minimising the internal perturbations. However therein lies a 
contradiction; the process is populated and only exists as a result of the input and 
maintenance of that social system it attempts to control. This contradiction is 
exacerbated by the failure of the process to understand the mechanisms at work within 
the subjective social decision-making environment. Such mechanisms utilise 
information as a tool by which uncertainty and complexity may be minimised; 
consequently it is a lack of information that leads to uncertainty and complexity 
(Cambel, 1993). 
3.7 Information 
The more pertinent and the more detailed the information available the more assistance 
it will be to the decision-making process. Consequently information may reduce the 
descriptive uncertainty associated with system complexity by affording greater clarity 
as to the manner of function and purpose of the system. Whatever the nature of the 
information it may be derived from a wealth of sources such as internally generated 
information in the form of knowledge based upon experience or externally generated 
information such as that communicated by experts. Whichever form the information 
takes it must be recorded and analysed by the individual and then acted upon if it is to 
be of any use in the decision making process. Cohen & Christensen (1970) and Cohen 
(1972) cite four types or varieties of information. 
" Selective information describes the statistical elements of information transfer. 
Therefore unexpected or exceptional information increases the situational 
uncertainty by posing more questions than it answers. 
" Inventive information describes the communication of a metaphor that implies 
a resemblance between itself and an object or action to which it does not 
directly relate. Metaphors are not intended to be interpreted in a literal manner; 
they mean something more than what they actually say (Cohen & Christensen, 
1970). Metaphors are easily misunderstood as a subjective association made 
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by the recipient may facilitate an interpretation other than that intended by the 
originator. 
" Semantic information relates to the shared understanding of elements contained 
within a communication of information that may be selectively quantifiable or 
non-selectively non-quantifiable. 
Whilst selective and semantic information may reduce uncertainty, inventive 
information will not because of the nature of its compilation; to convey something 
other that what was intended is to invite a further subjective interpretation. 
" Aesthetic information is communicated by objects such as works of art that can 
never entirely be communicated by semantic or selective information (Cohen, 
1972). For example an individual may view the structure in an abstract 
painting or simply interpret the kaleidoscope of images as complexity without 
structure. 
Figure 3.8 shows the translation of inventive and aesthetic information into a collective 
semantic understanding, which may be derived by an inter-subjective social 
agreement. Therefore in reality the risk management process attempts to turn the 
subjectively derived semantic information into an objective selective format. 
Inventive 
Information 
Aesthetic 
Information 
Semantic 
Information -º 
Risk 
Management 
Process 
Figure 3.8. Information translation via the risk management process 
I-ºI Selective 
Information 
The translation of semantic into selective information may be compromised by 
assuming that the decision-maker has undertaken a rational and objective interpretation 
of the entirety of the available information. This objective interpretation does not 
occur and it is impossible to differentiate between the subjective emotional and 
sensory aspects of experiential encounters with information; although that is what is 
often asked of rational decision-makers (Cherry, 1979). Individuals are often asked to 
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make decisions based upon an objective interpretation, ignoring the emotional 
`evaluation' that is often made regarding a situation before any attempt is made to 
locate and interpret the available information. Such scenarios and situations have 
inspired the likes of Gleick (1987) to enquire how the human brain sorts and decodes 
the vast amount of information that falls upon our senses at any one time. 
Cherry (1979) offers one such method for interpreting information and recognises that 
not all information that falls upon an individuals senses is registered as a `signal' or 
something that requires them to act. Only then do individuals decide upon how best to 
respond, as a result of what Klir (1985) terms ".. some specific measurement 
procedures". Therefore not all information that is registered by an individual's senses 
is processed as a signal. Complacency and repetition of task may de-sensitise an 
individual to the presence of signals, an issue that receives further discussion in 
chapter 4. However experience allows individuals to establish views of the world by 
which new environments and situations are compared and interpreted. As has 
previously been mentioned the reliance upon probabilistic calculations of likelihood 
neither recognises nor allows experiential information to participate in the calculation 
process. 
3.8 Information Processing 
The objective and rational perspective required by the risk management processes does 
not allow for any omission or frailty in the decision making process. Hogarth (1987) 
states that information perception is selective, a valid reaction to what is intrinsically 
an extremely complex environment. To minimise the complexity certain information 
is anticipated and reliant upon the physical and motivational factors at play at that 
particular moment. This is akin to `categorisation theory' (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; 
Cantor et al, 1982), which forms the basis for an individuals long term memory storage 
of objects, people and events within a prototype set; the contents of which all conform 
to a given category. In its simplest form the theory states that individuals do not re- 
invent the world anew everyday. Instead an individual may categorise information, 
objects etc, and relate new experiences to the older recorded, categorised ones in an 
attempt to minimise the complexity of their environment and assist in their 
understanding of it. In order to prevent becoming overwhelmed by information the 
decision-maker cannot afford to recognise and take account of all the information that 
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is available to them. Instead they must make assumptions about the available 
information in order to keep pace with events as they transpire, a concept that closely 
resembles the theory of bounded rationality. This is again in contradiction with the 
structured risk management processes that rely upon frequentist statistical analysis, 
which necessitates that the entirety of the information relevant to the decision domain 
be considered and included within any analysis. 
Decisions based on intuition and experiences are founded upon information contained 
within the individual's memory. However the use of judgement is necessary in 
complex situations whereby judgemental heuristics can assist in managing the 
information load placed upon the decision maker (Nutt, 1998). Hogarths' (1987) view 
is that the human memory works on past associations, reconstructing information from 
the past to match the demands of the present. Hogrth (1987) states that people; ".. do 
not posses intuitive calculators that allow them to make what one might call `optimal' 
calculations". However people do possess intuitive calculators that may not be 
calibrated to the same scale and functions between individuals, but do nonetheless 
offer the individual the ability to make inferences and judgements based upon the 
information available to them at the time. The risk management processes, whilst 
attempting to objectively and rationally calibrate these calculators, fail to do so 
because they do not control the actual communication of their output. Nor do they 
control the derivation of the information that constitutes their input. Consequently 
they provide information that is deemed objective, but which is based upon inter- 
subjective agreement made between group and organisational members. 
3.9 Summary 
The philosophical natures of risk and uncertainty have been investigated and the two 
have been found to be irreducible; without uncertainty there is no risk. There are 
however two main interpretations of risk; the subjective and the objective. The 
objective view sees risk as a definite article that exists in the world and can be gauged 
and measured. The subjective view sees risk as a possible future event whose 
realisation may be unwarranted. 
Within the identified generic risk management processes the objective view is 
predominant and consequently risk is measured by combing the probability of its 
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occurrence and its potential impact. These risk management processes consider the 
nature of individual decision makers to be objective and rational; therefore the outputs 
of such processes are objective. Decision makers react differently to uncertainty and 
risk, however it is misleading to label any one individual risk seeking or averse. The 
decision maker reacts to the stimuli of each specific decision domain on its own merits. 
A contributory factor to the perception of uncertainty is the complexity associated with 
the individuals environment; the greater the complexity the greater the perceived 
uncertainty and hence the risk. Information is therefore used to minimise the 
complexity, and hence the uncertainty, by allowing a description of the decision 
environment. 
The structured risk management processes rely upon distributional probability 
calculations whilst individuals rely upon non-distributional possibilities to 
communicate their subjective perspective of risk. Consequently organisations use risk 
management strategies to achieve objectives whilst individuals use cognitive processes 
to achieve desirable outcomes that are not always maximising in an economic sense. 
Therefore risk management has been shown to be a subjective process that relies upon 
the input of individual decision makers to achieve an inter-subjective interpretation, or 
model, of the decision environment. Consequently the structured risk management 
strategies, which fail to recognise or address these issues, require modification as 
undertaken in chapter 7. 
Chapter 4 investigates the nature of individual rationality and decision-making 
processes, the nature of information processing that takes the form of heuristics etc, 
and the role that mood plays in influencing decision makers. 
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4 Risk and Decision-Making 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 showed how project management was managing the uncertainty associated 
with increasingly complex construction projects through bespoke risk management 
strategies. 
The subjectivity of risk management relates not only to the individualistic nature of 
bespoke risk management processes but also to the qualitative methods used to identify 
and manage risk. An individual's willingness to live with uncertainty and their 
intuitive notion of risk cloud their judgement of the likelihood of potential outcomes so 
that often decision makers are considered irrational. 
This chapter will begin by investigating risk-taking behaviour and continue to explore 
human rationality and the descriptive and normative theories of decision-making. The 
progression of the argument within this chapter identifies how risk perceptions 
translate into decision risk preferences and hence the need for a greater understanding 
of the impact of individuals and decision-making groups upon the risk management 
environment. The effect of group discussion upon risk preference is discussed together 
with its ramifications. 
4.2 Rationality in Decision-Making 
Conceptualising the conflicts between the predominant normative and descriptive 
theories of decision-making is fundamental in achieving an understanding of the 
conflicts within the risk management process. This conflict revolves around emotional 
responses to situations and the fallibility of the human mind that often render 
individuals incapable of deriving optimal decisions in complex environments (Diehl & 
Sterman, 1995). 
4.2.1 Rationality 
English & Allison (1993) have conceptualised human rational thought as having the 
two following interpretations: 
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a) "... doing what is sensible, reasonable, or most beneficial to the actor, is closely 
related to the concept of maximisation or optimisation"; or 
b) "... a decision process in which the actor evaluates outcomes of possible courses of 
action and chooses amongst them". 
Interpretation (a) constitutes a line of reasoning that has imposed a normative model of 
decision-making and encouraged the idea that rational man ought to seek to maximise 
economic benefit from every transaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Chater & 
Oaksford (2001) seek to differentiate between the rationality that allows people to 
achieve their goals and the `objective', normative rationality of economics, (and 
structured risk management processes). They conceptualise rationality in two forms: 
c) ".. thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a way that is 
generally reliable and efficient for achieving ones goal"; and 
d) ".. thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when one has a 
reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory". 
Interpretation (c) may be an everyday rationality which is independent from the formal 
systems of rationality as demanded by the more normative theories described in 
interpretations (a) and (d). 
4.2.2 Normative Theories of Decision Making: Economic Rationality 
Normative models of human behaviour are intended to function as predictive tools for 
the observers of human decision-making behaviour; they pertain to show individuals as 
they should behave. Amongst the most prominent of the normative models is the 
theory of the economically rational man. This theory predicts that the individual 
should attempt to obtain the economic optimum form any situation without regard for 
their wants and desires (Shackle, 1969). This theory predicts that the decision-maker. 
is aware of the most beneficial option available to them, can identify an exhaustive list 
of the beneficial and non-beneficial ramifications, eliminate all uncertainty and is left 
with no doubt as to the outcome should any particular decision be made. Where they 
are unable to do so unaided, structured processes such a risk management will 
facilitate such optimum decision-making. However this is not the case where desires, 
needs and wants of the decision-maker are considered. 
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Howarth (1988) comments that in some cases non-rational behaviour can be closely 
linked with a verbal expression of beliefs rather than the objective reality of the 
situation. Simon (1981) has also called this theory into question intimating that man is 
incapable of discerning the optimum option from any environment. Therefore when it 
is reported that man is incapable of utilising rational, normative cognitive processes it 
is likely that an everyday rationality, description `b' or `c', is being utilised in 
instances where rationality `a' or `d' is expected. English & Allison (1993) have 
shown that what is deemed `orderly' rational behaviour can in fact be as a result of an 
individual's ".. random response to external constraints", a form of rationality by 
fortune. 
However with the realisation that decision-makers consider more than simply the 
economic value of a decision outcome, descriptive theories of decision-making, such 
as bounded rationality, have gained greater favour. 
4.2.3 Descriptive Theories of Decision Making: Bounded Rationality 
Simon's (1957) theory of Bounded Rationality considers man incapable of evaluating 
the whole of the decision realm and acknowledges the following factors as 
determinants to the deficiency in human decision-making: 
a) decision-makers may lack knowledge of the problem definition, any available 
alternatives, criteria, and impact of choice upon outcome; 
b) decision-makers may have practical considerations such as time and cost 
constraints placed upon them that limit their ability to discern the whole; 
c) individual perceptions will produce differing opinions between individuals; 
d) individuals can only commit a finite amount of information to memory for analysis 
and reference; and 
e) the individuals' intelligence will limit the quality of their decision relative to the 
optimal decision available; should this be known. 
(Bazerman, 1986) 
Raftery (1999) considers bounded rationality as descriptive of an individual's 
indolence in their search for information. However a series of investigations by 
Kahneman & Tversky (1972,1979,1981,1982a, 1982b, 1984) identified a series of 
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judgmental heuristics determined by necessity and not lethargy. Similarly Whiting 
(1979) considers man to be a conservative information processor by necessity. The 
belief that there are problems that require rational decisions is founded in the belief 
that an objective reality exists and has inspired the notion of the irrational decision- 
maker; one who fails to exhibit maximising behaviour in his decision-making (Al 
Jaafari, 2001). Whilst numerous examples of inexplicable decision behaviour can be 
found at the highest levels of decision making this has more to do with very human 
frailties such as ego and misplaced loyalty than to the omission of objective decision- 
making (Janis, 1982). 
4.2.4 Mind Models 
Risk management processes expect an exhaustive assessment of the decision-domain 
to have been executed. However the mind models theory advocated by Johnson-Laird 
(1983) states that when faced with a problem an individual creates a mental model of 
the circumstances surrounding that problem in order to identify any potential 
responses. According to this theory the number of mental models required to satisfy 
the problem provides a measure of the level of difficulty of that problem. However 
when the individual fails to construct counter- models of the problem the process fails 
to deliver the optimal solution. This process could be undertaken but is often not 
accomplished spontaneously by the individual possibly because decision makers often 
restrict themselves to constructing only one model from which an answer is derived. 
This in turn relegates the individual's impression that a second or third mental model is 
required in order to fully appreciate the problem domain. In addition prior knowledge 
has been shown to have a strong influence upon the comprehension of the problem 
domain and plays a crucial role in the development of the initial model (Harris, 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1982c). 
4.3 Influences upon Decision Makers 
Katzell et al (1970) identified two sources of influence upon decision-makers. Firstly 
`situational parameters' that one cannot influence such as the global economy and 
secondly the `dependant variables' that are open to influence such as group culture. 
Both the situational and dependant elements of a decision domain must be identified if 
influential policy is to be established to maximise the group effectiveness. 
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Hale (1987) provides a "tentative interpretation" of how an individual questions their 
relationship with the risky decision domain. The first concerns their relationship with 
the decision domain; "Can I influence it? Do I understand how? Do I trust the people 
in control? Who benefits from the situation? " The second concerns the issue of 
consequences; "How bad (good) would it be? How soon will I suffer (benefit) and for 
how long? " The terms in parenthesis have been added to supplement Hale's (1987) 
`questions' that originally conveyed only negative attributes; to truly encompass the 
issue of individual uncertainty they must also consider positive issues. 
Vlek & Stallen (1980) propose three measures of perceived risk to fill the void left by 
the purely quantitative measures of perceived risk, as follows: 
" physiological measures such as heart rate and blood pressure; 
" behavioural measures such as avoidance or courting behaviour; and 
" cognitive measures such as opinions of expressed possibility. 
The authors believe that these measures provide a more accurate medium for 
comparison and communication of individual uncertainty. Katzell et al (1970) make 
distinct the situational variables that are open to influence and manipulation whilst 
Hale's (1987) questioning strategy allows the individual to ascertain which situational 
variable falls into which of those categories. Finally Vlek & Stallen's (1980) 
proposals allow the individuals perception, understanding and response to the situation 
to be measured. Figure 4.1 shows how the decision maker must consider the decision- 
macro and microenvironments and highlights the factors that influence his 
understanding and perception of those environments. The figure shows how the 
problem being considered, with or without the aid of a structured risk management 
process, exists within a macro environment, which includes issues mainly beyond the 
control of the decision-maker. The microenvironment contains those decision 
variables that may be perceived by the decision maker and relates directly to those 
possible ramifications of the decision that may or may not affect the individual. 
Consequently within a group environment there will be more than one decision maker 
operating within the microenvironment, all with their own individual perceptions of 
that decision environment. 
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Figure 4.1. Decision environments and influential factors. 
Consequently the cognitive measure of possibility may be compared across all 
individuals to ascertain their preferences for that decision environment. The following 
discussion will consider the origin and impact of those individual traits at wok within 
the microenvironment. 
Harriss (1998) postulates that all our observations are interpreted using information 
and experience, and therefore the interpretations are subject to influence from theories. 
He states that there has to be some generalization of circumstance that can be 
galvanized into theories that enable individuals and groups to learn and understand the 
nature of their environment. The nature of contemporary decision-making requires the 
individual to adapt to unique situations that require innovative ideas and solutions. 
This necessitates that the individual develop rules of thumb; or non-rational heuristics 
from which to develop a novel solution (Rasmussen, 1987). These heuristics are 
utilised by the individual to minimise the amount of information required for 
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consideration before a decision is made (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a). The three 
generally accepted heuristics of representativeness, availability, and anchoring 
(Raftery, 1994) are explored below. 
4.3.1 Representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic is used to predict the likelihood of event `X' occurring 
based upon its resemblance to event 'Y' with which the decision-maker has had prior 
acquaintance by discerning similarities from events and holding them as universal 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982c). This heuristic is used to group objects into similar 
classifications, discern the origins of events and to predict future states (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982a). There are several concerns with the use of such a judgemental 
tool; firstly the comparison and prediction fail to take into account the reliability of the 
original event. Secondly individuals often ground their assumptions with regards to 
perceived likelihood upon too few examples dubbed `belief in small numbers' 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b; Cohen, 1979). Thirdly favourable descriptions of 
events lead to favourable predictions of future performance (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a) akin to the effects of problem framing. Finally individuals often fail to 
recognise regression to mean tendencies and when they do recognise them they in turn 
invent spurious causal reasoning in justification (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a; 
Loewenstein & Mather, 1990). 
4.3.2 Availability 
The availability heuristic utilises the most memorable or recent events to base 
assumptions of possible future events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a). The saliency 
and familiarity of the event add to its availability, consequently the heuristic predicts 
the frequency of occurrence based upon the strength of association between the current 
and previous events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982c). The obvious bias that availability 
might induce is due to the retrievability of the instance. The saliency with which the 
event can be recalled will determine the extent of its influence and therefore 
physiological symptoms will add to the vividness of the event and hence influence the 
subjective probability of that event reoccurring. Similarly where the individual has no 
prior experience of the event in question prediction of future possible occurrences is 
limited to the ease with which the individual can imagine the event. 
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4.3.3 Anchoring 
The anchoring heuristic encourages individuals who start their assessment from 
differing premises to base their conclusions upon the limited evidence of their point of 
origin. Tversky & Kahneman (1982a) concluded that groups only considered the first 
few stages of the problem leading to biases in their answers dependant upon their 
starting point, a comparatively similar phenomenon to mind models (Johnson-Laird, 
1983), as discussed in section 4.4.4. This phenomenon has ramifications in the arena 
of risk management whereby availability encourages individuals to identify possible 
future states by their saliency and the anchoring heuristic pre-determines courses of 
events based upon the event the individual originally identified. Therefore individuals 
who are prone to consider non-beneficial outcomes will naturally consider worse case 
scenarios whilst the converse is equally possible. 
Munier (2001) finds that the reasoning utilised by risk managers to design risk 
management practices is often contained within rules of thumb that are emergent from 
experience and "informal conversations between the risk manager and engineers" 
(ibid). Consequently these rules of thumb or heuristics need constant updating to 
remain pertinent (Raftery, 1994). However the it is likely that the individual's 
heuristics change in relation to their experience. 
4.3.4 Experience and Problem Familiarity 
Hale & Perusse (1978) found that individuals assess situations by creating hypothesis 
and then testing them. As a consequence individuals place far more importance upon 
information they attained through personal experience than information they received 
second hand. This can be attributed to the perception of experiential information as 
more significant and manageable in decision-making and ultimately contributes to the 
formulation of subjective- probabilities with regards to possible future events 
(Whiting, 1979). Similarly Edwards & Bowen (in print) found personal experience to 
be the most dominant method of identifying risks in construction project management 
teams. 
Ellesberg's Paradox assumes a link between experience and risk preference by 
predicting that individuals will prefer explicit to ambiguous risks (Lopes, 1983). 
Therefore risks that the individual has had prior acquaintance with are likely to be 
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more acceptable to that individual than untried and previously un-encountered risks 
because of their familiarity (Howarth, 1988). Similarly March and Shapira (1992) 
found that individuals have a tendency to underestimate risks when they have 
previously experienced a positive experience with them. Consequently there have 
been many incidents where the outcome history and familiarity with a particular threat 
has given rise to complacency that has in turn led to accidents, for example Tokaimura 
uranium processing plant (BBC, 10/11/00) and Sellafield nuclear plant (BBC, 
18/02/00). Similarly Glendon (1987) found that individuals identify and rank risks 
according to their experiences and personal value systems. However Beamish (2000) 
concluded that individuals accepted and replicated the predominant behaviour of their 
colleagues even when that behaviour contradicted their own belief/value systems. 
Roth et al (1996) similarly concluded that experience could lead to the suppression of 
emotional responses to stimuli, amounting to the evolution of coping processes within 
the individual. 
4.3.5 Perception of Control 
Langer's (1977) view is that people who feel that they have control over their 
environment exhibit behaviour that equips them to better handle potentially threatening 
situations. Predictive tools such as Monte Carlo simulators are often used to impose 
some perceived control over the decision domain by affording the decision maker a 
sense of certainty and empowerment inherent within the calculation of probabilistic 
outcomes that the tool provides (Greene et al, 2000). However it is preferable for the 
decision-maker to believe that they can exert control over the decision domain rather 
than to believe they have no control so long as the perception resembles the reality of 
the situation. Unfortunately decision outcomes tend to be interpreted as directly 
resulting from previous actions, which may lead to the confusion between the 
operation of skill and fortune (Langer, 1982). 
4.3.6 Problem Framing 
Cantor et al (1982) found that individuals focus their attention on the social aspects of 
decision domains, "on the behaviours, people, norms, and atmospherics in situations 
(ibid)". Hill (1999) found that construction managers on the same project collaborated 
to socially construct a perception of their working environment. They realised that 
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using the word `chaos' was emotive of situation that was `out of control' whilst terms 
such as disorder described a serious occurrence that could still be rectified. 
Kahneman & Tversky's (1992,1979) cumulative prospect theory is a descriptive 
alternative to expected utility theory, which they considered inadequate to describe 
risk-taking behaviour. The theory states that people normally view outcomes as gains 
or losses rather than final states of wealth and welfare (Van Schie & Van der Pligt, 
1995). They showed that decision outcomes in terms of gains or losses were open to 
manipulation by numerical, written and verbal problem framing. Cumulative prospect 
theory predicts that when problems are framed in terms of possible gains individuals 
will exhibit risk-averse behaviour, and when problems are framed negatively risk- 
seeking behaviour will predominate as individuals seek to maintain what they have in 
the gain domain and to minimise their losses in the loss domain. Cumulative prospect 
theory clashes with the widely held concept that individuals will undertake risk- 
seeking behaviour in order to achieve a beneficial objective irrespective of their 
current position with regards to that objective (Hollenbeck et al, 1994; Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992; Lopes, 1987). 
The perception of threat and opportunity are distinct from loss and gain decision 
domains (Highhouse & Yuce, 1996; March & Shapira, 1987). The former is 
perceptual phenomena and the latter a decision-making perspective. Consequently 
verbal framing manipulations have a strong influence on perceptions of choice 
alternatives (Highhouse & Yuce, 1996). 
4.3.7 Leadership Influence 
Situational variables such as "group size, member personality, group traditions and 
culture, nature of the task, and so forth" make commentary on leadership influence and 
effectiveness complicated and often untenable (Katzell et al, 1970). Nonetheless Grey 
& Gordon (1978) conclude that those who rise higher within their organisation are 
relatively happier to live with uncertainty. However Rabow et al (1966) found that 
group leaders are less willing to take risks relative to their fellow group members. 
Correspondingly Hoyt & Stoner (1968) also found no direct correlation between 
leadership risk orientation and group decision-making. 
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Lamm & Kogan (1970) found that leaders are constrained by their responsibility to 
`not loose face' in group discussions and are therefore more likely to arrive at a 
compromise. They have in a sense too much to loose whereas social values may 
influence decision-making only when leaders or decision-makers are free to move 
within the decision realm. This is similar to the position offered by Barnlund (1959) 
who identified a `face saving' trend in situations where deadlock in group discussion 
and negotiation arose. 
However, what is deemed permissible or acceptable by the subordinates will be 
derived directly from observed patterns of behaviour exhibited by the senior members 
of the project team (Clarke, 1997). Consequently observed patterns of behaviour will 
exert a normative effect upon other team members thus establishing a self-reinforcing 
and perpetuating group culture. Katzell et al (1970) found that leadership `face 
saving' was lessened in more compatible groups intimating that group and 
organisational culture play an influential role in the determination of acceptable risk. 
4.3.8 Cultural Values 
Empirical approaches to cultural risk can take two dimensions; firstly the longitudinal 
approach addressing the historical aspects of risk handling such as trends of risk 
behaviour and attitude that exert a normative affect upon existing group members and 
new inductees to the groups (Beamish, 2000; Hovden & Larsson, 1987). 
Hofstede (2001) defined culture as "the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group from another". He continued to liken the 
affect of culture upon groups to the affect of personality on the individual, adopting 
Guilford's (1959) definition of an individual's personality as "the interactive aggregate 
of personal characteristics that influence the individual's response to the environment". 
The influence upon decision-making instilled by culturally established social norms 
encourages individuals to pre-suppose degrees of risk being encountered by viewing 
them through cultural filters (Douglas, 1992). Therefore culture often exerts greater 
persuasion over an organisations performance than any other influence (Uher & 
Toakley, 1999). Therefore group culture influences group member's response to 
situations; furthermore those responses are not uniform across all groups. Similarly 
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individuals will adapt to and adopt views, opinions and behaviours that are in contrast 
to their own (Beamish, 2000; Loewenstein & Mather, 1990). 
4.4 Motivation and Risk Acceptance 
Predicting the duration and the intensity of the vigour with which an option is pursued 
necessitates consideration of the motivational aspects of human behaviour when 
considering an individual's choice amongst alternatives (Atkinson, 1957; Simon, 
1967). Whilst the impact of experience, judgement heuristics and culture upon 
decision-making are considerable they do not encompass the entirety of the influences 
upon individual choice. Motivational issues such as the need for achievement and the 
desire for security also influence individual choice and risk preference (Lopes, 1987; 
Slovic, 1964), subsequently decisions are often based upon emotional responses, both 
anticipatory such as dread and fear and anticipated such as regret (Mellers et al, 1997; 
Loewenstein et al, 2001). 
4.4.1 Trust, Mood and Dread 
Nakayachi (1998) has concluded that trust plays the most important role in the 
management of risk. Therefore trust is seen as an issue in deciding risk acceptability 
and if one trusts the person perceived to be in control of the hazard one might be more 
inclined to accept it (Kealey, 1999; Hale, 1987; Singleton & Hovden, 1987). 
However Langer (1982) found that in order to completely master the environment the 
individual must control chance events, a view that exemplifies the philosophy that 
underpins the use of risk management processes. 
Whilst psychologists and economists observe a consequentialist interpretation of 
decision-making under uncertainty; i. e. people play to the perceived consequences of 
decisions when making them and treat feelings as epiphenomenal it is possible that an 
individuals feelings may make their decisions for them (Loewenstein et al, 2001). 
Consequently hope and fear are often treated as a consequence of an action and not the 
drivers of action (Tversky & Fox, 1995). Dichotomously people that are in a good 
mood will not risk incurring a loss for fear of loosing their good mood, highlighting 
mood as a driver behind risk incurring decisions (Isen et al, 1988; Mellers et al, 1999). 
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Similarly instilling a mood can manipulate an individuals risk preference and 
perception, i. e. instilling a `depressive' mood will encourage a more pessimistic view 
of a situation (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This intimates that individuals make 
judgements based upon their mood and that this influence may extend beyond those 
stimuli that induced the mood in the first instance. Johnson & Tversky (1983) naively 
acknowledge the impact this may have upon "the susceptibility of lay judgements, and 
the apparent lack of awareness of this effect" but fail to recognise or acknowledge the 
potential affect upon professionals charged with risk management. This criticism is 
evidenced in affect of visceral influences on decision-making. Desires such as the 
need to sate lust, hunger, thirst and the need for sleep influence decision-makers 
irrespective of their professional status and are often so intense that they preclude 
decision-making (Loewenstein, 1996). 
Brehmer (1987) reports that cognitive risk seems to have two aspects, dread and how 
catastrophic the event(s) seem to be and familiarity with the risk; both of which impact 
upon an individuals emotional state and hence their ability to reason (Cherry, 1979). 
Experience provides coping mechanisms that protect the individual from the feelings 
of fear or dread that were experienced with the initial encounter. However individuals 
may not want to discuss experiences that induce dread or fear but may well recall them 
overeagerly because they would like to do all in their power to avoid them in the 
future; akin to a highly motivated fear response (Loosemoore, 1998). Therefore dread 
exerts a strong influential factor that influences the extent to which the individual 
wants the risk reduced or eliminated (Brehmer, 1987). 
4.4.2 Regret 
Interestingly Langer (1982) found that individuals feel more confident in solving 
difficult problems; a legacy of this over-optimism is that the individual experiences 
regret when they fail to perform to their predicted level. Regret is an anticipated 
emotion that occurs when an actual decision outcome is less beneficial than the 
outcome of an alternative decision that was not chosen, or when the actual outcome is 
less beneficial to the decision-maker than was the pre-decision situation (Mellers et al, 
1997; Bell, 1982). Nonetheless Mellers et al (1997) concluded that individuals often 
make decisions in an attempt to avoid the perceived worst possible decision outcome. 
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Bell (1985) found that decisions are not made solely to minimise the maximum level 
of regret associated with a decision outcome but rather to minimise the feelings of 
regret when preconceptions are compared against the actual results of a decision. This 
idea is akin to Savage's (1954,1951) minimax principle that predicted that people 
aimed to minimise their maximum level of decision regret, which was criticised by 
Mellers et al (1999) because it "does poorly at describing choice". Bell (1982) 
concluded that axiomatic violations could be attributed to the urge in individuals to 
avoid personal blame for the consequences of decisions even if the decisions made 
were valid and based upon all the available evidence at the time of making the 
decision. 
Hindsight may induce surprise, regret and disappointment at an outcome after a 
counter factual comparison by decision-makers. Surprise is closely related to 
adaptation and occurs when preconceived notions of performance are shown to be 
unfounded (Loewenstein & Mather, 1990). Similarly individuals may experience 
regret because they harbour unrealistic expectations of their abilities and exaggerate 
their control over the environment, consequently predicting overly optimistic outcomes 
for their futures, (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover, over-optimism increases as the 
time between asking for the opinion and the task increases (Heath & Jourden, 1997). 
Langer (1982) has attributed this behaviour to the individuals need for complete 
mastery of their environment. Subsequently when the actual task performance 
feedback arrives the individuals seek to maintain their self-esteem by making more 
realistic interpretations of their behaviour. 
However the inclusion and management of such motivational aspects of decision- 
making and risk preference within structured decision-making processes remains 
illusive. Concepts such as expectation, regret, trust, mood and other visceral factors 
such as fear are intangible and not easily communicated or realised. Consequently 
managing such influences remains impractical and may also be unwarranted. Those 
factors that make individuals unique also add to the variety and scope of information 
generated within group discussions. Subsequently the costs of removing such traits of 
individuality may outweigh the benefits. However educating the decision-makers to 
recognise their presence and subsequently promoting self-management may reduce the 
impact of the irrational effects of these influences upon decision-making. 
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4.5 Group Decision-Making and Communication 
Arguably the effects of group communication and decision-making upon the risk 
management process are an influential factor concerned more with the management of 
the process rather than the process per se. Nevertheless the structured processes do not 
accommodate any such managerial responses to group dynamics or acknowledge the 
impact \that these may have. Consequently they go unmanaged and their impact 
unnoticed. 
Whilst groups are used to achieve an inter-subjective objectivity in structured risk 
management processes, both groups and individuals are equally consistent in their 
violations of the axioms of utility theory. However groups are inclined to discuss and 
argue points of contention whereas individuals do not have that opportunity and 
therefore stimulate more careful consideration of problems leading to a consideration 
of a wider range of ideas and provided a "more objective and crucial testing of 
conclusions" (Barmund, 1959; Bone et al, 1999). 
Gouran & Hirokawa (1983) have found that communication impacts directly upon the 
performance of group decision-making. Group members are continuously moving 
towards a solution by a process of developing group consensus of the options 
indicating that groups make judgements and hence decisions by the gradual 
modification of ideas (Scheidel & Crowell, 1964). During group discussions members 
who are aware of different facts are very often unable or ineffective in communicating 
and integrating their unique knowledge, therefore group judgements are dominated by 
commonly held group knowledge (Gruenfeld et al, 1996). Consequently the more 
group members who are aware of a specific piece of information, the more likely it is 
that the information will be mentioned during discussions. Therefore the more 
informative data that is held by the minority of group members is less likely to be 
discussed and as a consequence has less influence. Significantly Asch (1955) has 
shown that some individuals are prone to influence by group pressure to the extent that 
they are willing to compromise or ignore their own opinions for the sake of conformity 
further increasing the possibility that groups will fail to realise and discuss at least 
some pertinent information. Nonetheless as each individual brings different values to 
his group, group members question one another's values that in turn encourages the 
group to become more objective and hence effective as a decision-making unit. 
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However groups still make errors when the `impression of universality' becomes 
dominant; when "agreement becomes the criterion for correctness" (Barnlund, 1959). 
This is a similar observation to Jani's (1982) `groupthink' syndrome; when a group 
experiences high cohesiveness the members of the group "express solidarity, mutual 
liking, and positive feelings about attending meetings and carrying out the routine 
tasks of the group" (Janis, 1982). This solidarity can lead to the group over estimating 
its power and morality, encouraging closed mindedness to suggestions amongst group 
members and increasing pressures toward group uniformity. Group behaviour will 
then adapt to maintain the group cohesiveness that requires group members not to 
question their colleagues; as a consequence concurrence-seeking tendencies within the 
group emerge. 
The preceding section has identified that groups are more effective decision makers 
than individuals, in general making better decisions than the most able group member. 
Therefore so long as the groups are insulated from becoming overly cohesive and self- 
supporting they will not exhibit groupthink tendencies. Bazerman (1986) has shown 
that groups are as open to the influences of judgment heuristics as are their members 
who should therefore be encouraged to bring their knowledge and experience to group 
discussions. Such a group environment requires strong effective leadership that is 
neither punitive nor dismissive. 
The effectiveness of group decision-making has been accepted and encouraged in 
regulatory bodies, in profit and not for profit organisations. However the effects of 
group culture and social influence have been shown to influence the decisions of 
individuals to the extent that the group risk preference is greater than the average 
individual group member's preference. 
4.6 Risky Shift 
Wallach et al (1962) replicated the work of Stoner (1961) confirmed the risky shift 
phenomenon using a twelve questions Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ); the 
main conclusions of their research may be summarised as follows: 
" unanimous group decisions subsequent to discussion exhibit a risky shift when 
compared with the mean of the individuals initial pre-discussion choices; 
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" post discussion individual choices also exhibit this risky shift; 
" the shift is exhibited in individual decisions for between two to six weeks after 
group discussion; 
" no shift occurs over time without the prior group discussion; and 
" members of the groups who are relatively risk-taking are perceived as having 
influenced the group decisions. 
A replication of the CDQ and a replication of the Wallach et al (1962) study is 
undertaken in chapter 5. 
4.6.1 Diffusion of Responsibility Hypothesis 
Wallach et al (1964) proposed that group decision-making introduced a diffusion of 
responsibility together with pressure towards consensus that acted as the key 
mechanism for causing the risky shift. The authors concluded that group decision to 
consensus firstly encourages the group to err on the side of the risky and secondly 
enables the group representative to feel removed from the decision and therefore blame 
free in the event of negative consequences. However Vinokur (1971) points out that 
the evidence supporting the `diffusion.. ' theory also promotes a dichotomous 
hypothesis; the `assuming of responsibility hypothesis'. This hypothesis predicts that 
individuals will take greater risks in order to show that they are willing to take 
responsibility for their decisions to achieve a leadership position whilst also receiving 
the accolade for the success of the decision-making group. Clark (1971) and Vinokur 
(1971) determined that there was insufficient evidence to distinguish between the 
`diffusion' and the `assuming' hypothesis as the preponderant cause of the 
phenomenon. 
Moscovich & Zanallonni (1969) state that individuals are not likely to place 
themselves in the `extremities' of group opinion, that they prefer to blend and to 
conform to the average, and also that groups tend to aggregate their responses to the 
average of the individual responses. The authors criticise Kogan & Wallach's (1967) 
assertion that group members `bond to a common fate by discussion' as a tentative 
assertion which looses its plausibility after the experiments of Bateson (1966) and 
Flanders & Thistlethwaite (1967) concluding that "responsibility diffusion cannot be a 
convincing interpretation of risky shift". The authors prefer the suggestion that the 
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shift occurs as the individuals considering the problem domain immerse themselves 
within it and achieve greater commitment thereby postulating that the risky shift is 
achieved through this normative commitment. Cecil et al (1970) concluded that group 
pressure might account for the risky and conservative shifts found in decision-making 
groups. 
Bern et al (1965) sought to extend the generalisation of the `diffusion' hypothesis for 
risky shifts in group decision-making to scenarios where the negative consequences of 
decisions were emphasised. An alternative hypothesis that higher risk takers have 
greater social significance was discounted by the fact that threat of public exposure of 
individual preferences was found to result in lower risk taking preferences. 
4.6.2 Risk-is-a-Value 
Teger & Pruitt (1967) found that there was sufficient reason to doubt the `diffusion' 
hypothesis and instead favour the `risk-is-a-value' hypothesis as offered by Brown 
(1965). The `value' theory (Clark & Crockett, 1971) states that there are ideal risk- 
taking levels, dependent upon the situation, as preferred by a society and its culture. 
Risk-taking is perceived as socially desirable and each individual would like to think 
that they emulate that risk-taking position in their decision-making. However when 
the conservative decision-maker finds that they are somewhat off the group average 
they alter their position to bring themselves more into line with the socially desired 
position (Willems, 1969; Levinger & Schneider, 1969). Wallach & Wing (1968) also 
argue persuasively in favour that risk-taking is culturally more favourable than 
conservatism whilst also stating that perceptions seem to gravitate towards cultural 
values. However two of the questions in the 12 CDQ produced a conservative shift in 
decision-making; this is accounted for in the risk-is-a-value hypothesis by the 
assumption that society dictates levels of risk in a situational context (Brown, 1965). 
Stoner (1968) used a CDQ with four questions designed to elicit a cautious shift and 
concluded that a predominance of cautious attitudes amongst group members would 
inflict a cautious shift and vice versa favouring the `value' hypothesis as an 
explanation for the results of this survey. 
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4.6.3 Familiarisation 
Bateson (1966) offers a cognitive explanation for the risky shift by postulating that the 
individuals initially more cautious response could be accounted for by their instinct to 
`err on the side of caution' until they have more information. However this may be 
possible in instances where the problem is perceived as complex or offers many 
possible outcomes. Subsequently acquaintance with the problem and familiarisation 
via information gathering will allow a more unified decision to be made. However 
Teger et al (1970) concluded that the magnitude of the risky shift after candidate 
familiarisation with the problem was not consistent enough within their own study to 
justify its relevance, nonetheless the authors acknowledged that familiarisation has in 
some instances caused a risky shift. Flanders & Thistlethwaite (1967) also failed to 
replicate the results of Bateson's (1966) study. Subsequently the weight of the 
evidence against the `familiarisation' theory indicates that the risky shift phenomenon 
is subject of a group process (Vinokur, 1971; Teger et al, 1970). 
4.6.4 Information Exchange 
Brown (1965) noted that as a consequence of the `value' hypothesis two 
epiphenomena would have to be present. Firstly decision-makers would have to 
believe that they were more risk seeking than their counterparts. Secondly for the 
cultural influence to operate the cultural value of risk-taking must necessitate 
conversation, flow of information and argument formulation in favour of the position 
with the greater inherent uncertainty. Brown (1965) termed this the `information 
exchange' hypothesis. Kogan & Wallach (1967) and Lamm (1967) replicated Browns' 
(1965) study conditions and concluded that the information exchange hypothesis did 
not generate such a significant shift to warrant the hypothesis being deemed the 
dominant cause. 
Madaras & Bern. (1968) found that knowledge of fellow group member's relative risk 
positions, garnered without inter-group discussion, was not sufficient for the shift to 
arise. However the authors found that the inter-group discussion did bring more 
pertinent information to light and subsequently they concluded that comparison 
between the relative positions of each participant was not the cause (the `value' 
hypothesis), but the information highlighted as a result of the discussion did result in 
the shift (the information exchange' hypothesis). The previous theories of `risk-is-a- 
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value' and `information exchange' offer `affective' explanations for the shift caused by 
the social influences highlighted as a consequence of the comparison of group 
member's relative positions. 
4.6.5 Leadership 
The `leadership hypothesis' states that risk-takers are viewed by other group members 
to be leaders and more verbally dominant and persuasive during discussions than other 
less risk seeking group members (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964; Marquis, 1962). 
However Lamm & Kogan (1970) state that leaders are constrained by their 
responsibility to `not loose face' in discussions and are therefore more likely to arrive 
at a compromise than to shift in a risky direction. 
This poses the strongest threat to the generality and relevance of the risky shift to 
decision-making groups where status amongst group members is unequal. Lamm & 
Kogan (1970) concluded that leaders have too much to loose, therefore social values 
may influence a risky shift only when leaders or decision-makers are free to move 
within the decision realm. Subsequently Vinokur (1971) concludes that the 
`leadership' hypothesis may be "safely discarded". 
4.6.6 Individual Influence 
A series of investigations by Rim (1963,1964a, 1964b, 1965,1966a & 1966b) 
reported that the disproportionate risk-taking individual, in group terms, will be an 
extrovert, have a high need for achievement and be tolerant of ambiguity. The risk- 
takers theoretical, economic and political interests will be high on their agenda as will 
their interpersonal values of leadership and recognition; they will be good at 
manipulating interpersonal relations and be inwardly directed. However this 
investigation would offer little to explain the risky shift per se as Rabow et al (1966) 
and Wallach et al (1968) found that persuasiveness and popularity are independent of 
risk-taking behaviour. They found that the risky shift in male groups "does not derive 
any degree from exertion of greater general persuasive power by high risk takers" 
(ibid). 
4.6.7 Influence of Instructions 
Clark & Willems (1969) and Willems & Clark (1969) concluded that is the 
preponderance of the instructions offered to candidates taking the 12 CDQ that 
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actually encourages a risky shift by highlighting the need to "indicate the lowest 
probability of success they would accept before recommending the potentially more 
rewarding but riskier option" Wallach et al (1962). Clark & Willems (1969) found 
that when neutral instructions were used instead of the standard instructions no risky 
shift occurred. However Wallach and Mabli (1970) state that Clark & Willem's 
(1969) instructions are ambiguous rather than neutral and as a result lead to an overall 
conservative view in the group to dominate. 
4.6.8 Group Size 
Bateson (1966) predicted that as group size increases so should the factor of the risky 
shift as the group would be increasingly likely to hold at least one person who is going 
to be able to sway the group in the risky direction. Similarly he states that the longer 
the group remains together the larger the shift accounted for by the closer affiliation of 
group members. Similarly prior association may weaken the risky shift phenomena by 
allowing status systems to be built that would predetermine individual relationships. 
4.6.9 Further Considerations 
The presence of incentives has been shown to have no impact on choices made by 
subjects (Beattie & Loomes, 1997) as displayed by Wallach et al's (1964) results when 
they introduced real losses and gains into the decision-making whilst utilising the same 
CDQ. Pruitt & Teger (1969) established that a group shift towards risk was manifest 
when betting was considered. They also established a positive relationship between 
group cohesiveness and the extent of a risky shift. However the authors highlighted 
the need for group communication for the shift to occur as group cohesiveness alone 
would not produce the shift effect. Wallach et al (1965) found that group members 
can recognise the effect of the group discussion process on individual choice 
preferences irrespective of whether it produces a cautious or risky shift. This 
encourages the conclusion that the influential individual may be able to increase their 
impact as they are aware and, as Rim (1966 a) has established, harbour Machiavellian 
tendencies. 
In conclusion Lamm & Kogan (1970) have shown that the `value' hypothesis is the 
most generic in its application as a causal mechanism but only in groups of equal 
status. Douglas & Wildavsky (1982) have since argued favourably for a cultural 
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theory of risk-taking, however Vinokur (1971); Clark (1971) and Wallach and Mabli 
(1970) claim that the mechanism causing the shift is included within the information 
exchange hypothesis and much less to do with the comparison of choices as vindicated 
by the `value' hypothesis. 
Consequently the decision-making groups that populate the structured risk 
management strategies are prone to the risky-shift effect. However no study has ever 
been undertaken to establish it's relevance to construction management decision- 
making groups. Therefore to establish whether this phenomenon is a valid concern for 
construction management a replication of the Wallach et al, (1962) test was undertaken 
as reported in chapter 5. 
4.7 Summary 
Individual decision makers often fail to exhibit rational decision-making because they 
are influenced by emotional factors such as dread, fear and hope together with other 
visceral factors such as hunger and thirst. These influences combine with learned 
responses to the environment such as heuristics, cultural responses and problem 
familiarity etc. They aid to further distinguish between normative theories of rational, 
objective decision-making, as exemplified by structured risk management strategies, 
and the descriptive theories that reflect the subjective, and non-rational decision- 
making behaviour of individuals. 
Similarly risk management relies upon group input to the process. However a 
phenomenon, which indicates, that groups may be magnifying the effect of these 
differences in perception and decision-making preferences remains unnoticed by 
construction management research. Therefore chapter 5 undertakes a replication of the 
Wallach et al, (1962) study with two primary aims; firstly to identify the impact, if 
any, of the risky shift phenomenon. Secondly, to provide a model of the decision- 
making environment in construction risk management that may be compared with the 
data generated by the case study in chapter 6, to provide an improved risk management 
process; reported and discussed in chapter 7. 
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5.0 Group Effect upon Individual Decision-Making 
Preferences 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a replication of the Wallach et al (1962) study using the original 
Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ). The chapter also outlines the method adopted 
to implement the current study and examines the results obtained from construction 
project management decision-making groups together with the analytical statistical 
tools used. This chapter concludes with recommendations regarding the application of 
the risk prism and the effects of the risky shift phenomenon upon project management 
decision-making. 
5.2 Discussion 
The Wallach et al, (1962) study assumes that whilst the questions used within the CDQ 
are only an approximation of potential `real life' scenarios they are a close enough 
approximation to establish the observed phenomena as `real'. Consequently the CDQ, 
the subsequent analysis of data and the establishment of the risky shift as a `real' 
phenomenon indicate that the original study was very much a positivist approach to 
identifying and discussing psychological phenomena. Ostensibly, therefore, there is a 
contradiction in its use to establish an individual perception of risk, which has been 
argued throughout this thesis, is a subjective phenomenon, and one that cannot be 
probabilistically quantified. 
However, as has been argued within the methodology chapter of this dissertation, the 
CDQ provides a model of a phenomenon, which will subsequently be tested against 
the reality of a risk management group discussion in chapter 6. Accordingly the choice 
of 1 through 10 out of 10 options are interpreted in this thesis to convey subjective 
non-distributional possibilities of likelihood and not distributional probabilities of 
occurrence as was considered with all of the previous tests using the CDQ. This 
notion is founded upon the premise that individuals neither identify nor utilise 
probabilistic interpretations of risk: Instead they prefer to use linguistic constructs, see 
chapter 6. Consequently when the groups are discussing their relevant positions with 
regards to a particular scenario they are reverting to a linguistic interpretation of the 
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non-distributional possibility that has been transcribed on the CDQ as a numerical 
expression. This effect can be seen at work in chapter six and is discussed at greater 
length in chapter 7. 
Similarly the questions utilised within the CDQ relate to life style scenarios and not 
occupation specific scenarios. There are two primary reasons why this will not 
infringe upon the generalisation of the findings to occupation related behaviour. 
Firstly it has been argued earlier in this dissertation that there is no difference between 
the deliberation processes of professionals and non-professionals. Similarly both 
groups are subject to the previously discussed influences of mood, culture, heuristics 
etc. Therefore the questions should elicit the same deliberation processes as would be 
used in any problem deliberation environment. 
However it cannot be ignored that the Wallach et al (1962) CDQ attempts to 
objectively record risk, which as has been argued throughout this dissertation, is a 
subjective phenomenon. Consequently the contradiction in its use may prove to be 
irreconcilable and therefore the weakness of the CDQ in distinguishing this 
phenomenon amongst individuals must be borne in mind and will remain a limitation 
of this research. 
5.3 Replication of the Study 
Wallach et al (1962) and all the prior studies covered in the review have treated the 
measures used in the CDQ as distributional probabilities expressed by the participants. 
However individuals are more inclined to express perceived possibilities, as discussed 
in chapter 3. Consequently were more than one option presented per scenario the 
participants would have had to assign distributional probabilities when non- 
distributional possibilities are desired. Therefore the results of prior studies using the 
CDQ may be more easily explained by considering the nature of the perceived 
possibility of each scenario as opposed to the probability. This implies that although 
the values assigned to each option increase after a group discussion they do so not 
because they are seen as more probable but because they are seen as having an 
increased possibility of occurrence. Consequently the group members do not consider 
that there will be more occurrences of that option in the next one hundred scenarios but 
they do consider that the possibility of occurrence has increased. 
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5.3.1 Hypothesis and Null Hypothesis 
The hypotheses relevant to the present study are: 
H1 Group discussion to consensus has the effect of changing pre-discussion 
individual preferences of construction project management professionals 
towards uncertainty. 
If hypothesis H1 is shown to be valid then the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H2 The project management group preference will exhibit a willingness to accept 
greater uncertainty than the individual pre-discussion preference. 
H3 The group discussion to consensus will encourage individual post-discussion 
preferences to exhibit a similar increased willingness to accept greater 
uncertainty than the pre-discussion individual preference. 
H4 The group discussion to consensus will continue to affect the individual 
preference of project management group members for up to six weeks after the 
group discussion. 
The null hypothesis is therefore: 
HO Group discussion to consensus has no effect on the pre-discussion individual 
decision-making preferences of construction project management professionals. 
5.3.2 Method 
For clarity figure 5.1 illustrates the basic sequence of testing, the terminology used to 
refer to these stages and the statistical tests utilised to analyse the data that were used 
by Wallach et al (1962) and by the present study. 
The CDQ used in this research was the published version of the original Wallach et al 
(1962) study. However the published questionnaire did not replicate the CDQ in the 
format in which it was utilised in the original study. Therefore the present study 
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developed the published version to ascertain the most effective way of presenting the 
CDQ in a controlled test environment. 
TERMINOLOGY PHASE OF TESTING TESTS USED 
Pre-Discussion 
Individual Preference 
Group Preference 
Individual Pre- 
Group Discusssion 
Group Discussion to 
Consensus 
Paired t Tests to Compare Pre- 
Discussion Individual 
Preferences to group 
Preference 
Paired t Tests to Compare 
Group Preferences 
* Post-Discussion 
Individual Preference 
Individual Response 
Post-Group Discussion 
Paired t Tests to Compare Pre- 
Discussion Individual 
Preferences to Post-Discussion 
Individual Preferences 
Group Members 
Ranked for Influence 
4 Post-Postdiscussion Individual Preference Postal Response 2-6 Weeks After Group 
Discussion 
Figure 5.1. Terminology, method and statistical tests used 
Kendall Coefficieint of 
Concordance 
Paired t Tests to Compare Post- 
Postdiscussion Individual 
Preferences with Pre-Discussion 
Individual Preferences and 
Post-Discussion Individual 
Responses 
5.4. Validating the Wallach et al (1962) CDQ 
The questionnaire was presented to research students working within the department of 
Civil and Building Engineering at Loughborough University. They were questioned to 
ascertain their impressions and criticism of the questionnaire. Comments were most 
often received relating to the actual instructions to candidates, to the effect that they 
lacked clarity. 
Questioning of the candidates highlighted that the instruction to choose the option that 
expressed `the lowest probability of success they would accept' was confused with 
highlighting an option that the candidates thought most accurately reflected the most 
probable outcome of the scenario. Secondly, some candidates had found it difficult to 
comprehend the probability options expressed numerically. To overcome this 
difficulty the choice options were represented graphically in the form of a pie chart and 
also numerically. Question 1 taken from the CDQ used in the present study is shown 
in figure 5.2. The questionnaire was then presented to a different set of research 
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students together with the original set and their reactions gauged. The revised 
questionnaire was judged to have been better understood by comparing the research 
student's initial comments with replies to post-consideration questioning. 
As with the original Wallach et al (1962) questionnaire the choice options were 
arranged in numerical ascending and then descending order for subsequent questions. 
This design element of the original study was intended to counteract any potential 
probability choice order preference on the part of the candidates. 
An electrical engineer may stick with his present job at a modest but adequate 
salary, or may take the new job offering considerably more money but no long- 
term security. 
Figure 5.2. Question one taken from the developed CDQ utilised in the present study 
5.4.1 Questionnaire Pilot testing 
To avoid implementing the questionnaire `blind', pre-testing was run on three groups 
of five university research students from the department of Civil and Building 
Engineering at Loughborough University. The students in these groups had not been 
included in those who had been canvassed for comments upon the questionnaire during 
its development. Each of these test groups was tested independently of the others over 
a period of one week. The candidates, no more than five at any one time, sat the test 
individually and were instructed not to discuss questions with each other. 
The candidates were asked to indicate the lowest probability of success they would 
accept for each scenario before recommending the potentially more rewarding but 
riskier option detailed within the scenarios. The probabilities are listed as a 1,3,5,7, 
or 9 out of 10 chance of success. If the candidates would not choose the riskiest 
alternative, no matter what the chances of success, they were instructed to choose the 
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10 out of 10 option indicating that only outcome certainty would be acceptable for this 
particular scenario. 
The conditions and instructions of the Wallach et al (1962) study were adhered to as 
closely as possible during the pilot testing. They were: 
1. The central person in each situation must choose between two courses of action, one of which 
is more risky than the other but also more rewarding if successful. 
For each situation you should indicate the lowest probability of success you would accept 
before recommending that the potentially more rewarding option be chosen. 
2. The more risky alternative is always assumed to be more desirable than the safer course if 
proven successful. 
The odds which you select for each scenario should reflect the lowest odds you would be 
willing to take and still advise the central figure to give the risky alternative a try. 
3. There is no time limit. You should consider each scenario carefully, and you may return to an 
earlier scenario if necessary. 
When all the candidates had completed the test individually they were told that they 
had sat through an initial run to allow them to become accustomed to the test 
procedure. They were then organised into one group of five and asked to re-sit the 
same test, this time with the following instructions: 
4. This is the same questionnaire you have just completed. 
You completed it the first time around to familiarise yourself with the questionnaire and to give 
yourself some idea of where you stand on each situation. 
5. I would now like you as a group to discuss each scenario again and arrive at a unanimous 
decision for each. This time you may not return to an earlier scenario. 
6. When you have arrived at a unanimous group decision please mark that decision on each of 
your sheets. 
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The groups were then sent into different rooms to complete the test, each group with 
an observer to ensure compliance with the instructions. If a group struggled to reach 
consensus and asked for the intervention of the observer the following standard 
instructions were read to that group: 
Most groups are able to come to some decision if those who disagree will restate their reasons, 
and if the problem is re-read carefully. 
Upon arriving at a group consensus for any one question the candidates were asked to 
record their own post-discussion preference if they had not agreed with the group 
preference. These post-discussion individual preferences were recorded on the same 
questionnaire they had recorded the group preference. Once the questionnaire had 
been completed the candidates were individually separated from the group and asked 
to rank their fellow group members in respect of their influence upon the group 
decision-making process. A score of one was to be awarded to the candidate who had 
most influenced the group and the remaining other group members were ranked in 
ascending numerical order in respect of their influence. 
The final stage of the Wallach et al (1962) study was to re-administer the CDQ to 
candidates up to six weeks after the group discussion had taken place. It was deemed 
unnecessary to replicate this element of the original study for the pilot study. 
5.4.2 Further Development 
Discussion and comments received from the candidates involved in the first pilot test 
revealed that nearly all candidates had misunderstood the test instructions. In all 
instances of misunderstanding the candidate confused the instruction to indicate `the 
lowest possible probability' with their choice of how successful they thought the 
riskiest option would be. To counteract this an example question was included with 
the instructions to the candidates, shown in figure 5.3. The example question was not 
one of the scenarios included in the original study and had been written specifically for 
the present study. In the subsequent two pilot test group studies and the industrial 
studies the candidates were talked through the example question on a flip chart once 
they had read the instructions to candidates included on the cover of each 
questionnaire. 
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a) A house requiring underpinning may be purchased at a reduced rate well below 
market level. If the underpinning is successful the house could be sold at a 
substantial profit, however the structural engineer cannot guarantee the success of the 
underpinning procedure. 
lýýý '<ý ýý ýI ýv 
1in10 
Chance 
3 in 10 5 in 10 7 in 10 9 in 0 
Chance Chance Chance ><ce 
10 in 10 
Chance 
In this example Adam required evidence to assert the probability that the underpinning 
would be successful nine times out of ten before advising that the riskier option of buying 
the property be adopted. 
Figure 5.3. Example question from the developed CDQ utilised in the present study 
5.4.3 Industry Testing 
For the purposes of this research two, three-day residential risk management 
workshops hosted by an international construction company were utilised. Between 
fourteen and seventeen people attended each workshop, all of whom were employed 
by the same organisation, had professional backgrounds in a construction discipline 
but who worked in different geographical of the United Kingdom. 
The testing was undertaken at the end of the first day of the workshops. In total forty- 
two individuals were tested comprising five groups in three separate workshops. This 
study followed the same instructions and manner of implementation as was utilised by 
Wallach et al (1962) that were also used for the pilot testing of the questionnaire. A 
copy of the CDQ used to execute this research is included in appendix `A'. 
5.4.4 Interpreting the Results 
The preferences expressed by the candidates to the individual questions are scored 
from one to ten. The lower the score the lower the probability of success they 
accept.. 'and the higher the uncertainty regarding the achievement of the desired 
objective. It is assumed that those individuals who are `risk-seekers' are those who are 
happiest to live with uncertainty and will therefore score the lowest. The converse is 
true for `risk-averse' individuals. By presenting the candidates with a selection of life 
style scenarios a broader measure of their risk taking tendencies may be achieved. 
3 in 10 
86 
Chapter 5 Group Effect Upon Individual Decision-Making Preferences 
Therefore a risky-shift occurs when an individual is happier to live with greater 
uncertainty than they were previously. In the instance of the present study a risky-shift 
is shown to have occurred when the mean of the sum of the group pre-discussion 
individual preferences is higher than the group preference. 
Comparison of any one individual with their peers from within the groups or from 
within the entire sample population tested will allow that individual to be placed within 
a spectrum of risk taking tendencies specific for the sample population. If the sample 
populations tested prove to be indicative of the overall population then parameters and 
upper and lower limits may be placed that may act as benchmarks by which to gauge 
subsequent candidates who complete the CDQ. 
5.5 Analysis 
The analysis of the data seeks to test the four hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and the null 
hypothesis HO based upon the findings of the present study. The results are then 
compared with the Wallach et al (1962) study. To test these hypotheses a one-tailed, 
paired t test has been employed to substantiate the validity of any difference between 
the individual and group preference means after each phase of the study (Wright, 
1998). Wallach et al (1962) used the one-tailed, paired t test in the original study. 
A complete transcription of the statistical analysis is included in appendix `B' of this 
thesis. Comparisons between the present and original studies are summarised below. 
5.5.1 Wallach et a/ (1962) results 
Wallach et al (1962) tested one hundred and sixty seven individuals in the course of 
their study, all of whom were liberal art students enrolled in summer sessions at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder. They comprised fourteen all male groups with six 
members in each and fourteen all-female groups again with six members in each, none 
of whom were previously acquainted. The present study will only concern its self with 
the results obtained by Wallach et al (ibid) for the male groups, as all but one of the 
forty-two subjects in the present study was male. 
The means of the pre-discussion individual preferences for all six members of the 
groups were calculated for each of the twelve individual questions and also for the 
complete CDQ. These means were then subtracted from the group preferences for 
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each of the fourteen groups. The differences between mean pre-discussion individual 
preferences and group preferences were totalled for the fourteen groups and the mean 
of this answer obtained tested for significance using a one-tailed t test. Table 5.1 
shows the results obtained by Wallach et al (ibid) for the fourteen all male groups. 
Item Mean 
difference 
Number of 
groups 
t 
All combined - 9.4 14 6.46 <0.001 
1 - 1.0 14 4.34 < 0.001 
2 -0.2 14 <1.00 
3 - 1.1 13* 2.19 p <0.05 
4 -1.8 13* 6.18 p <0.001 
5 +0.1 13* <1.00 
6 - 1.2 13* 3.35 <0.01 
7 -2.0 14 9.64 < 0.001 
8 - 1.1 14 1.97 
9 -1.0 10* 3.67 p<0.01 
10 -0.4 13* <1.00 
11 - 1.1 12* 4.37 p<0.005 
12 +0.8 11 * 2.34 < 0.05 
*When a number of groups in table 5.1 is shown as less than fourteen it signifies that a group reached a 
deadlock on that particular question and were unable to arrive at a decision. A negative score in the 
`mean difference' category indicates a risky shift whilst a positive score signifies a cautious shift 
(Wallach et al, 1962). 
Table 5.1. Table showing the significance of the difference between the pre-discussion individual 
preference and group preference (Wallach et al, 1962) 
The results obtained for the overall questionnaire by Wallach et al (1962) strongly 
indicate that for their fourteen all male groups, group discussion to consensus has the 
effect of encouraging individuals to choose options which offer less certainty of 
achieving desired outcomes than they had previously chosen as individuals, termed the 
`risky shift'. 
This risky shift effect is exhibited over ten of the twelve CDQ questions with only 
question 5 and 12 exhibiting a cautious shift. The authors suggest that this cautious 
shift is evidence that questions five and twelve are " impure measures of the 
psychological dimension being tapped by the other ten items" (Wallach et al. ibid). 
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Even considering the cautious shift exhibited by questions 5 and 12 the risky shift is 
still evident when the questionnaire is considered in its entirety. 
5.5.2 The Present Study 
The present study tested forty-two industrialists currently employed by the same parent 
organisation in the construction industry. Of the forty-two subjects tested only one 
was female. The male to female constitution of the sample should not be considered 
unrepresentative when the demographics of the construction industry are considered. 
The attendees were seated around a horseshoe-shaped arrangement of tables with no 
seating spaces between one another. This may give rise to reservations regarding the 
comparison of answers between candidates in the individual pre-group discussion 
stage of the experiment however none was observed. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire the attendees remained quiet and seated until the last person had finished 
and the papers had been collected. This behaviour ensured that no candidate felt 
rushed to complete the questionnaire. 
In the Wallach et al (1962) study the researchers ensured that none of the group 
members were previously acquainted. Throughout the course of the present study it 
became apparent that some of the group members had previous acquaintance through 
their employment. Because the subjects were all invited by their employer to partake 
in a professional development workshop, and also because there were only enough 
attendees to constitute two groups, it was impossible to distinguish between those 
individuals who may have had prior working acquaintance with one another. 
Therefore group composition was achieved by choosing individuals by their alternate 
seating arrangement around the table. 
5.5.3 Industrial Groups Comparison - Hypotheses H1, H2 and HO 
In the present study the overall questionnaire results substantiate the risky shift theory 
stating that the group effect on the individual is such that the individual will be more 
inclined to live with increased uncertainty. In the present study the mean difference in 
the `all combined' category is -9.2 a very similar result to that obtained by Wallach et 
al (1962) study of -9.4. In the present study the t value of 5.23 expresses a confidence 
at the p<0.01 level. 
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For the individual questions the results between the two studies are slightly different. 
Whilst the present study shows cautious shifts on questions 5 and 12, it also shows a 
cautious shift on question 8. The mean difference of + 0.8 on question 8 is however 
not a strong shift which results in at score of t=0.17, p>0.20 and therefore lacks 
statistical significance. 
Question 5 in the present study shows evidence of a remarkably stronger cautious shift 
than did the Wallach et al (1962) study; mean differences of +0.1 and +4.2 
respectively. The results for question 12 in the present study also show a stronger 
cautious shift than in the Wallach et al (ibid. ) study, mean differences of +0.8 and +1.4 
respectively. Table 5.2 shows the results obtained from the testing of five groups. 
Item Mean 
difference 
Number of 
groups 
t 
All combined -9.2 5 5.23 p<0.01 
1 -0.1 5 0.04 p>0.20 
2 -0.3 5 0.13 p >0.20 
3 -2.7 5 0.34 p>0.20 
4 -2.2 5 0.31 p>0.20 
5 +4.2 5 0.30 p>0.20 
6 - 1.3 5 0.21 > 0.20 
7 - 1.7 5 0.34 p>0.20 
8 +0.8 5 0.17 >0.20 
9 - 1.7 5 0.21 p>0.20 
10 - 1.1 5 0.23 p>0.20 
11 - 1.1 5 0.33 > 0.20 
12 +1.4 5 0.48 >0.20 
None of the industrial groups achieved deadlock in their consideration of any of the questions in the 
present study. 
Table 5.2. Table showing the significance of the difference between the pre-discussion individual 
preference and group preference for the present study 
The remaining nine questions show mean differences similar to the Wallach et al 
(1962) study however, because of the smaller sample size used in the present study the 
independent evidence they provide is not strong enough to assert the validity of the 
questions as a true test or validation of the risky shift effect. However when compared 
with the Wallach et al (1962) results the similarity between the two studies is sufficient 
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to conclude that the results concur. The risky-shift effect has been shown to influence 
decision-making groups comprising construction professionals. 
5.5.4 Pre-Discussion Individual & Post-Discussion Individual Preference 
Comparison - Hypothesis H3 
Wallach et al (1962) tested the mean score of their respondent's pre-discussion 
individual preference against their post-discussion individual mean preference for the 
complete questionnaire and for individual questions. The results were then tested for 
significance using a one-tailed t test. The instructions to candidates were to indicate 
their individual answer if they were not in complete agreement with the group 
consensus of opinion. The Wallach et al (1962) results are recorded in table 5.3 
below. 
Item Mean 
difference 
Number of 
groups 
t 
All combined - 10.4 14 9.12 p<0.001 
1 -1.0 14 4.32 p<0.001 
2 -0.6 14 2.87 p<0.20 
3 - 1.1 14 3.04 p <0.01 
4 -1.7 14 8.14 p <0.001 
5 +0.1 14 <1.00 
6 - 1.1 14 3.79 p<0.005 
7 - 1.8 14 7.80 < 0.001 
8 - 1.1 14 3.54 p<0.005 
9 - 1.1 14 3.99 p<0.005 
10 -0.3 14 <1.00 
11 -0.8 14 4.36 p<0.001 
12 +0.1 14 <1.00 
Table 5.3. Table showing the significance of the difference between the pre-discussion individual 
preference and post-discussion individual preference (Wallach et al 1962) 
The pre-discussion and post-discussion individual preference comparisons for the 
present study are shown in Table 5.4. A one-tailed t test was used to test for 
significance of difference in preference. Again the score for the complete 
questionnaire shows that the shift is significant beyond the p<0.01. However 
questions 1,2,5, and 6 indicate no significant shift whilst questions 8 and 12 indicate 
shifts in the cautious direction replicating the results obtained for the pre-discussion 
individual preference comparison with group preference for the present study. 
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The results obtained for questions 5 and 12 replicate the results obtained in the original 
Wallach et al (1962) test which found that these two questions showed no indication of 
sharing the "general shift towards greater risk taking found for both sexes" (ibid). 
Item Mean 
Difference 
Number of 
Groups 
t 
All combined - 7.44 5 3.81 p<0.01 
1 -0.36 5 0.67 p>0.20 
2 - 0.57 5 0.92 p>0.20 
3 - 1.83 5 3.63 < 0.05 
4 -1.51 5 1.86 p<0.1 
5 +0.02 5 - 0.05 < 
6 -0.61 5 0.81 >0.20 
7 - 1.47 5 2.46 < 0.05 
8 -0.55 5 -1.06 
9 - 1.44 5 2.36 p <0.05 
10 -0.6 5 0.98 p <0.20 
11 -0.53 5 1.03 < 0.20 
12 +1.19 5 -2.68 
Table 5.4. Table showing the significance of the difference between the pre-discussion individual 
preference and post-discussion individual preference for the present study 
The results obtained by the present study indicate that group discussion process affects 
private attitudes as well as affecting the publicly expressed opinion evident in the 
group discussion to consensus preference. These findings concur with the results and 
conclusions obtained by the Wallach et al (1962) study. 
5.5.5 Perceived Influence within the Group 
Wallach et al (1962) used the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (KCC) to ascertain 
the level of consistency between the group members ranking of their peers with 
regards to their influence upon the group decision-making process. The KCC was 
applied to each groups influence rankings, the higher the corresponding value of the 
resultant W the higher the level of consensus amongst the group members. Table 5.5 
presents the W values and subsequent significance for the fourteen all male groups 
tested by Wallach et al (ibid) together with the W values and subsequent significance 
for the five groups tested in the present study. 
Wallach et al (1962) found that the level of agreement in influence rankings was 
significant for all fourteen of the male groups. The present study found that four of the 
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five groups achieved significant levels of agreement but the fifth group did not. 
Wallach et al (1962) then correlated the perceived level of influence in the group 
decision-making process and the level of pre-discussion individual preference for each 
individual. 
Group Wallach et al. (1962) Group Present Study 
N W N W 
1 6 . 64 <. 05 1 7 . 43 p<01 
2 6 . 55 <. 05 2 7 . 45 <. 01 
3 6 . 74 p<05 3 8 . 46 <. 01 
4 6 . 72 p<05 4 8 . 52 <. 01 5 6 . 70 p<. 05 5 5 . 32 not significant 
6 6 . 50 <. 05 
7 6 . 56p<01 
8 6 . 50 <. 05 
9 6 . 62 <. 05 
10 6 . 66 <. 05 
11 6 . 66 p<05 
12 6 . 55 <. 05 
13 6 . 54 <. 05 
14 6 . 73 p<05-- Table 5.5. Significance of consensus amongst group members concerning individual influence in the 
group decision-making process 
Wallach et al (1962) established that those who were the highest risk takers were the 
most influential in the group decision-making environment concluding that it was these 
participants which were responsible for the occurrence of the risky shift by influencing 
the other more conservative group members to shift. This theory has been used by 
Wallach et al (1962) to explain the risky-shift phenomenon but has been largely 
dismissed by subsequent studies as misleading and simplistic. Therefore this element 
of the original study was not completed in the present study. 
5.5.6 Longevity of Group Discussion to Consensus Effect - Hypothesis 
H4 
In the original study Wallach et al (1962) sought to establish the longevity of the group 
decision effect upon individual decision-making. They were able to contact twenty- 
two of the original eighty-four male participants, twenty-six percent of the original 
sample, and none of the female participants. The sample of twenty-two, who were 
approximately evenly distributed over the original fourteen male groups, were again 
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administered the same CDQ after a time interval of between two to six weeks had 
elapsed since participating in the group discussion to consensus. This sample group 
were asked to complete the same CDQ questionnaire, this time by post. The 
instructions for the completion of the questionnaire were the same as for the original 
pre-discussion individual testing. 
The respondent's pre-discussion and post-discussion individual preferences were 
subtracted from their post-post discussion preferences and the mean difference 
calculated for both categories and tested for significance by a one-tailed t test. Table 
5.6 highlights the Wallach et al (1962) results. 
The present study replicated this element of the original study and received twenty- 
three replies from the original sample of forty-two, a fifty-five percent response rate. 
Again the comparison between pre-discussion and post-discussion individual 
preferences with the post-post discussion individual preference were tested for 
significance by one-tailed t-test. The results are also shown in table 5.6 for 
comparative purposes. 
Post - Post 
Mean 
Pre - Post/Post 
Mean 
t Post - Post/Post 
Mean 
t 
Wallach et al. 54.6 -12.3 4.92 <0.001 -1.6 
Non-significant 
Present Study 72.6 -0.91 0.4 5.35 1.98 p<0.05 
Table 5.6. Comparison of the means of the post-post discussion individual preferences with the pre 
discussion individual and the post-discussion individual preference means for both studies 
There is a significant discrepancy to be found in the comparison of the present study's 
results and those of the original study. Wallach et al (1962) found that the effect of the 
group discussion on individual decision-making lasted for a period of up to six weeks 
after the group discussion to consensus had taken place. The post-post discussion 
individual preference exhibited greater affinity with their post group discussion 
preference than with their individual preference before the group discussion had 
occurred. However, the present study found that the individual decision-makers 
reverted to their original pre-group discussion preference rather than maintain any 
influence of the group decision discussion to consensus process. The present study has 
found that the risky-shift is not maintained over a period of two to six weeks and 
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intimates that the effect may be only transient on groups of professionals who have had 
prior acquaintance. 
5.6. The Risky Shift Effect 
The original Wallach et al (1962) study concluded that group discussion to consensus 
had the effect of encouraging the group to accept greater uncertainty than the 
individuals would accept pre-discussion. The present study found that group decisions 
made by construction professionals exhibited a willingness to live with greater 
uncertainty than did the mean of the individual decisions of the group members and 
concurs with Wallach et al (1962) and substantiates the hypotheses H1 and H2. The 
null hypothesis HO is therefore rejected. 
5.6.1 Influence of Group Consensus upon Individual Decision-Making 
In the original Wallach et al (1962) study the post-discussion individual preferences 
were found to exhibit a tendency to adopt a riskier position; i. e. one with greater 
uncertainty than was present in the original individual pre-discussion preference. 
These findings were also replicated in the present study of construction management 
decision-making groups substantiating hypothesis H3. 
5.6.2 Maintenance of the Risky Shift Effect 
Wallach et al (1962) found the effect of the group decision to consensus process 
continued to influence the individual decision makers over a period of two to six 
weeks after participating in the group discussion. The present study indicates that the 
individual preferences made by the construction professionals returned to their pre- 
discussion position after a similar time span of two to six weeks has elapsed since the 
group discussion process. Therefore the present study did not concur with this element 
of the original Wallach et al (1962) study therefore rejecting hypothesis H4. 
5.6.3 Influence of the Individual upon the Group Decision-Making 
Process 
Wallach et al (1962) established a positive relationship between "degree of risk taking 
in pre-discussion individual decisions and the extent to which group members are 
perceived by one another as influencing group decisions" (ibid). This conclusion has 
been shown to be erroneous by subsequent authors who have replicated the study, 
(Vinokur. 1971; Rim, 1963). Rim in a series of papers (1963,1964a, 1964b, 1965, 
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1966a, 1966b) established a detailed psychological profile that describes the most 
influential person within the group decision-making process. Rim (ibid) founded his 
theory upon his replications of the original Wallach et al (1962) study, using an 
abridged version of the CDQ and additional psychometric tools. Inclusion of Rim's 
(ibid) additional psychometric tools were beyond the scope of the present study and 
hence the correlation between pre-discussion individual preference and influence 
within the group decision-making process was not undertaken for this study. The issue 
of causation with regards to the risky-shift' in considered in chapter six. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The present study using construction project management professionals has established 
that group discussion to consensus encourages groups to live with greater uncertainty 
than would the individuals that comprise the group thereby indicating that individual 
preferences for uncertainty may be manipulated. 
5.7.1 The Risky Shift 
The mechanism causing the post-discussion change in individual preference does so by 
altering the perception of the problem domain by some or all of the group members. It 
is the communication and perceptual processes that must be examined in order to 
better understand these processes and to be able to offer guidance on how to educate 
individuals in their decision-making skills. These issues are reported in chapter 6, the 
case study investigation. 
5.7.2 Concluding Comments 
From the research already undertaken using the Wallach et al (1962) CDQ 
group/social culture has been identified as playing a vital role in the decision making 
processes of status equal groups, influencing an individual's perception with regards to 
risk and inducing a group decision risky shift. 
This research provides a model that can now be compared against the data 
accumulated via the case study reported and discussed in chapter 6. The second stage 
of the research using groups of construction professionals to identify and understand 
the mechanism(s) that facilitate the change of risk preference and perception. 
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6 Case Study Investigation 
6.1 Introduction 
The methodology and rationale supporting the case study have been discussed in 
chapter 2. This chapter therefore describes the practicalities of data collection and the 
purpose of the case study investigation. The findings derived from the case study 
investigation of construction risk management decision-making groups are presented 
together with the data, the method of data collection and analyses the results. 
The intention of the case study was two fold. Firstly it was designed to highlight the 
purpose of the organisations introduction of a risk management strategy and to see if 
this concurred with a previously detailed interpretation regarding the purpose of those 
strategies; namely to they seek to objectify risk. Secondly the case study was designed 
to identify the way in which individual perceptions of possibility were influenced 
within the process of group discussion as identified in the previous chapter that 
highlighted the effect of the risky shift phenomena on construction management 
professionals. 
6.2 Case Study Approach 
The collaborating industrial partner was attempting to introduce a new bespoke risk 
management strategy into their organisational processes. The introduction centred on 
training workshops the purpose of which was to introduce the employees to the new 
strategy and to educate them as to its implementation. 
The implementation of the phenomenological-oriented case study adopted the three- 
stage approach shown in figure 6.1. By utilising data generated in an organisational 
learning climate, as opposed to using staged `experimental' events, the likelihood of 
capturing data that exhibited actual responses was increased. It is possible that as the 
employees were attending a taught programme they might envisage a conception of 
right and wrong in terms of deliberation of problems and formulation of answers 
motivating them to avoid providing `incorrect' information. This effect of their taught 
environment may have been exacerbated by the presence of a researcher who remained 
present within the room during the group discussions. Therefore to avoid unduly 
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influencing the intuitive decision-making processes of the observed groups the 
approach to data collection was designed to minimise contact between researcher and 
subject. The method of data collection and group composition is discussed below. 
Stage 
Sta eA 
Sta eB 
Sta eC 
Element 
Pre-Workshop 
Workshop 
Post-Workshop 
Intention 
Establish organisational 
objectives and attendee pre- 
conceptions 
Observe how organisational 
obejectives are comunicated 
and understood by attendees 
Comparison of desired 
organisational perspective with 
actual employee interpretation 
of training objectives 
Figure 6.1. Three-stage case study methodology 
6.2.1 The Training Workshops 
The employees attended two-day residential project risk management workshops 
hosted by the organisation, the purpose of which was to communicate a desired 
organisational strategy for risk management. The aim of the training workshop is to 
educate the attendees to manage the project risk management process. The attendees 
were randomly divided into two groups, four members in each, by the workshop 
instructors. At pre-defined stages throughout the workshop they were set certain tasks, 
five in total, focused upon a fictitious home office extension project. The groups were 
assembled to ensure that neither was solely populated by individuals who had 
previously worked together. As discussed previously in section 3.4.5 the risk 
management process of identification and assessment constitute the more subjective 
stages of the process and consequently the case study research concentrates solely on 
those two dimensions. The tasks utilised for this research are reproduced in figure 6.2 
together with the task `brief'. The remaining un-used tasks concentrated on the 
derivation of a management strategy and the use of Monte Carlo simulation. However 
neither of these two tasks would add anything of value to case study that could not be 
identified within the examination of those previously mentioned stages of the process. 
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At the end of each task the groups were required to present their work in front of the 
assembled attendees. The presentation materials together with a recording of the group 
discussions were collected for analysis and form the basis of the findings presented 
here. 
You want to build a single-story extension to your own house for you to use as an office to work 
form home. You have a budget of £20,000 and a target completion date of six months from today. 
You haven't started anything yet! Carry out the following steps in syndicates at the end of the 
relevant lecture sessions. 
Part 3- 45 minutes 
Using brainstorming identify a maximum of 30 correctly named risks associated with the 
project, against the project objectives and risk management plan you defined earlier. 
Using the following structure, identify a maximum of 5 risks per section, leaving "Whole 
Project' to the end to account for any risks you feel should be in the project, but not 
covered elsewhere: - 
a) Whole Project, b) Planning Permission, c) Finance, d) Building Work, 
e) Decorasting & f) Moving In 
Part 4- 45 minutes 
Assess the probability and impacts against the time and cost impact categories you have 
defined for each identified risk, and plot risks on a PI Grid to allow you to rank them in 
order of importance. Identify the top 5 risks (Opportunities and Threats). 
Figure 6.2. Attendee brief 
Mini-disk audio recorders, placed as unobtrusively as practicable within the two group 
discussion rooms, were used to record the group conversations. In total ten recordings 
of group sessions were made, five of each group over the two-day period of the 
workshop. Only the recordings from each group that contain the discussions with 
regards to the two tasks detailed in figure 6.2 are being used in this research. As both 
groups were aware that their discussions were being recorded for analysis the 
possibility that the presence of these recording devices compromised the `purity' of the 
data collected must be considered. However no comment was made by any of the 
group members to the effect that voluntary censure was being considered or was 
advisable during the recorded sessions. 
The two groups completed their tasks in separate meeting rooms both of which were 
furnished with flip charts and pens. The presentation materials were recorded on these 
flip charts, which were subsequently collected and duplicated for partial inclusion 
within this research. The group discussions were transcribed using the methods 
detailed in chapter 2, and are reproduced in part within this chapter. Permission was 
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received by all participating group members for their discussions to be recorded for use 
within this research. The anonymity of the collaborating organisation and the group 
discussion participants has been maintained throughout this research. The group 
discussions under consideration in this research are included in their entirety in 
appendix `D'. 
6.2.2 Transcription Glossary 
Table 6.1 provides a glossary of symbols used in the transcription of the group 
discussions as recommended by Hutchby & Woofit (1998) and is replicated here to 
assist in the analysis of the provided transcription segments. 
Symbol Description 
(0.5) The number between the parentheses indicates the time elapsed in tenths of a second. 
Indicates a pause in conversation of less than two tenths of a second or less 
Equals sign indicates one sentence ` latching' onto the following of the same speaker 
Open square brackets indicate an overlapping sequence of conversation 
Double parentheses indicate a non-verbal activity or a transcribers comment 
- Dash indicates the sharp cut off of the preceding word or sound 
Colons indicate the stretching or continuation of the previous sound or letter. The more 
colons the eater the length of the continuation 
An exclamation mark indicates an emphatic tone 
Empty parentheses indicate the presence of an indiscernible fragment 
a: Marked falls in pitch are indicated by underlining the letter preceding the colon 
a: Marked rises in pitch are indicated by underlining the colon 
under Underlining indicates speaker emphasis 
CAPITALS Capitals indicate a fragment of noticeably louder speech than the surrounding speech 
o° 
Degree signs indicate a fragment of noticeably quieter speech than the surrounding 
speech 
>< Greater and less than signs enclose speech that was noticeably quicker than the 
surrounding speech 
Table 6.1. Transcription notation glossary (Hutchby & Woofit, 1998) 
Individual lines of the transcribed text can be identified by their preceding three-part 
code. For example the code G987fa refers to the Green team transcription, denoted by 
the initial letter G, line 987, denoted by the three figure number following the initial 
letter, spoken by group member `fa', denoted by the two letters following the three 
figure number. Table 6.2 details the professions of the group members. 
6.2.3 Attendee Pre-conceptions of the Risk Management Strategy 
The department responsible for the organisation of the training workshops provided a 
list of contact details of those individuals who were due to attend. All of the named 
individuals on the list were contacted one week prior to the workshop date and 
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interviewed over the telephone to asses their knowledge of the organisations bespoke 
risk strategy and their expectations, if any, of the workshop. 
Profession 
ID Red group 
as Senior QS 
ba Contract Manager 
ca Contracts Engineer 
da Chief Engineer 
Green Group 
ea Project Manager 
fa Chief Surveyor 
a Project Engineer 
ha Technical Integrator 
Table 6.2. Group member professions 
Unfortunately work commitments and other unidentified circumstance resulted in only 
eight of the prospective twelve employees attending. From those eight only five were 
named on the initial attendee list. Therefore it was impossible to collect sufficient data 
to ascertain the level of prior awareness and knowledge of the strategy held by the two 
groups. 
6.3 Summary of Findings 
Analysis of the information provided by the group discussion transcriptions and the 
subsequent findings are detailed below. The primary finding of this case study 
investigation is that the risk management strategy provided a framework within which 
identified risk may be recorded and managed but did not take account of the subjective 
nature of the risk management process, therefore: 
1. the risk management strategy did not offer any mechanism by which 
individual perceptions could be ascertained, managed or normalised. 
As a consequence individual subjective perception and hence identification of risk is 
not addressed and as a result the group decision-making suffered from the following: 
2. the groups were often unable to calculate meaningful probabilities of 
occurrence and in the main opted for 50/50 propositions; 
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3. cohesive group members often failed to question the validity of proffered 
estimates of probabilistic likelihood; 
4. less cohesive group members often questioned the validity of proffered 
estimates of probabilistic likelihood that in turn led to fewer 50/50 options 
being chosen; 
5. individual group members would use a rhetorical strategy in order to gain 
acceptance from other group members for a proposition; 
6. often only one proposition was considered at the expense of considering other 
options; nonetheless 
7. both groups managed the risk identification process effectively. 
The evidence for these findings is now presented and discussed in turn below. 
6.3.1 The Risk Management Strategy 
The following is a synopsis of the organisation's bespoke seven-step risk management 
strategy shown in figure 6.3. 
" Define business and project objectives - set the scene for the risk management 
process. 
" Define risk management plan - the risk management plan defines the risk 
management process, which is then incorporated into the executable project 
plan. 
" Identification - qualitative identification of the risks, both opportunities and 
threats, associated with the current project. 
" Assessment - qualitative and quantitative assessment of the probable likelihood 
of occurrence and potential impact in terms of financial impact and time of the 
identified risks. 
" Planning - determination of responses to the potential risks in order to 
minimise the threats and maximise the opportunities 
" Management - management of the seven-step strategy 
" Feedback -experiential knowledge is recorded to allow the evolution of the 
strategy. 
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Define Business and 
Project Objectives 
Define Risk 
Management Plan 
Identification 
) 
Planning 
Management 
y Feedback 
Figure 6.3. The seven-step risk management process 
The organisations risk management strategy adheres to the same identify - assess - 
manage generic stages as the risk management processes identified in section 3.4.4. 
The main difference in this instance is the organisations additional explicit requirement 
to `define the business and project objectives'. However the difference would appear 
to be superficial as the instruction is simply made explicit whereas it would not be 
possible to execute the risk management process without first doing so. Similarly the 
instruction to `define the risk management plan' is cosmetic as it would not be possible 
to execute the process without having initially defined a plan. However the explicit 
inclusion in the organisations strategy enhances the bespoke identity of the process and 
highlights the branded nature of the approach. 
6.3.2 Purpose of the Risk Management Process 
A semi-structured interview with the senior manager responsible for the 
implementation and provision of the risk management strategy and training was 
undertaken. The purpose of the interview was to identify and ascertain the explicit 
aims of workshop/training programme and also to establish the organisational strategy 
for promoting the concept of the organisations bespoke risk management strategy, as 
discussed in section 2.6 to satisfy items Al and A3 detailed in table 2.3. The interview 
was recorded on mini-disk and an analysis of its content is included within appendix C. 
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The interview analysis suggests that the `drivers' behind the instigation of the 
organisations risk management approach are three fold: 
a) it is intended to replace the disparate approaches that existed previously with a 
comprehensive, objective and generic approach that may be used globally 
throughout the organisation; 
b) the approach is intended to represent the company's diversification from the 
mainstream of its competitors by exhibiting a progressive and matured 
approach to risk management to its customers; and 
c) the changing nature of the organisations customer interface have necessitated a 
prescribed risk management approach. 
The approach as it currently stands is identifiable by its seven step `branded' structure 
that represents formalised, current best practice within the organisation. This approach 
provides a standardised terminology, lexicon and generality that will enable the 
organisation to communicate internally between divisions and departments. A primary 
organisational objective was to design a generic risk management strategy that could 
be incorporated into the various departments own working practices and processes that 
would be seen as an integral and necessary feature of the overall construction process. 
This involves educating the employees in the philosophy and the processes of the 
organisations preferred approach to risk management. The initiative stresses 
individual accountability that is supported by an objective view of risk afforded by the 
risk management strategy. It has been acknowledged that previous approaches 
towards risk management within the organisation were disparate and that whilst 
employees were aware of risk they had not been `educated' in a formalised and 
structured approach to its management. 
The initiative has been running for approximately four years and the delivery team are 
finding that approximately three quarters of the attendees arrive with an understanding 
of the premise and the language used within the risk management framework. The 
opinion of the senior manager who gave this interview was that approximately ninety 
nine percent of the attendees leave the workshops with an `understanding' of risk 
management and the organisations preferred approach. Only ten percent show any 
interest in continuing or implementing their risk management training. However as 
104 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
there is no available evidence to support the existence or use of a prescribed and 
thorough manner of post-workshop interviewing it is difficult to ascertain how these 
figures are derived. 
In summary the organisations view is that it has designed a `comprehensive' and 
`objective' risk management strategy that will enable risks to be `seen' by their 
employees. The cultural change accompanying this view communicates that the 
organisation is not afraid of risk and uncertainty and is inclined to accept risk if they 
are to be rewarded in turn. This initiative was partly designed to provide a framework 
within which risks to the organisation arising from their diversification of interests 
may be effectively and objectively managed. However as they are not inclined to 
recruit risk managers from outside of their organisation there is uncertainty as to 
whether they realise that the initiative only provides a framework and does not educate 
the risk managers to identify risks they do not have the knowledge to recognise. 
6.3.3 Failure to Address Individual Preferences 
Although the organisations objective is to introduce a `comprehensive' and `objective' 
risk management strategy that will enable risks to be `seen', the strategy currently only 
provides a method for recording and identifying the organisations risks. In essence the 
strategy is an engineered response to a perceived organisational need that amounts to 
little more than a normative tool designed to control the manner in which employees 
undertake an organisational process. The structure of that process is well defined and 
controlled but has been done so without due consideration to the process inputs or 
outputs such as the behavioural issues and cognitive issues as identified by Vlek & 
Stallen (1980) other than on a superficial and mechanistic level. Similarly the strategy 
fails to manage the individual's impact upon the process by not identifying or stressing 
the need to discuss the assumptions upon which identification of risks and predictions 
of probability are made. 
The process of assumptions analysis is covered within the training workshop material 
and forms a component of the taught aspect of the workshop. However its use is 
restricted to ensure that no area of uncertainty is overlooked. Consequently no 
mention is made of the need to address assumptions when assessing probabilities and 
impacts or the assumptions upon which the identification of risk is made in the first 
105 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
instance. Figure 6.4 replicates the two slides used within the workshop materials to 
discuss the topic of assumptions analysis. 
To illustrate this point, any assumption that a project will have a problem with the 
delivery of materials, for example, may be recorded and later assessed for potential 
impact. The strategy does not identify or encourage the need to discuss any prior 
assumptions that uphold the notion that there will be a problem with delivery of 
materials in the first instance. Similarly the importance of clarifying assumptions that 
underlie any estimates of potential impact, in terms of both likelihood and severity, are 
not addressed. 
Slide 1. 
ASSUMPTIONS ANALYSIS 
o Identifly and list asumptions 
o Asses stability and sensitivity 
o Convert into risks 
stability 
sensitivity 
IF 
assumption proves false 
THEN 
effect on project objectives 
Figure 6.4. Assumptions analysis 
How 
likely? 
How good 
or bad? 
Slide 2. 
ASSUMPTIONS ANALYSIS 
oStrengths 
Rapid 
Specific to Project 
Simple 
oW eaknesses 
Depends upon prior identification of assumpions 
Can be subjectiive 
May miss generic risks 
This omission amounts to one of the primary weaknesses of the organisation's bespoke 
risk management strategy. In essence the strategy fails to address issues such as bias, 
experiential knowledge, motivation, group influence or individual behaviour towards 
uncertainty, all of which are evidenced in an individual's assumptions. These issues 
have been explored and discussed in detail in section 4.5 (see Harriss, 1998; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992,1982a, b and c, 1979; Raftery, 1994; Loewenstein, 1996; Hsee & 
Kunreuther, 2000; Chater & Oaksford, 2001; Munier, 2001; Beamish, 2000 and Bruine 
et al, 2000). 
These omissions from the taught aspect of the workshops are compounded by 
inclusion of the organisation's preferred technique for risk identification, which does 
not specifically include or encourage assumptions analysis, an integral aspect of the 
106 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
RAMP (1998) risk management process. Rather it is focused upon the singular use of 
brainstorming for identification and the recording of risks in a prescribed and standard 
format. Figure 6.5 replicates the workshop slide used to communicate the 
organisation's `common' preferred technique to risk identification, (the empty 
parenthesis on figure 6.5 indicate that the name of the organisation has been omitted to 
maintain anonymity). 
The common () technique 
Risk Workshops 
o Brainstorming for risk identification 
O Use of standard structure 
Generic sources of risks 
Generic check lists 
o Use of flip charts ID P 0 
Figure 6.5. Preferred organisational technique 
I 
The use of brainstorming is encouraged in an atmosphere of status equality amongst 
participants, without the questioning of identified prospective risks. However no 
opportunity is afforded the participants to question the validity of the inclusion of risks 
before they are assessed for probability. Consequently, whilst an individual may be 
able to justify the inclusion of a risk, via the use of a rhetorical strategy, questioning 
will only arise if the group composition encourages it, as is discussed in section 6.3.5 
(see Janis, 1982). Nonetheless, risk assessment in terms of potentiality and impact is 
undertaken both qualitatively and quantitatively. There is no guidance on qualitative 
assessment, which is left to the descriptive abilities of the individuals. 
Conversely the quantitative aspect of risk assessment is focussed upon the use of 
Monte Carlo simulation. Once a simulation has been run using the identified and 
qualitatively assessed risks the strategy encourages the risk management team to 
challenge the results. Figure 6.6 reproduces the workshop slide that highlights the 
basis of that challenge. 
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Challenge 
O Does it feel right? 
O What are the key risks that affect the 
output? 
o Have simple checks and ballences been 
carried out? 
0 Have we correctly modelled reality? 
Figure 6.6. Challenging the quantitative results 
Case Study Investigation 
The foundation of the challenge upon the results of the qualitative assessment is 
explicitly gut feel; "Does it feel right? " The risk management strategy provides no 
mechanism by which individual perceptions are gauged or assessed but ultimately 
retains the need for the use of intuition and experience in the assessment of potentiality 
and impact of risk. Whilst the second two points in the slide are valid and prudent the 
final remark is worthy of comment. 
"Have we correctly modelled reality? " is indicative of the organisations desire to 
objectively control and influence uncertainty. Whilst it may be an academic trait to 
highlight the specious nature of this intention, the effect that it may have on the risk 
management team is not to be underestimated. Greene et al (2000) have shown that 
often such methods of quantitative assessment are used to externalise the risk 
management process and thus afford the individual using them a sense of distance 
from the eventual outcome. In such a case the risk management process may become a 
placebo for the organisations unwillingness to acknowledge the nature of its operating 
environment as previously discussed in section 2.2.4. The following slide, figure 6.7, 
illustrates the organisations interpretation of its bespoke risk management strategy. 
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Deploying the risk process 
o Confirm business/project commitment 
Project within a project 
o Launch risk process 
Risk workshop 
Kick-off meeting 
Project Launch 
o Implement risk process 
Follow the seven steps 
Liaise with Risk Practitioner, supply chain 
Figure 6.7. Deployment 
Case Study Investigation 
The language used to communicate this interpretation conveys a sense of militarism: 
"Deploying the risk process", "Launch the process", and "Implement risk process". 
Use of these terms expresses a hard-edged certainty that could encourage one to 
believe that what is carried out within the risk management framework is an objective, 
concrete interpretation of reality, an objective it is unlikely to achieve for because of 
the complex nature of contemporary construction projects (Cambel, 1993; Gregoire & 
Progogine, 1989; Edwards & Bowen, 1998). Refer to section 3.9 for a more complete 
discussion. 
6.3.4 Probabilistic Propositions and their Derivation 
At the outset of the risk management assessment stage the groups are required to 
ascertain and record what they consider to be the cost and time impacts to their 
respective projects. These impacts are recorded on a pro-forma probability/impact 
chart designed by the organisation for use specifically within the bespoke risk 
management process (figure 6.8). The pro forma chart expresses minor opportunities 
and insignificant threats as improbable occurrences with a less than ten percent chance 
of occurrence and so forth. Opportunities and threats are expressed as negative and 
positive figures respectively. The groups must initially equate financial and time 
impacts to the threat and opportunity `bands' for their respective projects for each of 
the five categories of probability. The following extracts from the transcribed group 
discussions suggest that the group members are unable to discern the numerical 
expression of probability, a phenomenon discussed by Bruine et al (2000). 
109 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
PROBABILITY IMPACT 
% OPPORTUNITY COST TIME THREAT COST TIME 
£000'S DAYS £000'S DAYS 
1 Improbable <10 -1 Minor 1 Insignificant 
2 Could 10- -2 Significant 2 Marginal 
Happen 30 
3 As likely as 30- -3 Substantial 3 Serious 
not 50 
4 Probable 50- -4 Very 4 Critical 
70 Substantial 
5 Highly >70 -5 Exceptional 5 Catastrophic 
Probable 
Figure 6.8. Probability/impact chart. 
Instead the group members rely upon the verbal expressions within the 
probability/impact chart. Shackle's (1969) potential surprise offers one explanation for 
this phenomenon by predicting that individuals prefer to use the notion of the possible 
rather than the probable. Consequently the use of verbal expressions of `could happen' 
and `as likely as not' reflect the perceived possibility rather than the objective 
probability inherent with the particular decision domain. Consequently the subsequent 
calculations in the assessment stage of the process are fundamentally flawed because 
they are based upon the notion of the possible, a subjective interpretation borne of 
experience and intuition, which is no basis for frequentist probability calculations 
(Christensen, 1979). Similarly the evidence suggests that the expressions `could 
happen' and `as likely as not' are not discriminated between within the group 
discussions and are interpreted intuitively as inferring one and the same option. It is 
suggested that these two phrases whilst intended to express probabilities of 10 - 30% 
and 30- 50% respectively are actually intuitively interpreted as verbal expressions of a 
50/50 possibility option. Consequently this allows the group members the freedom to 
express possibilities of likelihood that are interpreted by the process as practically 
meaningless probabilities of equal likelihood. Table 6.3 details the identified group 
risks and their respective probabilities as identified by the two groups. The figures 
noted under the headings `P' in the table are the numerical pro-forms of the probability 
values and correspond to the adjacent risks. 
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RE D TEAM GREEN TEAM 
ID Risk Description P Risk Description P 
Planning Permission Planning Permission 
1 Failure to obtain planning permission 2 P. P (planning permission) not 
Granted 
2 
2 Restrictive permission, i. e. size, use, location 2 Ground conditions not suitable 2 
Additional requirements, i. e. landscaping, drain 
upgrading, fire escape, additional access 
I Delay 2 
Finance Finance 
4 Bank restrictions on loan 2 Finance (loan) not granted 3 
5 Turned down for loan I Interest rate changes 3 
6 Unexpected windfall, i. e. granny dies 4 Interest rate drops 3 
7 Interest rates alter 
(A) up 
(13) down 
3 
3 
Alternative fund arrangement 2 
Building work Building Work 
8 Delivery times of materials 3 Availability of materials 1 
9 Builder unable to start on time 2 Labour Availability 2 
10 Weather Conditions exceptional 2 Adverse weather 3 
11 Below ground problems - could require piling 2 Work Acceleration 3 
12 Access 2 
Decorating Decorating 
13 Building not drying out 3 Wife changes mind - colour 3 
14 Long delivery on carpet 2 Interface of building and decorating 
work 
2 
15 Building drying out too quickly - cracks 2 DIY 3 
Moving In Moving In 
16 Final connections to utility services, i. e. telephone 4 Utility provision 3 
17 Restricted access 1 Furniture delivery 3 
18 Postponed delivery of furniture 2 Will it fit? 2 
Whole Project Whole Project 
19 Portacabin 2 Use Individual sub-contractors 3 
20 Share additional space for rent 3 Tax benefit potential 2 
21 Convert garage 2 
_Company 
2 
22 Family problems due to stress 3 Circumstance changes (redundancy) 2 
23 Increased property values enables upgrade 2 
Table 6.3. Comparison of Green and Red group expressions of probability 
The red group identified twenty-three risks, twelve of which were ranked as `could 
happen (2)' and six as `as likely as not (3)'. The Green team identified twenty-two 
risks, eleven of which were identified as `could happen (2)' and ten of which were 
identified as `as likely as not (3)'. The Green teams identification of almost an even 
split between the two options bears some resemblance to a phenomenon described by 
Bazerman (1986) who noted that when asked to predict the results of a series of a 
fictitious coin toss the respondents almost always presented an even split between 
heads and tails, the only two options available. This result is similar to the regression 
to mean tendency whereby individuals expect an equal `spread' of outcomes, a fact not 
upheld by the science of probability (Slovic et al, 1982). This may explain the 
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predilection to use the 50/50 options. The following text explores the proposition that 
group members often failed to question the validity of an individuals verbally 
expressed prediction of likelihood as a causal factor for 50/50 choice options. 
G1034fa. yeah (. ) ok (. ) yeah (. ) labour availability (0.8) er: m (3.7) it could happen 
G1035ha. [yeah ] 
G1036ea. it could happen 
G1037fa. [yes it does 
G1038ea. it's a two 
G1039ha. two 
This passage of text concerns the Green groups' discussion of labour availability. In 
this instance the group express their estimation of probability with the phrase `it could 
happen'. None of the group members express actual percentile probabilities however 
in line G1037 fa implies that "it does" happen. Therefore the group members know 
that it does happen, but relying solely upon their intuition and experience they 
acknowledge that `it could happen'. It is arguable that this equates to a 50/50 
proposition even though the probability/impact chart defines this as a 10 - 30% chance 
of occurrence because of the notion that the phrases `could happen' and `as likely as 
not' evoke. Similarly the group fail to identify, verbalise or discuss the causes that 
they perceive may lead to problems with labour availability. The group remain 
oblivious that they may all be working from differing experiential backgrounds and 
therefore discussing (sic) the problem from different premises. The following is 
another example from the Red group. 
R938da. builders work (2.3) delivery times on materials (0.3) 
R939aa. phew ((audibly breathes out)) 
R940da. well that's as likely as not could happen (. ) 
R941aa. that could happen (0.4) 
R942da. er: m (. ) as likely as not though is it 
R943aa. yeah 
R944da. is it a three 
R945ca. yeah give it a three 
R946da. give it a three 
R947aa. yeah: i think so (0.9) 
On line G940da the phrase "as likely as not could happen" is used. This confuses the 
two options 'of could happen' and `as likely as not' and highlights the lack of 
meaningful difference between them when considered as verbal constructs. However 
the group agree that it is 'as likely as not' without any discussion of their individual 
assumptions regarding the nature of the risk. The following text is example of the 
Green groups failure to address their potentially differing assumptions and premise. 
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G1073ea. erm: adverse weather (1.2) 
G1074ga. I'd say a three (0.6) 
G1075ea. it is yeah (. ) it's as likely as not isn't it (2.8) now (1.4) the impact (1.7) i- i basically think = 
G1076fa. [yeah] [yeah] 
On line G1074 ga opines "i'd say a three", using the communicative numerical value 
of the chosen likelihood as a pro-form for the complete verbal expression. On the 
following line, G1075, ea responds, "it's as likely as not isn't it" preferring to use the 
verbal construct of likelihood. Both group members avoid using the numerical 
percentile expression provided in the probability/impact chart when communicating 
probabilities. Although only three examples from the text are provided here at no time 
do any of the members from either group use a numerical percentile expression of 
probability in the one and a half hours that they spent considering the likelihood of 
occurrence of their identified risks. This tendency to use verbal expressions of 
probability may be attributed to the group members' non-rational as opposed to 
objective interpretation of the decision domains, a theory proposed by Howarth (1988). 
Therefore whilst percentile numerical expressions are provided within the 
probability/impact chart they are never utilised and reliance is placed upon the use of 
verbal constructs of probability in order to communicate individual interpretations of 
decision domains. 
6.3.5 Effect of Group Member Relationships on Probability Assignment 
A limiting factor with the group performance hypothesis of this research is that only 
two groups were studied. However there are marked differences between how the two 
groups both discussed potentiality and the overall spread of values attributed to their 
identified risks. 
Of the two groups the Green group showed almost an even distribution between the 
probabilities awarded to their risks, eleven were deemed, `could happen' and ten ' as 
likely as not'. On the whole the green team exhibited a more cohesive group structure 
than the Red team who scored twelve risks as `could happen' and six `as likely as not'. 
In this research group cohesion was measured by the number of occasions on which 
the group members rejected a proffered measure of potentiality, in essence how often 
they disagreed with one another. A study of the transcribed group discussions 
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highlighted nine occasions when the Red group showed any signs of outright 
disagreement when discussion likelihood of occurrence compared to only two 
occasions for the Green team. The most explicit examples are shown below. 
R758da. right (. ) additional requirements ie landscaping (1.4) well again that's going to be a two = 
R759da. = isn't it (. ) it could happen they could ask us (1.7) 
R760aa. i think that's er: (. ) a bit higher than that 
R761da. as likely as not 
R762aa. hm:: 
R763ba. but landscaping drain upgrading i think that is highly unlikely 
R764da. wel- well we can still put something 
R765aa. you think that's unlikely 
R766ba. yeah 
R767aa. do ya (3.8) 
R768ba. well f- for a small extension i agree if it was a big one 
R769da. that's right you see (. ) you see people who build extensions and leave builders = 
R770ba. [but not for a little extension like this one] 
R77 I aa. [right ok then] 
R772da. = rubble around their houses 
R773aa. [put it a one: then (. ) put a one_ then 
In this example three Red team members disagree about the likelihood of additional 
requirements being imposed by the local authority. They do not negotiate a value 
rather they present their opinions and the most valid argument holds. The initial 
position is set in line R759da to the effect that "it could happen". A counter position is 
offered in lineR760aa but without the use of a rhetorical strategy. A third position is 
established in line R763ba that is questioned in line R767aa. The originator of this 
third position, `ba', uses a rhetorical strategy in line R768ba to `set a scene' with 
regards to the problem to which agreement is found in line R769da. The original scene 
is complemented in line R769da and completed in lines R770ba and R772da. 
Throughout this discourse `ba' and `da' contribute to create a scene by which 'aa' can 
see that his original position may be unfounded and consequently he alters his position 
to concur with them. This may be explained by 'aa' acquiescing to group social 
pressure rather than pursuing his position further. Alternatively the position forwarded 
by his two colleagues may have given him reason to doubt the veracity of his own 
initial position. Nonetheless in both instances the group entered into a discussion 
regarding the issue at hand and unanimously agreed having persuaded one of their 
members to alter his original position. The following scenario is a typical passage of 
conversation taken from the Green group as follows. 
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G1034fa. yeah (. ) ok (. ) yeah (. ) labour availability (0.8) er: m (3.7) it could happen 
G1035ha. [yeah ] 
G1036ea. it could happen 
G1037fa. [yes it does 
G1038ea. it's a two 
G1039ha. two 
In this passage of the transcript there is a sense of apathy regarding the issue under 
discussion; the three participating group members simply agree amongst themselves "it 
could happen" without recourse to discussion of any kind. The majority of the Green 
group discussions were of this nature with only two notable exceptions, one of which 
follows below. 
G1276ea. = shall we go for the minus five 
G1277fa. it wouldn't do any harm would it (. ) it's going to be the biggest opportunity that = 
G1278fa. = you will have 
G1279ea. >PUT IT this way you couldn't be proven the other way could ya< 
G1280fa. no 
G128lea. >you couldn't be proven < (. ) that it's a minus four (. ) 
G1282ha. we are talking about decorating (3.4) 
G1283ea. oh i tho- yeah yeah 
G1284ha. we are not going to save five grand on decorating are we ha ha ((laughs)) 
G1285fa. [yes (. ) we've go t- to be] 
G1286ha. on decorating 
In this instance whilst two of the group members are in agreement in lines G1276ea - 
G128 lea inclusive, they are proven to be incorrect in their assumptions in line 
G1282ha. This shows that group member 'ha' is willing to point out the group errors 
if he is aware of them whilst also showing his desire not to make errors. Therefore the 
group will reassess its position if shown to have cause to do so. Noticeable 
throughout the transcriptions of the Green teams discussions is the willingness of 
group member 'ea' to use rhetorical strategies, or scene setting, to communicate his 
perspective to the group. Accordingly he seems to be the most influential and 
`leading' member of the group. No subsequent analysis of this hypothesis has been 
undertaken as it is the author's belief that a more comprehensive study utilising 
psychological measures is required to establish any one group member as the most 
influential in the group decision-making environment (Rim, 1963,1964a, 1964b, 1965, 
1966a & 1966b; Katzell et al, 1970). 
Similarly Red group member `ea' appears to be an influential member in terms of his 
willingness to question outright his fellow group members. Although not 
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confrontational his attitude is one of devils advocate, albeit perhaps unwittingly. The 
following are examples of this behaviour taken from the transcribed group discussions. 
R776da. [we'll give it a one (0.4) er:: m 
R777aa. and if it happened what would happen then (. ) 
R778da. we: ll (. ) if it happened it would cost us a few quid to put it right 
R779ca. [ ()] [yeah 
R780aa. marginal 
R866da. we're a big company but on the other hand we said we would do it ourselves (. ) 
R867aa. and if they did what would it be then (. ) critical: (0.8) 
R868da. [hm:: ] c- could have serious implications 
R869aa. no well we've just said on the other that- 
R870ca. [are we just talking about from the one place here (0.7) 
R908da. = would go up () and that it would go down (1.1) so we are talking three for up and three= 
R909da. = or less than three for down 
R910aa. no i think it's more for going down int it 
R91 Ida. yeah () so we could have it three minus three perhaps (0.5) 
R984da. up to:: (1.3) a three >which is a serious one< (. ) just over a week 
R985ca. yeah 
R986aa. i wouldn't say it's serious i would say it's marginal really (1.4) two to four days out of a= 
R987aa. = six months 
R988da. [but what happens if we go- 
R989aa. [what 
R990da. what happens if we go over our six months period (3.6) 
R991aa. w- what does happen (1.9) 
R1069ca. only if it's frost you could be held up for a week at a time 
R1070da. [but bu- but would we be liable (. ) we are saying that we would be liable (1.2) 
R1071aa. ah no the builder is liable because i challenged that if you recall (1.0) I'm not sure the = 
R1072aa. = builder can be liable 
In all of the above examples `aa' forces the group to reconsider their position and 
defend their position by asking `what if' questions. This can be construed as a pivotal 
role in the group dynamic because it requires the group to reconsider their choices and 
options, a role highlighted by Janis (1982) as one of the preventative measures in 
avoiding groupthink, see section 4.7.2. No member of the Green team would appear to 
fulfil such a role. 
The conclusion is that the Green team exhibited some of the traits of highly cohesive 
groups, such as concurrence-seeking tendencies, as detailed by Janis (1982) that 
encouraged them not to question one another's position for the sake of maintaining the 
group dynamic. Similarly Sitkin & Weingart (1995) have highlighted the role that risk 
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propensity plays in limiting the search for information. This may be evidenced within 
the group discussions by the apparent willingness to accept the first option that is 
disclosed. However the questioning nature of the Red group, specifically 'aa's role of 
`devils advocate', amounted to a less cohesive group relationship but arguably 
facilitated more reliable results in terms of the risk management process. 
6.3.6 Consideration of Singular Rhetorical Strategies 
An emergent feature of the transcribed group discussions was the use of rhetorical 
strategies in order to gain agreement by other group members for a particular 
proposition. The tactic would seem be to verbalise a conception of the decision 
domain that is conducive to an individual's position in order that the remaining group 
members can `visualise' and will therefore be able to concur with that position. The 
following text concerns a discussion regarding the impact of labour availability. 
G1062ea. well ((breathes the word out)) (2.5) i think it's a three as well because: 
G1063fa. yeah 
G1064ha. [yeah] 
G1065ea. i can't come i've got a job (. ) yeah 
G1066ha. yeah 
G1067ea. it's going to be another two weeks before i finish that job (. ) >because six months is = 
G1068ha. [yeah] [yeah] 
G1069ea. = ridiculous< (. ) once you think about it really (1.2) yeah (. ) normally builders i can't = 
G1070ha. [yeah] 
G1071ea. = come this week it's going to be another three weeks the the three covers it i think 
G1072fa. [yeah yeah] [yeah (1.5) 
In this example `ea' utilises a rhetorical strategy to describe the hypothetical behaviour 
of a builder with which the other group members agree. No group member questions 
this proposition and consequently whilst there appears to be no agreement as to the 
length of time the builder will be absent, the group are in agreement as to the potential 
impact. This is similar to the mind models proposition made by Johnson-Laird (1983) 
which predicts that when faced with a problem only one model of the circumstances 
surrounding the problem is constructed and considered at the expense of formulating 
and considering other counter models. This `strategy' ultimately leads to sub-optimal 
solutions being identified. Consequently the use and consideration of singular 
strategies can be deemed, in Howarth's (1988) terms (refer to section 4.4.2), non- 
rational. This may be explained by the fact that no group members are certain of what 
will occur; therefore a plausible (sic) option is derived. However in most instances the 
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preferred strategies would appear to be spurious; the following extract of conversation 
from the Green group is an example in point. 
G1321ea. = moving in (. ) utility provisions (1.1) now i think this is as likely as not really the = 
G1322ea. = probability of that happening (. ) you know what they are like these new utility.. 
G1323fa. [oh yes] 
G1324ea. it's not like the old bt where it was spot on= 
G1325fa. yeah 
G1326ha. [yeah] 
G1327ea. = and the old gas board (. ) these other companies offer you hundred quid less a= 
G1328fa. [yeah] 
G1329ea. = year but you get less of a service 
G1330fa. course you do yeah 
G1331ea. so i think 
G1332fa. i think it er: () is quite likely (. ) 
G1333ha. as likely as not yeah 
In line G1322ea reference is made to a shared, common experience by the use of the 
phrase "you know". The originator of this `scene', `ea', projects a personal experience 
directly `onto' the other group members by using the phrase "you know what they are 
like" making it a shared group experience. However this phrase may have a two fold 
purpose, whilst it may project an experience it may also be questioning its own validity 
by inviting disagreement from the group. Consequently as it would appear to be a 
group dynamic to rarely question or disagree the experience is accepted and the 
likelihood gauged accordingly. The following example highlights the Red groups 
culpability in this regard. 
R951aa. we're talking about four to five four to six (. ) six days here (1.5) 
R952da. yeah 
R953aa. if the material doesn't come in four to six days: 
R954ba. well we've only got- 
R955aa. [it's got to be serious and we can't start 
R956da. yeah (1.0) 
R957aa. if we don't get the material we can't start for four to six days (0.5) 
R 958ba. yeah 
R959da. [so it's three 
R960aa. [that's what we are saying (. ) three times three i would have thought = (1.1) 
R961aa. = and all we can do is hope he can make that up (0.6) 
In line R951aa an assumption is made that the materials will not arrive for between 
four to six days to which agreement is made in the subsequent line R952da. The 
potential impact of such an occurrence is then calculated upon this assumption. In this 
example the group members' assumptions are made explicit, i. e. the materials will be 
between four to six days late, but the underlying validity of these assumptions are not 
questioned. It is interesting to note that in this example group member `aa' is the 
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individual setting the `scene' and no other group member would appear to be willing to 
take over his role of `devils advocate' in this scenario. The next example is one taken 
from the Green group who are discussing the issue of restricted access to their 
property. 
G1139ea. access er:: m (2.9) could happen (1.0) 
G1140fa. hm: (3.2) 
G1141ea. [erm: ] 
G1 142ga. well if you couldn't and you you had to take down a fence or you had to get permission = 
G1143ga. = from a neighbour 
G1144fa. yeah. 
G1145ea. yeah () i think your threat is: () marginal (. ) money wise 
G1146fa. hm: 
G1147ha. hm: (0.8) 
G1148ea. what you're gonna have it's gonna be a fence 
G1149fa. yeah 
G1150ha yeah it's gonna be- 
GI 15lea. it's an arse but you can lift it up 
G1152fa. yes 
The issue of what constitutes a restriction is addressed in line G1142ga stating that 
"you had to take down a fence or you had to get permission from a neighbour". 
Consequently in line G1145 group member `ea' takes on a pseudo advisory role by 
offering "i think your threat is" and again in line G1148ea he states that "what you're 
gonna have is". In this extract of conversation `ea' momentarily distances himself 
from the group to adopt an advisory role; the role of a pseudo expert in matters of 
access. In both the first example of this section as well as the current example the 
effect on the group could be one of achieving elevated status. Where first hand 
experiential knowledge is projected onto the group they perceive the `projector' as 
having knowledge in these matters that the rest of the group members do not. 
Similarly where the group perceive the position of invited `expert' or `advisor' 
elevated status is also achieved. 
In the previous examples all estimates of threat and impact are based upon singular 
presumptions. In the following example from the Red team the original `scene' is set 
in lines R962da with an estimate of "up to a week". In the following line R963aa the 
original proposition is countered with a fuller rhetorical strategy to which some 
agreement is given in lineR966ca and even embellished upon in line R968ca. 
However in lines R969da - R971da inclusive the original proposition is re-stated but 
with greater depth to the extent that a `scene' is established to add further veracity. 
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R962da. >BUILDER< unable to start on time (. ) so that could be again up to a week (2.0) 
R963aa. a:: well i would say it's improbable if we've chosen the right builder () we've = 
R964da. [or even two weeks] 
R965aa. = discussed it with him you know 
R966ca. it's not a great start from his point of view is it 
R967aa. a- 
R968ca. [we've agreed a date 
R969da. [i would say it could happen though (. ) because he he- might = 
R970da. = have turned round to him and said () you know () look you've got defects on my= 
R971da. = property and if you don't fix them i aint going to pay you any more money at all 
R972aa. ok lets loo- 
R973da. [yeah so it could happen 
R974ba. °yeah° 
R975da. could happen 
When group member `aa' attempts to further question the position in line R972aa he is 
interrupted and an `agreement' made in line R973da. In this instance the `scene' being 
constructed in line R963aa is a personal one. The originator neither projects his 
experiences onto the group nor does he distance himself from the group in an 
`advisory' capacity, consequently he is unsuccessful in `selling' his position to the 
group; they remain unconvinced and instead offer a rebuttal in line R969da. Also a 
point to consider is that the position offered in line R963aa was in direct conflict with 
the original position established in line R962da. 
6.3.7 Risk Identification 
Both groups effectively managed the risk identification process. Each was given the 
same amount of time to identify their project risks and the same prompt list containing 
five categories of risk as follows: 
" planning permission; 
" finance; 
" building work; 
" decorating; 
" moving in; and 
" whole project. 
Figure 6.5 shows the organisation's preferred manner of risk identification. In both 
groups the members used each other's suggestions as platforms from which to 
embellish on and proffer further suggestions. This was accomplished in spite of the 
120 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
fact that neither group used a facilitator for the brainstorming sessions, as is 
encouraged by the risk strategy. Table 6.4 contains the identified risks that were 
common to both groups replicated directly from the group's presentation materials. 
RE D TEAM GREEN TEAM 
ID Risk Description Risk Description 
Planning Permission Planning Permission 
1 Failure to obtain planning permission P. P (planning permission) not Granted 
Finance Finance 
2 Turned down for loan Finance (loan) not granted 
3 
4 
Interest rates alter 
(A) up 
(B) down 
Interest rate changes 
Interest rate drops 
Building work Building work 
5 Delivery times of materials Availability of materials 
6 Builder unable to start on time Labour Availability 
7 Weather Conditions exceptional Adverse weather 
Decorating Decorating 
8 
9 
Building not drying out 
Building drying out too quickly - cracks 
Interface of building and decorating work 
Moving In Moving In 
10 Final connections to utility services, i. e. telephone Utility provision 
11 Postponed delivery of furniture Furniture delivery 
12 Restricted access Will it fit? 
Table 6.4. Comparative risk table 
In total forty-five risks were identified twelve of which were identified by both groups 
and from the remaining risks eleven were unique to the Red group and eleven unique 
to the Green group as shown in table 6.5. In short, whilst both groups were working 
within the same time limits, with the same information and prompt lists they managed 
to identify a total of thirty- three risks. Eleven of those would have gone unrecognised 
without the benefit of being able to compare and contrast the two identified lists. 
These results highlight the subjectivity of the risk identification process and the role 
that experience and intuition play; arguably two factors that significantly influence risk 
identification (see chapter 4). In the current study the organisation had no 
understanding of the experience or knowledge that each group held and consequently 
the groups performance in both the identification and assessment tasks reflected this. 
It may be argued that there was no need to assemble groups in such a regard for the 
purposes of a training workshop, however it should be borne in mind the degree of 
seriousness that the organisation places upon these training sessions. 
121 
Chapter 6 Case Study Investigation 
RED TEAM GREEN TEAM 
ID Risk Description ID Risk Description 
Planning Permission Planning Permission 
1 Restrictive permission, i. e. size, use, location 12 Ground conditions not suitable 
2 Additional requirements, i. e. landscaping, 
drain upgrading, fire escape, additional 
access 
13 Delay 
Finance Finance 
3 Bank restrictions on loan 14 Alternative fund arrangement 
4 Unexpected windfall, i. e. granny dies 
Building work Building Work 
5 Below ground problems - could require piling 15 Work Acceleration 
16 Access 
Decorating Decorating 
6 Long delivery on carpet 17 Wife changes mind - colour 
18 DIY 
Whole Project Whole Project 
7 Portacabin 19 Use Individual sub-contractors 
8 Share additional space for rent 20 Tax benefit potential 
9 Convert garage 21 Company sponsorship 
10 Fan-il problems due to stress 22 Circumstance changes (redundancy) 
11 Increased property values enables upgrade 
Table 6.5. Table of risks 
Once the attendees have completed their training they are considered project risk 
managers and may be called upon to fulfil this role in the workplace. Therefore the 
workshops constitute the only dry run the employees will have before engaging in the 
actual process of risk management on a live project. Consequently these risk managers 
may be called upon at any time to assemble a group of professionals to participate in a 
live risk management process. The criteria for inclusion in such a group amounts to 
availability or `having done something like it before'. 
6.4 Summary 
Because all of the above examples are drawn from a training workshop and not a real 
project-working environment, an argument may be forwarded that the groups are 
circumventing the process of assessment. They may be doing this by making 
assumptions regarding the nature of the hypothetical example in order to expedite the 
assessment process. However the conclusions are supported by well-established 
theories that are themselves grounded in actual behaviour and not experimental design 
and thereby assisting to validate the observed group behaviour in this research as a 
valid construct. 
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The organisations bespoke risk management strategy does not manage the individual, 
their decision-making or their preferences with regards to uncertainty and risk. 
However the strategy does manage the structural process of risk management by 
providing a framework within which the risk management processes are to be 
conducted. In conclusion it would appear that either the organisation is unaware of the 
need to manage individual perceptions, or alternatively the organisation may be aware 
of that need and have a desire to do so but are failing because of the reasons stated 
above. 
The use of rhetorical strategies has been highlighted as a method by which individuals 
can exert their influence over their fellow group members. However this strategy also 
provides an explanation for the functional mechanisms motivating the risk-is-a-value 
hypothesis (Teger & Pruitt, 1967). The assumption is that the rhetorical strategies 
engender a group understanding and consequently the prevalent, or most accessible 
proposition, becomes the accepted group norm. However societies prevailing cultural 
response to given situations may still motivate the formulation of rhetorical strategies. 
The use of the strategies may be a learned response on behalf of the construction 
professionals. Section 3.6.5 has shown how prescribed solutions to problems are often 
not available construction managers (Gunning, 1999,1996) as a consequence of the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with contemporary construction projects 
(Williams, 1999). Therefore the rhetorical strategies are based upon some experiential 
knowledge, utilising judgemental heuristics, but are misplaced in the sense that they 
are utilised to formulate answers to problems with which the decision-makers have no 
actual experiential knowledge. Bounded rationality would appear to offer a plausible 
explanation for their formulation. The theory states that individual decision-makers 
minimise uncertainty by making assumptions etc (Simon, 1957); this maybe the case in 
this instance, however in some cases the assumptions may be incorrect and misleading. 
Consequently the heuristics and experiential knowledge utilised in their formulation 
are being misapplied. 
The reasoning behind the acceptance of the strategies lies within the formal and 
everyday (Chater & Oaksford, 2001) quasi rationality, interpreted as consistently 
substandard and non-maximising behaviour exhibited by an individual (Raftery, 1999). 
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This implies that acceptance of the strategy is aided by the individuals languor in their 
search for information and solutions, as reflected in the mind-models theory. 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the transcribed group discussions that will 
assist in formulating a risk management strategy and that take account of individual 
perceptions and preferences are discussed in chapter 7. 
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7.0 Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
Risk is irreducible from uncertainty; it only exists as a potentiality in terms of both 
impact and likelihood. However structured risk management strategies view risk as an 
objective reality established by virtue of their rational interpretation of the decision 
environment. These contemporary risk management strategies follow the generic 
processes of identify, assess and manage; the output of which are probabilistic 
interpretations of the decision realm. However the risk management strategies fail to 
consider the propensities of individual decision-makers with regards to risk and 
uncertainty, their motivations or their intuitive interpretation of the decision 
environment. Therefore a dichotomous view of risk is expressed by the perceptions of 
individuals and their intuitive interpretation of the decision environment. 
7.2 Research Questions 
At the outset of the research following two questions were set: 
What is the cumulative effect, if any, of factors such as mood, motivation, 
rationality and complexity upon individual and group decision-making? 
The first question may be addressed by examining the philosophy of risk. Firstly risk 
is irreducible from uncertainty (Hertz & Thomas, 1984) and has been shown to be an 
individual reaction to the unknown. Hence risk and uncertainty go hand-in-hand in 
expressing an individual's interpretation of their environment with regards to the 
perception of an unwarranted outcome (Beck, 1986). However individuals are 
susceptible to psychological phenomenon such as motivation, mood, desire and culture 
(Mellers et al, 1999; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). These factors drive the 
individual's perception of their environment with regards to their needs, wants and 
desires, therefore they impact upon the type of information and the way that the search 
for information is undertaken. Consequently individual decision makers may not 
always want the same as their peers in terms of decision outcome. Therefore they 
must rationalise these wants amongst the group to achieve group objectives that are 
acceptable to the majority. The second question is re-stated below: 
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How do individuals manage the information required to interpret their 
environment? 
Individuals create `short cuts' and establish `types' which enable them to categorise 
some of the vast amount of information available to the decision makers from within 
their environment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). These heuristics etc. aid the decision 
maker by allowing them to make inference and comparison between present and past 
events which in turn negates the need to investigate the present environment in its 
entirety (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972,1979,1982a, 1982b, 1984). The problems arise 
with this process when the decision makers make spurious and unwarranted 
associations that are either incorrect or misleading. Also, as the derivation of these 
`short cuts' is based upon individual experience and knowledge they differ between 
decision makers and so lead to conflicting views of group environments and the 
establishment of group objectives. The risky shift (Wallach et al, 1962), as described 
in chapters 4 and 5, has shown how some individuals are willing to alter their 
perception of their environment if sufficient information is made available to them 
(Teger & Pruitt, 1967). These differing opinions and interpretations may be 
considered using the analogy of the risk prism, not all prisms refract the `light' in the 
same way. The following discussion highlights the way in which this research has 
attempted to rationalise these differing perceptions via the introduction of a new risk 
management process. 
7.3 Purpose of Risk Management Strategies 
The use of risk management strategies is founded on the belief that they add structure 
and objectivity to the process of risk management. However the framework of that 
strategy only adds to the auditable nature of those processes contained therein and does 
not objectify risk. The strategies do allow the participants to identify with, and to 
position themselves within, a defined process for the execution of the organisations 
risk management function. However the risk management strategies fail to accomplish 
the following: 
they fail to address the individualistic nature of risk identification and 
assessment; 
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" they do not differentiate between the possibilities identified by participants to 
the process and the probabilities required to execute a distributional analysis of 
the decision environment; 
" the mechanics of the process are often flawed as they fail to elucidate on, or 
make explicit, the assumptions that drive the participants view of the decision 
domain; and 
" the processes make no real attempt to manage the group dynamics or group 
performance within the risk management strategy. 
The following discussion examines these failings in the strategies and concludes with 
an improved risk management process. 
7.3.1 Assessments of Likelihood 
Individuals do not naturally identify with distributional probability theory; even those 
with higher degrees often make assertions that contradict the axioms of probability 
theory (Bruine et al, 2000). These individuals express their perceptions of likelihood 
in terms of what is possible as opposed to what is probable. Consequently the 
following observations may be made which when considered will allow the conception 
of an improved risk management process. 
participants to the risk management process assign possibilities to the identified risks 
but these values are interpreted as probabilities by the strategy and the subsequent risk 
simulations. For probability theory to 
function an exhaustive list of potential future 
states must be identified (Shackle, 1969). 
Accordingly when the risk identification 
process is undertaken it is assumed that an exhaustive 
list of risks has been complied, 
which are subsequently assigned a value that reflects their likelihood of occurrence. 
However when the values assigned to the individual risks are totalled they generally 
exceed the value of 100%. This is in an axiomatic violation of 
distributional 
probability theory, i. e. that when all the values are totalled they must sum to 
1.0 or 
100%. This leads to the assertion that the contributors to the process treat each risk as 
a discrete event independent of the others. 
Firstly this is in part attributable to the 
desire of risk management strategies to identify only the most important risks, or those 
with the greatest potential 
impact, which negates the need to establish an exhaustive 
list of potential outcomes. Secondly the causal dependencies and relationships 
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between the identified risks are often too complex to identify and are therefore 
ignored; as a result the participants to the process treat the identified risks as 
independent events. Consequently the participants attribute non-distributional values 
to those risks that reflect the possibility and not the probability of occurrence allowing 
the individual's affinity with the subjective possible as opposed to the objective 
probable measures to be expressed. However whilst the risks are assigned non- 
distributional measures they are treated as distributional probabilities by the 
subsequent process of assessment via simulation. 
If the parties to the risk management process were asked to identify an exhaustive list 
of potential outcomes and assign values to them in accordance with the axioms of 
distributional probability theory those risks would exhibit two primary features. 
Firstly the assigned values would have to sum to unity and secondly as individual 
events they would be assigned significantly lower values of likelihood of occurrence as 
prescribed by the need to be distributional (Shackle, 1969). Nevertheless the identified 
risks are treated as the events most likely to occur; the remainder of those risks that 
would sum to unity when added to that risk are seen as unimportant by virtue of the 
lower values they would be assigned and are not considered. The structured risk 
management strategies therefore truncates the process by assuming that those 
identified risks are most likely because of the objective distributional probabilities 
assigned to them by that process. Whereas in reality they are simply the risks 
identified by the participants within the process that are considered highly possible, i. e. 
non-distributional, with assigned values that reflect this. 
7.3.2 Group Effect on Assessments of Likelihood 
The group discussion effect reported in chapter 5 that resulted in increased risk taking, 
the `risky shift' (Wallch et al, 1962), may be reinterpreted if the values assigned to 
those risks are treated as possibilities and not probabilities. The participants offer 
opinion within the group discussions that reflect what 
is seen as possible to the 
individual. They do not present any evidence to support their claims other than verbal 
accounts of their own subjective interpretation of the 
decision domain, see chapter 6. 
The individuals will recount examples that reflect their relative positions with regard to 
their need for certainty. However the previous discussions recited above and in 
chapter 3 highlights the nature of subjective perceived 
likelihood. 
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Consider the nature of gambles, and in particular national lotteries. If those willing to 
gamble truly understood the odds against a win, rationally speaking they would not 
gamble. However many do gamble arguably because they believe that it is entirely 
possible to win, a notion that is not expressed as a probabilistic likelihood but as an 
intuitive, motivated desire; consequently this behaviour is seen as irrational and not 
objective. 
The use of rhetorical strategies by group members, as discussed in chapter 6, to 
convince others that their individual position is valid may encourage other group 
members, and hence the group, to choose inherently more uncertain options. This 
transposition of individual perceptions, as conveyed in the strategies, to group 
decisions, as achieved by consensus, may account for the risk-is-a-value explanation of 
the risky shift phenomenon (Clarke & Crockett, 1971). The participants choice options 
may then be considered to express the following; `if it were possible that I may be 
successful I would accept the option' and not `my chances are `x' out of ten for 
success'. However if the participating group members were offered more than one 
potential outcome within the CDQ it is not unwarranted to assume that they would also 
assign higher non-distributional values to other options. Therefore if the subjects 
discussed numerous other potential outcomes they would assign equal weightings of `8 
out of 10' expressions of possibility to more than one, which would not be practicable 
if they were considering the probabilities of success. 
7.3.3 Derivation of Subjective Possibilities 
The subjective interpretations of likelihood are derived from experiential knowledge 
and where that is unavailable information from the immediate environment is utilised 
to inform the decision-making process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Those 
experiences recounted by individuals in group discussions may add to the knowledge 
of the individual that in turn alters their font of knowledge with regards to decision- 
making, if what is being communicated is deemed pertinent and of value to the 
recipient. 
As individuals mature they learn and acquire experiential knowledge (Adams, 1995), 
consequently it is unlikely that they would ever find themselves in a position where 
they have little or no knowledge with regard to the decision at hand. This is made 
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possible by the individual's use of heuristics and other decision/learning tools that 
allow them to generalise between situations. However these `tools' often encourage 
decisions, as conveyed by descriptive theories of decision-making, that are deemed 
irrational because they make inference and suggestion that may not be relevant to a 
perceived objective and rational interpretation of the decision-realm as advocated by 
the normative theories. 
7.4 Improved Risk Management Process 
The primary aim of the research, below, expressed the need to address individualistic 
responses to risk and uncertainty. 
Al: Establish a risk management process that addresses the impact of 
individual and group reactions to risk and uncertainty. 
Consequently the recommended improvements to current risk management processes 
are not necessarily concerned with the process per se, but more concerned with the 
execution of that process and the reliance placed upon its output. Figure 7.1 shows the 
contemporary risk management process as discussed previously in section 3.6.1. 
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Figure 7.1. Contemporary risk management process 
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The process relies upon the unrealistic notion that all participants to the process share 
the same interpretation of the decision environment and are rational and objective in 
their deliberation of it. The proposed process in figure 7.2 acknowledges the 
differences in the participants understanding of the decision environment and seeks to 
rationalise these by encouraging those participants to discuss and present their 
interpretation to the decision-makers before commencing the risk identification or 
assessment processes. This process must encourage the recording and discussion 
surrounding each participant's assumptions about the environment. One method of 
doing so is by using `rich pictures' to present their interpretations and hence 
assumptions to the other decision makers (Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001). 
H Deliberate Decision Environment C> 
Encourage kWMduel Vocal ardor 
Ach Picture Presentation if 
Ovn Inlerpretatlaro 
ý 
b 
Risk 
Identification 
1 Risk 
Assessment 
-I Risk 
Response 
C> 
llý 
ý Subtecýe I Siblecthe Idenhficatlan ýor 
Iderwficadom (Brainstorm) 
(Brairutorm with MmPý) 
ý--º 
I 
Hsbrical Docurýentatlon 
Discussion 
/Now PaNdpenb to Eatebfah 
Group UM1pllieNC E)preeebrx 
oi Poesibiiy 
ApreemerM Wa 
Dlecusbn 
(In1er"StbjecnN Raary) 
b SLib)Wt%e Passibifhes 
sugecove 
Liý 
(TimaýCosV 
aauyisý) N 
Formals Plans 
and Raassessf« 
Restdual Fisk 
andlnpacf 
Mu"ed -Qak* 
troop Defined Scales 
Figure 7.2. Proposed risk management process 
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Also the proposed process highlights the need to allow the group members to construct 
their own linguistic interpretations of possibility. The case study highlighted how the 
group members preferred to use the provided 
linguistic constructs rather than the 
numerical probabilities. However this thesis 
interpreted the linguistic constructs as 
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ones conveying notions of possibility as opposed to probability. Consequently the 
group members were using the provided constructs that in actuality meant different 
levels of possibility to the different group members; "words carry different 
connotations for different people" (Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001). 
Discussion 
Therefore the proposed process encourages the group members to construct a group 
lexicon of terminology to convey their interpretations of possibility. This may be 
achieved by group discussion of their individual interpretations and recording those 
within the discussion documents for reference throughout the deliberation process. 
Figure 7.3 shows the effect of these changes utilising the risk prism. 
HIGH 
RISK 
SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF RISK HIGH 
RISK 
LOW LOW 
RISK RISK 
EFFECT OF LENS HIGH 
RISK 
Lens Is Designed 
to Minmise this 
Difference 
PERCEPTION'A' 
PERCEPTION 'B' 
LOW 
RISK 
Figure 7.3. Risk prism with lens 
The changes in the process, those sub-processes that encourage assumptions and 
interpretations to be rationalised, act as a lens at the front of the prism focusing those 
perceptions into an area of common group understanding of the decision/problem 
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environment. Consequently the high/low risk measure in figure 7.3 conveys a group 
inter-subjective interpretation of the decision/problem environment as opposed to an 
objective perspective of the risk and uncertainty that the decision makers face. 
The functionality of the final change relies upon what use is made of the output of the 
risk management process. Currently the simulated outputs are deemed to be objective 
and definite and as a consequence too much emphasis is placed upon those outputs; 
therefore the proposed process encourages the use of possibilities as a currency for 
simulation. However as the contemporary processes are doing this already, albeit 
under the misunderstanding that the output conveys probability of occurrence, the 
improvement to the current process is one of education of those who seek to utilise 
those outputs. 
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8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the performance of the research with regards to the achievement 
of the research aim and objectives. The conclusions and recommendations are 
discussed in light of their limitations together with recommendations for risk 
management practitioners. 
8.2 Performance Against Aim and Objectives 
The achievements of the research are compared below against the aim and objectives 
identified at the outset of this research. 
8.2.1 Aim 
The research aim was to: 
Al: Establish a risk management process that addresses the impact of individual 
and group reactions to risk and uncertainty. 
The attainment of the three principle objectives discussed below was critical to 
satisfying the principle aim of this research, consequently the relationship between the 
aim and objectives is a reciprocal one. The following discussion in this section briefly 
outlines the manner in which the objectives were satisfied and the results of those 
investigations. The conclusions and recommendations included in this chapter 
combine to satisfy the principle aim. 
8.2.2 Objective 01 
01: Ascertain the contemporary position of risk management strategies and 
determine the impact of individual and group reactions to uncertainty upon the 
execution of the risk management process. 
Objective 01 has been achieved in three parts. Firstly the acknowledged attributes of 
individualistic behaviour towards uncertainty and risk were identified from an 
extensive literature review, chapter 3. The review highlighted the theoretical basis of 
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individual and group reactions to uncertainty and risk. Subsequently the implications 
of these findings were tested in chapter 5 by replicating the Wallach et al (1962) study. 
This section of the research established the effect and implications of individual 
perceptions, preferences and group culture on the decision preferences and behaviour 
of those group members, both individually and collectively. The study replicated the 
original study, the risky shift, and verified that construction project management 
decision-making groups were inclined to live with greater uncertainty than were the 
members of those groups. The literature review had identified a number of potential 
causal factors that contributed to the risky shift. Subsequently the case study, 
described in chapter 6, identified the strategies employed by group members in order 
to communicate their perspective and to influence their fellow group members. These 
conclusions add to our understanding of the dynamics of group discussion within 
construction management decision-making groups further addressing the objective 
outlined in 01. 
8.2.3 Objective 02 
Research objective 02 was to: 
02: Conceive an approach that allows individual uncertainty preferences, 
perceptions and assumptions to be rationalised in a group decision-making 
environment. 
Figure 7.2 details the proposed amendments to the identified contemporary risk 
management processes. The amendments are concerned with encouraging group 
members to become acquainted with one another's assumptions with regards to the 
nature of the decision environment and the meaning inherent in their expressions of 
possibility. Also the approach recommends that possibility, and not probability, be 
used as the `currency' for communicating perceived risk and risk management outputs. 
8.4 Summary of Research 
The use of risk management strategies in construction project execution has had some 
of its weaknesses exposed, namely the failure of such strategies to consider the role of 
the individual within the risk management process. Consequently this research has 
undertaken an investigation to ascertain and understand the nature and impact of 
135 
Chapter 8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
individual decision makers upon the risk management process and how this may be 
addressed. The attributes and influences upon individual decision-making, risk and 
uncertainty perceptions and preferences have been explored and discussed in some 
detail. From those the `risk prism', a metaphor for the perception and preference of 
uncertainty, was developed to illustrate the manner in which these decision-making 
attributes operate. 
An investigation was undertaken to replicate the `risky shift' phenomenon in decision- 
making groups populated by construction project management professionals. The 
results of this investigation ascertained the influence of the group environment upon 
construction management decision makers, namely that individuals were influenced to 
accept greater uncertainty in a group decision environment. 
A case study investigation of an organisation's attempt to introduce a new risk 
management strategy was undertaken from which an enhanced understanding of the 
group discussion and decision-making environment was ascertained. The findings 
drawn from the case study combined with the data gathered from the risky shift 
experiment and the literature reviews have produced the following conclusions and 
recommendations. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The following discussion details the conclusions derived from the present research. 
8.5.1 Risky-Shift Phenomenon 
The results of the Wallach et al (1962) study have been generalised in an 
organisational specific work environment. It has been observed that construction 
management decision-making groups are subject to influence from the risky shift 
phenomenon. This conclusion implies that construction management decision-making 
groups are living with greater risk and uncertainty than are the individual construction 
and project managers that comprise the group. The findings also suggest that 
construction management decision-making groups are liable to be influenced by issues 
such as group composition. It should therefore be possible to design a risk 
management strategy that acknowledges the attributes of individualistic behaviour 
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towards uncertainty and risk and one that also conveys a desired perspective of risk 
and uncertainty. 
8.5.2 Use of Rhetorical Strategies in Group Discussions 
During group discussions regarding risk identification and assessment individuals 
would resort to the use of a rhetorical strategy. The strategy was employed to 
convince the other group members of the validity of their proposition by explaining 
often-hypothetical situations to the other group members that conveyed the desired 
position. However prima facie acceptance of these strategies would appear to rely 
upon group composition. 
8.5.3 Use and Acceptance of 50/50 Propositions 
Groups opt to use verbal constructs of probability rather than numerical percentile 
expressions during group discussions. Similarly the studied groups were often unable 
to discern a meaningful difference between the prescribed forms of options available 
and instead opted for 50/50 expressions of likelihood, effectively expressing ignorance 
of the decision-environment. 
8.5.4 Role of the Devils Advocate in Group Discussions 
The inclusion within the group of an individual who is prepared to question the 
accuracy of the group's propositions enhanced the group decision-making process. 
The questioning individual, or devils advocate, encouraged their fellow group 
members to ask `what if? ' questions which in turn forced a reconsideration and 
discussion of the proposition in question. 
8.5.5 Risk Identification and Group Composition 
The two groups who undertook the risk identification process showed marked 
differences in the nature of the identified risks. As the groups were assembled with no 
regard for their experiential knowledge etc concern remains that the risk identification 
process is not being managed effectively. 
8.6 Recommendations to Risk Management Practitioners 
This research has highlighted the subjectivity of the risk identification and assessment 
processes. Therefore the assumption that outputs from the employed risk management 
137 
Chapter 8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
strategies are objective need to be re-assessed in light of the conclusions detailed 
within this thesis. 
The previous findings and conclusions suggest that the following may be adopted to 
construct the organisational lens that will allow the risk perceptions and assessment to 
be normalised: 
" adopt the proposed risk management strategy that includes the `Deliberate 
Decision Environment' process; 
" encourage assumptions analysis at all stages of the risk management process; 
" allow the groups to create verbal constructs of possibility and disregard 
numerical percentile expressions; 
" interpret the out puts of the risk management strategies as possibilistic 
interpretations of the decision environment; 
" educate employees of their own heuristics and decision-making `short cuts'; 
and 
" include devils advocates within each risk management decision-making group. 
These recommendations are bounded in their applicability by the following limitations 
inherent within this research. 
8.7 Limitations of this Research 
This research, its conclusions and recommendations are restricted in their application 
by the following limitations. Firstly the thesis has incorporated a contradiction within 
its methodological execution by using the Wallach et al (1962) CDQ to test for what 
has been argued is a purely subjective phenomenon. The methodology explained 
herein has gone some way to explain this apparent contradiction however it remains a 
seemingly irreconcilable problem; namely how to establish, record and examine 
individual, subjective perceptions. 
Secondly the scope of the research was limited to one organisation operating within the 
construction industry. Therefore it is possible that the observed effects are 
generalisations of a culture specific to the participating organisation. This potential 
138 
Chapter 8 Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Research 
effect cannot be discounted and requires a further replication of this research within 
differing organisations to assess the validity of the findings and conclusions. 
Thirdly only two groups with four members in each were observed in the case study 
investigation thus limiting the generality of the conclusions derived from the research. 
Consequently this research project and the conclusions are intended to be used as a 
point from which to start a more thorough investigation to ascertain the validity of it's 
findings. Therefore this research constitutes a pilot study that will allow greater focus 
for subsequent studies by providing a focus for their instigation. It is also hoped that 
this research will foster a wider discussion amongst the construction management 
research fraternity on the topics and issues raised herein. 
Finally, the conclusions derived from the case study investigation are essentially 
subjective. However the evidence upon which all conclusions are drawn is presented 
for analysis. Nonetheless it is impracticable to comprehensively present the 
information and data collected which undoubtedly assisted in the derivation of a 
number of the conclusions. This is attributable primarily to the confidential nature of 
the cooperating organisations bespoke risk management strategy. Nevertheless the 
methodology included within this thesis will allow a replication of this study to be 
undertaken. 
8.8 Further Research 
This thesis presents the data and subsequently derived conclusions of an investigation 
in to group decision-making within the discipline of construction project risk 
management. The research has detailed a number of previously unidentified means by 
which construction management decision-making groups communicate subjective 
values and preferences for the purpose of influencing their fellow group members. 
However further research is required for two purposes, firstly: 
1 to establish the generality of these findings; and secondly 
2 to develop them into usable tools for the management of construction project 
decision-making groups. 
Therefore the following recommendations may assist in satisfying these two criteria. 
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8.8.1 Communication of Probabilities 
Comparative research should be undertaken to test the effectiveness of verbal 
constructs and numerical percentile to communicate a desired level of risk and 
uncertainty. Furthermore this verbal construct should be developed with specific 
regard for the group who will be considering its application to ensure that the intention 
is communicated to the group in the language that the group helped to compose. 
8.8.2 Management of Group Discussions and Decision-Making 
An `informed' individual should be placed within a decision-making group with 
instructions to communicate a pre determined perspective to ascertain whether 
purposeful manipulation of group perceptions is possible or viable. Comparison 
should be made with control groups who have studied the same decision domains but 
without the inclusion of an informed individual. 
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire ID: 
For each of the following scenarios (1 - 12) please indicate the lowest probability of' 
success you would accept before recommending the potentially more rewarding but 
riskier option. 
The probabilities are listed as a 1,3,5,7, or 9 out of ten chance of success. Strike 
through with your pen the option which best represents the number of times you would 
require proof of its' success before recommending the riskier option. 
If you would not choose the riskiest alternative, no matter what the chances of success, 
please highlight the 10 option. 
Explanatory Note 
3 in 10 
Chance 
This circle depicts a 
three in ten chance 
of the riskier option 
suceeding 
Tin 10 
Chance 
This circle depicts a 
seven in ten chance 
of the riskier option 
suceeding 
Example Question 
a) A house requiring underpinning may be purchased at a reduced rate well below 
market level. If the underpinning is successful the house could be sold at a 
substantial profit, however the structural engineer cannot guarantee the success of 
the underpinning procedure. 
1 in 10 
Chance 
3 in 10 
Chance 
5 in 10 
Chance 
9 in1.0 
cc 
I 
10 in 10 
Chance 
In this example Adam required evidence to assert the probability that the underpinning 
would be successful nine times out often before advising that the riskier option of 
buying the property be adopted. 
The questionnaire begins on the following page. 
1. An electrical engineer may stick with his present job at a modest but adequate 
salary, or may take the new job offering considerably more money but no long- 
term security. 
Iin10 3in10 5in10 7in10 9 in 10 10in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
2. A man with a severe heart ailment must seriously curtail his customary way of life 
if he does not undergo a delicate medical operation that might cure him completely 
or might prove fatal. 
10in10 9in10 7 in 10 5in10 3in10 I in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
3. A man of moderate means may invest some money he recently inherited in secure 
blue-chip low return securities or in more risky securities that offer the possibility 
of large gains. 
I in 10 3in10 5in10 7 in 10 9 in 10 10 in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
4. A captain of a college football team, in the final seconds of a game with the 
colleges traditional rival, may choose a play that is almost certain to produce a tie 
score, or a more risky play that would lead to victory if successful, sure defeat if 
not. 
10in10 9 in 10 7in10 5in10 3in10 I in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
5. The president of a UK based corporation which is about to expand may build a 
new plant in England where returns on the investment would be moderate, or may 
decide to build in a foreign country with an unstable political history where 
however, returns on the investment would be very high. 
1in10 3in10 5in10 7 in 10 9 in 10 10 in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
6. A degree graduate planning research studentship work in chemistry may enter 
university X where, because of rigorous standards, only a fraction of the students 
manage to receive the PhD, or may enter university Y which has a poorer 
reputation but where almost every graduate student receives a PhD. 
10in10 9 in 10 7 in 10 5in10 3in10 I in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chancc ('hancc 
7. A low ranked participant in a national chess tournament, playing an early match 
with the tournament favourite, has the choice of attempting or not trying a 
deceptive but risky manoeuvre which may lead to a quick victory if successful or 
almost certain defeat if it fails. 
Iin10 3in10 5in10 7in10 9 in 10 10in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
8. A degree graduate with considerable musical talent must choose between the 
secure course of going on to medical school and becoming a physician, or the risky 
course of embarking on the career of a concert pianist. 
10 in 10 9in10 7in10 5in10 3in10 I in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
9. An English prisoner of war in World War II must choose between possible escape 
with the risk of execution if caught or remaining in the camp where privations are 
severe. 
I in 10 3in10 5in10 7in10 9 in 10 10 in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
10. A successful businessman with strong feelings of civic responsibility must decide 
whether or not to run for Parliament on the ticket of a minority party whose 
campaign funds are limited. 
10 in 10 9in10 7in10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
11. A research physicist, just beginning a five year appointment at a university, may 
spend the time working on a series of short term problems which he would be sure 
to solve but which would be of lesser importance, or on a very important but very 
difficult problem with the risk of nothing to show for his five years worth of effort. 
1in10 3in10 5in10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance 
12. An engaged couple must decide, in the face of recent arguments suggesting some 
sharp differences of opinion, whether or not to get married. Discussions with a 
marriage counsellor indicate that a happy marriage, while possible. would not be 
assured. 
10in10 9 in 10 
Chance Chance 
7 in 10 
5in10 
7 in 10 
5in10 
3in10 
9 in 10 
3in10 
I in 10 
10 in 10 
I in 10 
Chance Chance Chance Chance 
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Summary of Interview 
Analysis of the interview suggests that the 'drivers' behind the instigation of the 
organisations RM approach are three fold: 
1. Firstly it is intended to replace the disparate approaches that existed 
previously with a generic approach that may be used globally throughout 
the organisation (1,2,4,13). 
2. Secondly the approach is intended to represent the company's 
diversification from the mainstream of its competitors by exhibiting a 
progressive and matured approach to risk management to its customers (18, 
23,25). 
3. The changing nature of the organisations customer interface necessitated a 
prescribed RM approach (23) 
The approach as it currently stands is identifiable by its seven step 'branded' structure 
that represents a formalised, current best practice within the organisation (4,5,14,3). 
This approach combines standardised terminology, lexicon and generality by which 
the entire organisation can communicate on the same level; can "spcak(ing) the same 
language" (5,9,14,46). Whilst it was communicated to the risk management trainers 
that the organisation would want to use RM even if their customers did not require it 
(30). However whilst some of the higher management would prefer to cxploit 
opportunities at the cost of customer relations (32) the RM process is intended to 
facilitate to a partnering style arrangement that offers a closer working arrangement 
between parties to the contract (33). 
One of the organisations objectives was to design an RM approach that would be 
generic (3) and one that could be incorporated into the various departments own 
working practices and processes that will hopefully be seen as an integral and 
necessary feature of the overall construction process (6,16). This involves educating 
the employees in the philosophy and the processes of the organisations preferred 
approach to RM (15). The initiative stresses individual accountability (41) that is 
supported by an objective view of risk afforded by the RM strategy (21,22). 
One of the principle aims of the initiative was to make the organisation risk aware, able to answer the 
question "what is risk? " (7,8). However the intention may be a little more oriented towards educating 
employees to answer the question "what is the organisations view of risk? " (7). This assumption is 
evidenced by the acknowledgement that there existed previously disparate approaches towards RM 
within the organisation; the interviewee acknowledges that "everyone was aware of risk" but they had 
not been 'educated' in a preferred approach to its management (13,15). 
The intention is to educate first hand a selected number of cmployccs who may then 
take the 'message' back to their departments and begin the dissemination process again 
via toolbox talks etc (10,12). It is hoped that the approach will become one of the 
core skills within the organisation and be embedded into the organisational work 
culture (19,41). The message is that the organisation is not afraid to take risks, but if 
they do they want the reward that accompanies that. Risk equals reward. This may 
encourage the risk takers to take even more whilst the risk averse may be inclined to 
take a disproportional smaller increase in risk compared to the risk takers. 'walk off 
the cliff with their eyes open' is almost a challenge. If you think you know what you 
arc doing then walk the organisation and yourself off the cliff. The only qualifying 
criterion is that we must be rewarded for doing so (24). However the nature of RM is 
that potential hazards will be identified and for these to be managed rationally strategic 
managers within the organisation need to be able to promote 'free speech' (26,27). 
The initiative has been running for approximately four years and the delivery team are 
finding that approximately three quarters of the attendees arrive with an understanding 
of the premise and the language used within the new RM framework (35,36). 
Approximately ninety nine percent of the attendees leave with an 'understanding' of 
RM and the organisation preferred approach (47) however only ten percent show any 
interest in continuing their RM training (11). This is leaving the organisation with a 
problem; they do not have the risk managers capable of managing the process (39,40, 
44,45) and so the training initiative is changing to make the organisation risk capable 
(8,24). However once employees have attended the workshop they arc not always 
getting a chance to put what they have been taught into practice and thereby they arc 
loosing the skill before they have acquired it (48). This is further evidenced by the fact 
that there are projects that are asking for risk managers (44) but are unable to instigate 
the process either partially, if at all, because there is insufficient trained and available 
manpower to do so (17,45). However those that are trained arc being offered higher 
paid employment outside of the organisation (42). 
The need to adopt the new organisational approach is being communicated from the 
highest levels of the organisations management (29), which is leading towards a view 
of the inevitable; i. e. we had better attend this course or we will be left behind, a 
dinosaur within our own organisation (28,38). However there is an air of the 
dictatorial about the learning process, attendance at the training workshops; "they 
know they have to be there, they know they should be there" (37). 
Conclusions 
The organisation has designed and is in the process of introducing an RM strategy that 
it views as objective enabling risks to be `seen' (22). The cultural change 
accompanying this view communicates that the organisation is not afraid to accept risk 
and that ins some cases risk may equal reward (24). This initiative was partly designed 
to provide a framework within which risks to the organisation arising from their 
diversification of interests may be effectively and objectively managed (23). I lowever 
as they are not inclined to recruit risk managers from outside of their organisation (44) 
there is uncertainty as to whether they realise that the initiative only provides a 
framework and does not educate the risk managers to identify risks they do not have 
the knowledge to recognise. 
The workshop attendees are encouraged to educate their colleagues back in the 
workplace in the organisations approach to RM; a process that may ultimately dilute 
the message the organisation is trying to communicate. 
The organisation is also facing problems on two other fronts. One is their struggle to 
educate sufficient numbers of risk managers and then to keep them within the 
company. The second is the clients perspective of the RM service offered by the 
organisation, i. e. we can only do this if you trust us and allow us to make the most of 
the opportunities we arc identifying for you (34). 
Appendix D 
APPENDIX D 
Green Team Verbal Transcription 
G709ea. what do we write in here (1.6) 
G71Oha. what we believe the values should be (. ) what's the minor value (. ) 
G711ga. what ((coughs)) (. ) what I understand is we write in here and transfer it to 
there (0.6) 
G712ha. yep (0.3) 
G713ea. first of all opportunities (7.4) right are we saying it is a scale of. six months 
G714ga. [yes] 
G715ha. [yes] 
G716ea. = for the whole job right (1.0) so a minor opportunity (1.8) 
G717ha. save an hour or two here or there (. ) 
G718ea. would you say is a day (1.2) 
G719ha. is that minor (3.0) 
G720ga. a minor opportunity what gaining a day (0.4) 
G72lea. a week 
G722ga. see if you gain a day here you can lose it somewhere else it's: it's: 
G723ha. [hm: ] 
G724ea. [yeah well 
G725fa. [well i hope= 
G726fa. = you were all paying attention because i started to loose the plot in that last bit = 
G727fa. =i must admit 
G728ha. i- in a six months: programme (. ) right (. ) let's start in the middle then (. ) what = 
G729ha. = do y- what do you believe would be a substantial opportunity (1.6) on a six = 
G730ha. = month contract period (2.1) 
G731ga. a saving right so how much: 
G732ea. [>it would be a ten grand saving< (2.4) on your = 
G733ha. [yeah] 
G734ea. = budget (. ) no five thousand 
G735ha = [>ha ha<] ((laughing)) 
G736ha. yeah 
G737ga. a twenty thousand pound budget is a really small budget ((mumbles away))= 
G738ga. = hardly °enough to pay one mans wages is it° 
G739ea. what five k (1.5) five ki would say is a substantial (. ) opportunity (0.4) 
G740ha. to save 
G741ea. hm: 
G742ha. hm:: (2.9) i mean pencil in five grand 
G743ea. yeah we can always change it (1.1) 
G744ha. yeah (1.2) 
G745ea. exceptional's ten (2.7) you know coming in at half the budget (8.1) 
G746ha [yeah] [yeah (. ) very = 
G747ha. = substantial is °what about six-° 
G748ea. [can i just ask you something here (0.6) how can something highly = 
G749ea. = probable (2.3) oh it wouldn't be highly probable would it 
G750ha. no it is nothing to do with that is it 
G75lea. no 
G752ha. they are just separate columns 
G753ea. sorry (. ) sorry (2.5) 
G754ha. [yeah] 
G755ea. seven k for very substantial ((laughing)) 
G756ha. yeah (1.1) significant what (0.8) two (. ) 
G757fa. °yeah° 
G758ha. or shall we say one thousand (3.9) 
G759fa. on on on that scale i would have said one (. ) was significant °on a budget = 
G760ha. [°yeah°] 
G761fa. = of twenty thousand° 
G762ga. may- maybe substantial should go to three 
G763ha. (minor is what one hundred pound (2.1) 
G764ga. three thousand pounds is still (. ) °quite a lot of money yeah maybe one = 
G765ga. = hundred pounds is: °= 
G766ha. minor (0.3) 
G767ga. = [quite a lot of money to loose (1.1) 
G768ea. yeah one hundred pounds (0.9) one thousand for significant (. ) substantial what three = 
G769fa. [yeah] [yeah] [yes] 
G770ha. [yeah] 
G771ea. =and a half (1.3) very substantial would be (1.6) 
G772ha. six 
G773ea. six 
G774ha six ish 
G775fa. hm: 
G776ea. yeah 
G777ga. hmm 
G778ea. and exceptional would be eight (1.5) 
G779fa. yeah yeah because you are talking major percentage of your budget there 
G780ha. [hm] 
G781ea. >yeah< (. ) i don't think we are out (0.3) a grand here of there are we 
G782ha. [yeah] [no 
G783fa. [hm: ] 
G784ga. and how and how (. ) ok just ask the question hm: (0.6) devil devils advocate = 
G785ga. = style (. ) erm:: ° how have you come to those figures° 
G786ea. we've guessed (. ) 
G787ha. [hm: 
G788fa. yes (3.2) 
G789ea. phew ((ea. blows a breath out)) if you if you've got a project and it's: it's = 
G790ea. = worth twenty grand (. ) yeah (. ) an exc_e: ptional opportunity (1.2) °yeah° _ 
G791ha. [hm: ] 
G792ea. = would be if it came in at you know sixty percent of your of of your budgeted = 
G793ea. = cost wouldn't it 
G794fa. [hm:: ] 
G795ha. of course (. ) 
G796ea. yeah (0.3) and it is achievable if you've if you've but if a builder were to = 
G797ea. = come in and say i'll do your extension for twenty k (0.9) you could do = 
G798ea. = it for twelve (. ) 
G799ha. hm 
G800ea. you could do it for twelve if you shopped round (. ) dug the footings yourself 
G801fa. [yes yes yeah] [hm: ] 
G802ha. [hm: ] 
G803fa. there are ways- 
G804ea. [there are ways and means of doing it yeah 
G805ha. get rid of all the unskilled 
G806ea [there might be some value engineering that goes on (. ) ((laughing)) yeah = 
G807fa. [yes] 
G808ea. = but you know you could still get your u values and so on 
G809fa. [ha] ((laughing)) 
G810ha. [hm: hm: ] ((laughing)) 
G81 lea. you wouldn't have any windows in the place like but er:: m ((laughing)) 
G812fa. [ha ha] ((laughing)) 
G813ea. but realistically you could get that to twelve k couldn't ya.. 
G814fa. you probably could yes.. 
G815ea. yeah (. ) ((ea. sniffs in loudly)) erm: (1.47) time days (1.0) minor (0.5) one day (4.4) 
G816fa. weighing against the whole project 
G817ea. [you see yeah ::: (1.4) ((training provider walks in)) 
G818fa. i would have thought yeah erm: slightly erm: (1.7) higher than that (. ) 
G819ha. [°yeah°] 
G820ea. a w: eek- 
G821fa. a week () yea: h a week (0.8) 
G822ea. you think about it it's only twenty grand over what are we saying six months.. 
G823fa. yeah hm:: 
G824ea. you know a week you know a week it's not like it's a retail outlet (0.4) 
G825fa. no (4.3) 
G826ea. six months is quite °a long time though isn't it° 
G827fa. yeas it is ((george haughton discussion 6.20)) 
((Training provider enters room and presents a monologue upon figures quoted for 
threats and opportunities... "they are specific to your project but they are the steepest i 
have seen recently.. "... " one trick you can use is to say greater than a figure... " "just 
think about it you want to be able to scale them to prioritise no have all your risks in 
the bottom left hand comer.. " )) 
G828ea. i would still say a grand for that 
G829fa. yes i think we °are somewhere along the right lines for that° 
G830ea. [i would say (2.6) we can = 
G83 lea. = do a band i'll do the band in a minute 
G832fa. yeah 
G833ea. so from the bottom i have gone five three two one 
G834ha. and virtually zero 
G835fa. yeah 
G836ea. [yeah now i would say an exceptional opportunity (1.3) in time (4.74) 
G837ha. [hmm] 
G838ea. is:: (1.1) 
G839fa. what do we work on the same side as 
G840ha. or do we work on the other side, i would say 
G841ge. i would start on the threat if i were you (. ) you might find it easier with a threat= 
G842ea. >RIGHT< 
G843fa. ok 
G844ge = and mirror for the opportunity 
G845ea. what for the cost and the time 
G846ge. you have the cost (. ) but you may find it easier 
G847ea. [RIGHT OK] [well i think cost is more a= 
G848ea. = priority on this job than time (. )because it's not a retail or a hospital or anything (2.3) 
G849ha. [yeah] 
G850ea. I'm just throwing things in here: (. ) 
G851fa. yeah (6.9) 
G852ea. what i've said is and i am not saying it's right- 
G853ha. [yeah ] 
G854fa. no 
G855ea. on the on the threats (. ) i've said insignificant seven days (1.8) because it's not = 
G856ea. = really not for a domestic (. ) job is it 
G857ha. no not really (. ) seven days stop but 
G858ea. [twenty one for marginal (0.8) i've tripled that (. ) 
G859fa. could we do it on the same seven you know band because there is a little more flexibility 
G860ea. [fourteen] [yeah = G86Iea. = between twenty one and thirty is serious because it's a month then (. ) getting on to = G862fa. [yeah] 
G863ea. =a month isn't it 
G864ga. [are we talking about excuse me are we talking about erm: a delay erm: of all = G865ga. = works are you saying it would occur and cease all work or is it just a delay in = 
G866ea. [er:: i would say it is the] 
G867fa. [yeah] 
G868ga. = the programme (0.5) 
G869ea. whole job really completion of the whole job really (0.6) completion of the whole job G870fa, [yes: ] [yeah = G871fa. = that is how i see it (0.9) 
G872ea. yeah i know what you mean (. ) you could overcomplicate it (. ) i know what you are saying G873fa. if that project overrun by those amounts time well 
G874ea. [>critical would be between one month and a month and a half <(0.4) 
G875fa. yeah: 
G876ga. so i am taking it as( ) 
G877ea. [catastrophic would be forty two days (. ) >that is what i have said <(. ) i might = 
G878ea. = not be right and we can alter these 
G879fa. [it's open to discussion 
G880ea. forty two to sixty days (2.0) 
G881ga. that's three months 
G882ea. two months 
G883fa. two months (. ) yea: h (4.9) 
G884ea. two months (. ) and considering that it's (. ) probably you know (0.8) it's a long time on a= 
G885ea. = normal type job but this isn't a normal type job (. ) 
G886fa. no (1.6) 
G887ea. lets be honest percentage wise yeah (1.9) five you know (. ) twenty five percent = 
G888ea. = over (. )on your costs (. ) yeah and you would be going fucking ballistic = 
G889fa. [yes] 
G890ea. = wouldn't you 
G891fa. [yeah (. ) on a personal level yes of course(. ) 
G892ea. e- >EVEN ON A MAJOR JOB EVEn on a normal job < (. ) twenty five percent = 
G893fa. ( )- [yeah = 
G894ea. = over and you would be (0.5) phew 
G895fa. = twenty five percent over] [you'd be (. ) phew 
G896ea. it would be exceptional really 
G897fa. [it would be a firing squad job ha 
G898ea. yeah and it probably wouldn't get to twenty five percent before it would be exceptional = 
G899fa. [no] 
G900ea. = to be honest 
G901ga. maximum what would you say would (. ) *be the maximum" 
G902ea. on a job 
G903ga. [on this job (. ) a twenty thousand pound budget percentage wise 
G904ea. five k (0.4) five k over yeah which is what we have said here (. ) would be catastrophic 
G905fa. [yeah] [yeah] 
G906ea. = yeah (. ) in relative terms (0.7) if if you know if (. ) 
G907fa. yeah if that's right (. ) °significantly amount of money ° (. ) if you were looking to = 
G908fa. = borrow again you would be looking at a hun:: dred and fifty quid a month for five = 
G909fa. = years and paying it back that would be- 
G910ea. [hm: ] 
G911ga. that would be two hundred () 
G912fa. yeah well whatever it is you know - 
G913ea. [do you (. ) do you think the time is right (. ) an insignificant threat (. ) up to seven = 
G914ea. = days you wouldn't be bothered would you (1.1) 
G915fa. no i- 
G916ea. [seven to three weeks you would be starting to worry but it would not be serious yet.. = 
G917ea. = three weeks (. ) well just hurry up yeah i want it no more serious yet (0.7) _ 
G918fa. [hm: ] [hm] [yeah 
G919ea. = now come you're a month late now yeah all right I'm in my main office= 
G920fa. [yeah] 
G92lea. =my (1.2) main office but i want to stop that now (. ) yeah (. ) you should have had this finished 
G922fa. [hm] 
G923ea. = come on (0.9) critical (1.0) yeah (. ) he's taking the piss now isn't he (. ) he's over the = 
G924fa. [hm] 
G925ea. = month and he is going to a month and a half (3) he is taking the piss in't he (. ) and = 
G926ea. = anything other is catastrophic isn't it (0.8) 
G927fa. hm: yeah 
G928ea. = >now< (. ) what do you think 
G929ha. hm: yeah- (2.8) 
G930ea. is it a (. ) good: ba:: nd >are the bands< (0.5) reasonable enough (1.5 
G931ha. seven twenty one (2.1) what thirty 
G932ea. >twenty one to thirty for three< (2.5) 
G933ha. hmm 
G934ea. four: is thirty to forty two.. (2.0) 
G823fa. yeah hm:: 
G824ea. you know a week you know a week it's not like it's a retail outlet (0.4) 
G825fa. no (4.3) 
G826ea. six months is quite °a long time though isn't it° 
G827fa. ye: s it is ((george haughton discussion 6.20)) 
((Training provider enters room and presents a monologue upon figures quoted for 
threats and opportunities... "they are specific to your project but they are the steepest i 
have seen recently.. "... " one trick you can use is to say greater than a figure... " "just 
think about it you want to be able to scale them to prioritise no have all your risks in 
the bottom left hand corner.. " )) 
G828ea. i would still say a grand for that 
G829fa. yes i think we °are somewhere along the right lines for that° 
G830ea. [i would say (2.6) we can = 
G83 lea. = do a band i'll do the band in a minute 
G832fa. yeah 
G833ea. so from the bottom i have gone five three two one 
G834ha. and virtually zero 
G835fa. yeah 
G836ea. [yeah now i would say an exceptional opportunity (1.3) in time (4.74) 
G837ha. [hmm] 
G838ea. is:: (1.1) 
G839fa. what do we work on the same side as 
G840ha. or do we work on the other side, i would say 
G841ge. i would start on the threat if i were you (. ) you might find it easier with a threat= 
G842ea. >RIGHT< 
G843fa. ok 
G844ge = and mirror for the opportunity 
G845ea. what for the cost and the time 
G846ge. you have the cost (. ) but you may find it easier 
G847ea. [RIGHT OK] [well i think cost is more a= 
G848ea. = priority on this job than time (. )because it's not a retail or a hospital or anything (2.3) 
G849ha. [yeah] 
G850ea. I'm just throwing things in here: (. ) 
G851fa. yeah (6.9) 
G852ea. what i've said is and i am not saying it's right- 
G853ha. [yeah ] 
G854fa. no 
G855ea. on the on the threats (. ) i've said insignificant seven days (1.8) because it's not = 
G856ea. = really not for a domestic (. ) job is it 
G857ha. no not really (. ) seven days stop but 
G858ea. [twenty one for marginal (0.8) i've tripled that (. ) 
G859fa. could we do it on the same seven you know band because there is a little more flexibility 
G860ea. [fourteen] [yeah = 
G861ea. = between twenty one and thirty is serious because it's a month then (. ) getting on to = 
G862fa. [yeah] 
G863ea. =a month isn't it 
G864ga. [are we talking about excuse me are we talking about erm: a delay erm: of all = 
G865ga. = works are you saying it would occur and cease all work or is it just a delay in = 
G866ea. [er:: i would say it is the] 
G867fa. [yeah] 
G868ga. = the programme (0.5) 
G869ea. whole job really completion of the whole job really (0.6) completion of the whole job 
G870fa, [yes: ] [yeah = 
G871fa. = that is how i see it (0.9) 
G872ea. yeah i know what you mean (. ) you could overcomplicate it (. ) i know what you are saying 
G873fa. if that project overrun by those amounts time well 
G874ea. [>critical would be between one month and a month and a half <(0.4) 
G935ha. hmm (0.3) 
G936ea. catastrophic (. ) five is forty two to sixty (. ) ok and that goes then for the opportunities = G937ea. = as well doesn't it (. ) 
G938ha. >what oh yeah< 
G939ea. you just take them and put them there don't ya- 
G940ha. [oh hm:: ] [yeah ((mumbles)) (13.6) 
G941fa. just working that back (0.4) is there any correlation (. ) if that is 25% of the cost of the = 
G942fa. = project (. ) do we need to think in terms of twenty five percent for time 
G943ea. [no! ] [no (. ) he said that 
G944fa. [oh all right] 
G945ea. = you're costs might be more= 
G946fa. [that's probably= 
G947ea. = you may be more cost driven than you are time driven (. ) 
G948fa. = where i nodded off] [yes] [yes he did say that 
G949ha. [yeah] [yeah] 
G950ea. hm: I'm doing a job at the moment (. ) where (1.9) time is more an issue than cost 
G951 fa. [yeah] 
G952ea. = it's a gap manufacturing warehouse (1.0) they want to get the sweatshirts in = 
G953fa. [hmm] 
G954ea. = and start rolling (0.9) and the cost the fuc- .. you know i think they've got = G955fa. [hm:: ] 
G956ea. = wads of it (. ) wads of cash (1.1) right: ok (. ) 
G957fa. are we relatively comfortable with that then 
G958ha. now we've got to rate 
G959ea. [i think s-I [yeah we've got to rate everything and plot it on a pi grid haven't we 
G960ha. yeah (. ) so yes (0.3) rate 
G961ea. [right] 
G962ha. rate has got to fit the time (. ) hasn't it (. ) because you will be going backwards = 
G963ea. [right ok] 
G964ha. = and forwards ha ha ((laughing)) 
G965ea. rate everything and plot it on a pi grid haven't we (0.5) i don't want to start rating it and = 
G966fa. [yeah] [no] 
G967ea. = find we are not doing it properly (. ) shall we find out that we are doing it right first 
G968fa. [no] 
G969ha. we are just looking at these (. ) two probability and impact 
G970ea. oh right i would say a normal job like that the probability (. ) er:: m- 
G971fa. are we going to do this in pencil then we can er: (. ) you know change it as we (. ) go 
G972ha. [yeah] 
G973ea. shall we find out if we are doing it right first before we: - 
G974fa. °yeah that wouldn't be a bad idea would it° 
((break in work whilst ea. checks with training provider)) (153.0) 
G975ea. so building work (0.6) erm: (1.4) the probability (3.2) is: (. ) it's improbable that you = 
G976ea. = are going to have a lack of (. ) er:: (1.4) 
G977ha. it's going to be low isn't it 
G978fa. yeah 
G979ea. and the threat is insignificant so it's a one (2.3) 
G980ha. °ok° 
G98lea. are we happy (1.7) 
G982ha. i- is the threat (3.9) is the threat insignificant.. 
G983fa. [they don't have to be identical any way do they anyway = 
G984ea. [no no.. not at all no] 
G985fa. = so it's just a case of erm: (1.7) 
G986ha. [no] 
G987fa. i would say the impact is higher than the probability 
G988ea. ok (. ) so 
G989fa. [that would be my view (2.2) it may not be high but i-= 
G990ea. ((breathes out audibly))[all right (. ) i didn't mean to go across 
G991fa. = think it will be higher than a one 
G992ea. what it means is if you couldn't get the materials that you specified what would happen= 
G993fa. [yeah] 
G994ea. = what would be the cost impact needed what would be the impact (. ) right we can't get = 
G995fa. [i-] 
G996ea. = portlands (. ) bricks right we'll have to go to:: (0.4) 
G997fa. whoever 
G998ea. whoever 
G999ha. would it cost us more (1.4) is there a cost impact 
G1000ea. [i think it is actually going to be: erm: _ 
G 1001 ha. [time 
G1002ea. = it's going to be a serious threat possibly 
G1003fa. [hm: (2.7) 
G1004ea. °a different type of brick ° ((thoughtfully)) (1.7) have we got the bands right one = 
G1005ea. = to two k (1.0) >WE HAVE YEAH< ii think it is a marginal (. ) it's a marginal threat = 
G1006fa. [hmm] 
G1007ea. =isn't it 
G1008fa. hm:: 
G1009ha. cost wise 
G101Ofa. yeah 
GlOl lea. >yeah so< (1.42) it's a two 
G1012fa. [i i would say- 
G1013ha. [what about time (3.3) because there is a cost element = 
G1014ha. = and there is a time element (1.3) 
01015ga. availability of resources 
G1016ha. [>as I see it-<] 
G1017ea. oh right (1.2) 
G 1018fa. well we can get rid of the () for that anyway can't we 
G1019ha. yeah 
G020ea. [oh sorry] 
G1021ea. time (. ) i don't think it is going to put more than seven days on it to be honest 
G1022ha. right (. ) ok (. ) yeah 
G1023ea. what do you think (. ) 
G1024ha. h: m yes (1.6) w- we ca- 
G1025ea. [most bricks are stock item aren't they 
G1026ha. there shouldn't be anything fancy we are going for nothing special (. ) 
G1027fa. [no] 
G1028ea. ye: ah the only problem s if you get the... th- th- the end of a batch you get= 
G1029ha. [we are not in a conservation area where we need a special brick or = 
G1030ea. =a slightly different colouring but you know (. ) they are doing them every = 
G1031ha. = tile or something] 
G1032ea. = day aren't they (3.4) 
G1033ha. [yeah] 
G1034fa. yeah (. ) ok (. ) yeah (. ) labour availability (0.8) er: m (3.7) it could happen 
G1035ha. [yeah ] 
G 1036ea. it could happen 
G1037fa. [yes it does 
G1038ea. it's a two 
G1039ha. two 
G1040ea. >i am not trying to speed it up< 
G1041fa. well no but we can change it as we go(. ) we we yeah (. ) we have to get a= 
G1042ea. [i'm just thinking that we have quite a lot to do really] 
G1043ha. [no] 
G1044fa. = base line down so (3.2) 
G1045ea. the threat (1.6) how much (2.0) 
G1046fa. well ii think it's it's one of the: (0.5) higher ones not (. ) off the scale (. ) but (0.6) 
G1047ea. i think it could cost you anyth- 
G1048fa. [yeah (2.6) 
G1049ea. ((breathes out audibly)) 
G1050fa. i see that as quite high 
G105lea. i think it is a serious really 
G1052fa. hm:: 
G1053ea. if you've got a labour problem you are going to have to induce someone to come = 
G1054fa. [yes: ] 
G1055ea. = and do it for you (0.9) now 
G1056fa. [yes] [and they may not be available (. ) and the chances are if that particular = 
G1057fa. = person can't come then everyone else is going to be in the sam- 
G1058ea. [>i think we give it a 3< 
G1059fa. yeah i would say that's- (1.5) yeah 
G 1060ea. er:: 
G1061fa. and then the impact on time (. ) 
G1062ea. well ((breathes the word out)) (2.5) i think it's a three as well because: 
G1063fa. yeah 
G1064ha. [yeah] 
G1065ea. i can't come i've got a job (. ) yeah 
G1066ha. yeah 
G1067ea. it's going to be another two weeks before i finish that job (. ) >because six months is = 
G1068ha. [yeah] [yeah] 
G1069ea. = ridiculous< (. ) once you think about it really (1.2) yeah (. ) normally builders i can't = 
G1070ha. [yeah] 
G1071ea. = come this week it's going to be another three weeks the the three covers it i think 
G1072fa. [yeah yeah ] [yeah (1.5) 
G1073ea. erm: adverse weather (1.2) 
G1074ga. I'd say a three (0.6) 
G1075ea. it is yeah (. ) it's as likely as not isn't it (2.8) now (1.4) the impact (1.7) i- i basically think = 
G1076fa. [yeah] [yeah] 
G1077ea. = we are used to working in 
G1078fa. [yeah] 
G1079ha. it should be marginal 
G1080ea. we very rarely do we get weather where we have to down the (. ) down tools and = 
G1081ha. [completely] 
G1082ea. =stop bricky'ing 
G1083ha. yeah 
G1084fa. [yeah] 
G1085ea, yeah (. ) so (. ) do you think the impact is:: phew ((ea. breathes out audibly)) (2.7) 
G1086fa. well i don't know whether this is (0.6) 
G1087ea. is:: is:: a two (. ) minus (0,4) 
G1088fa. two i would have- 
G1089ea. [sorry a two (. ) yeah: (. ) 
G1090ha. marginal 
G109 lea. and time (. ) i think it's: (. ) it's insignificant (. ) seven days(. ) 
G1092ha. °seven° yeah (. ) 
G1093ea. yeah 
G1094fa. yeah 
G1095ea. you know = (1.5) 
G1096fa. yeah 
G1097ea. = it would be interesting to se what it is statistically on our sites you know i think = 
G1098fa. [yes] 
G1099ha [yeah] 
G1100ea. = this is the only year we have had to (. ) down any concrete work isn't it 
G1101ha. yeah 
G1102ea. erm:: (. ) work acceleration- 
G1103fa. yeah this was a: (. ) an opportunity this was an opportunity yes 
G1104ea. [this was an opportunity wasn't it] (now 
G1105fa. yes 
G1106ea. erm:: (1.4) i think it is as likely as not really (. ) 
G1107ha. yeah a six month programme for this one ((laughingly)) small extension 
G1108fa. yeah (. ) you'll find that people who would be pricing against this would would = 
G1109ea. [well this is why it has it's opportunities and it's risks really] 
G1110fa. = price: conservatively wouldn't they to allow for and if the weather improves 
Gl ll lea. [hm: ] [yes] 
Gil l2ea. ii don't actually think it's a big coast opportunity (. ) 
Gil 13ha. not a cost opportunity no (. ) 
G11 l4ea. yeah i think it's a minor it's a minus one (. ) to be honest 
G1115fa. [hm:: ] 
Gl l l6ea. unless you disagree (1.2) 
G1117fa. [yeah 
Gil l8ea. because you'll say listen (. ) typically you'll say will it will accelerate the works = 
G1119ea. = but it will cost you no less 
G1120ha. hm: 
G112lea. yeah 
G1122ha. because you sti- 
G1123ea. [because i because i am still going to have get another guy in 
G1124fa. yes 
G1125ha. [yeah] 
G1126ea. erm:: (0.9) but your time(1.2) 
G1127ha. that's what your saying isn't it 
G1128ea. [i think it it's substantial (1.9) 
G1129fa. hm: 
G1130ea. [i think it could save you a month (1.3) 
G1131fa. yeah: potentially ok 
G1132ea. minus three (2.5) 
G1133ha yeah 
G1134fa. hm: 
G1135ea. alright 
G1136fa. yeah (3.5) what about the access one 
G1137ea. oh (. ) oh sorry 
G1138ha. the aces- 
G1139ea. access er:: m (2.9) could happen (1.0) 
G1140fa. hm: (3.2) 
G1141ea. [erm: ] 
G1142ga. well if you couldn't and you you had to take down a fence or you had to get permission = 
G1143ga. = from a neighbour 
G1144fa. yeah. 
G1145ea. yeah (. ) i think your threat is: (. ) marginal (. ) money wise 
G1146fa. hm: 
G1147ha. hm: (0.8) 
G1148ea. what you're gonna have it's gonna be a fence 
G1149fa. yeah 
G1150ha yeah it's gonna be- 
GI 15lea. it's an arse but you can lift it up 
G1152fa. yes 
G1153ea. soon put the concrete at the tops you know 
01154fa. [yeah there's a way round it 
G1155ea. [there's a way round it = 
G1156ea. = and it's not very expensive is it- 
G1157fa. no (. ) °not in the scheme of things no° 
G1158ea. and your time element (. ) it is going to be seven days it's going to be insignificant 
G1159fa. insignificant yes: (. ) 
G1160ea. it's going to be a one isn't it 
G1161fa. yeah i think that's a fair assessment 
G1162ha. yes: (. ) 
G1163ea. erm:: (3.3) right ok (1.2) decorating (. ) wife changes mind (. ) highly probable 
G1164ha. hm. - 
GI 165ea. it's a f: it's a five 
G1166ha. hm ((chuckles)) 
G1167ea. what it is is i think somebody else has picked this as well 
G1168fa, it's obviously happened before (. ) 
G1169ea. er:: m (. ) tch ((makes sound through teeth)) (2.3) yeah: (1.5) 
G1170ha. cost wise (2.0) your talking about decorating (. ) 
G 1171 ga. five exceptional 
01172ha. you're not going to spend a five grand on a room decorating it are you = 
G1173ga. [you would you would] 
G1174ha. =even if you had to re-decorate it 
G1175fa. that's right there's no big cost (0.5) 
G 1176ea. right we'll treat it is a threat yeah because we've got enough enough items 
G 1177ha. [yeah] 
G1178fa. [yes] 
G1179ea. er:: m (0.3) it's not going to cost you any more it's going to be colour schemes and = GL1180fa. [no] 
G 118l ea. = colour schemes don't cost you a great deal- 
G1182fa. no [i mean you you 
G 1183ea. [wall paper doesn't cost = G1184ea. = you that much (. ) for a for a single office does it (. ) 
G1185fa. no 
G1186ha. it could be insignificant (0.5) 
G 1187ea. so shall we put erm: a one (0.8) 
G1188ha. yeah 
G1189fa. yes 
G 1190ea. >t<.. 
G1191ha. again just a- 
G 1192ea. (] ((audible intake of breath)) 
G1193ha. = just to redecorate a room 
G 1194ea. °it's going to be up to seven days° ((almost whispering)) (. ) you'd have it done = 
G1195ea. = in a couple of days wouldn't ya 
G 1196fa. yeah 
G1197ea. [so it's a one again 
G1198fa. yeah 
G1199ea. [erm:: (. ) interface of building and decorating work (1.1) 
G 1200fa. hm:: ((thoughtfully ? )) 
G1201ea. erm: phew ((audibly breathes out)) over six months i don't think it's= 
G 1202ea. =a (2.5)>i think it's a two-< 
G1203fa. it's a small project isn't it (. ) so you should be able to manage that (. ) 
01204ga. can we just go back erm yeah probability on a five er: m (. ) are we going to go for= 
G1205ga. =a five or: (0.4) 
G1206fa. i would have said that was a three actually 
G 1207ha. ha ha ((laughs)) 
01208fa. not as high as that (0.9) the chances are that- 
G 1209ea. [i'd say it was a probable i really would = 
G 1210ea. we:: Il ok 
G 1211ga. it's just a case of putting some more paint on the wall ((rather incredulously)) 
(31212fa. yeah (. ) yes 
G1213ea. >no yeah we are saying what's the probability<- 
G1214fa. [what's the probability of that actually happening 
G1215ha. yeah (. ) what's the probability (. ) yeah (. ) thing is is it likely that your wife is going = 
G 1216ha. = to change her mind 
G1217fa. yeah (0.4) 
G1218ga. yeah ok sorry i was- 
G1219ha. (it's ok 
G1220fa. yeah give it a three 
01221ea. ok 
G 1222fa. you would hope you had discussed it (. ) before hand 
G 1223ha. [even if she had gone out an bought the paint = 
G1224ha. = herself she could still change her mind once it was up 
G1225fa. yeah it's about a three (. ) as likely as not i think is a fair (. ) °thing to say °- 
G1226ea. [eh] ((short curtailed vocalisation)) [i think it is improbable that you = 
G1227ha. [yeah] 
G 1228ea. = would on a six months job (. ) you're going to have a problem with your building and = 
G 1229ea. = decorating works to be honest (03) 
G 1230fa. yeah:: not a major one anyway 
G 1231 ha. no 
C, 1232ea. [>what do you think it's a two< 
G 1233fa. yeah you'll be alright with that i think 
G1234ea. erm: (. ) you're cost (1.8) 
G1235fa. you're cost (. ) would I think be fairly minor i would have thought yeah 
G1236ea. [minor] [i think = 
G1237ea. = it's a one that- 
G1238fa. hm: 
G1239ea. and time (1.3) >a two< (0.8) it's gonna be seven to twenty one days (1.1) 
G1240fa. hm::: (1.2) 
G1241ha. yes that would bring it back again 
G1242ea. can't do anything yet (. ) cant even put magnolia on it mate until it's dry = 
G1243ea. = it's not going to be dry for- (. ) maybe ten days 
G1244ha. hm: 
G1245ea. it's damp (. ) it's gonna be ten days isn't it (. ) if it's sunny it will be less (. ) i= 
G1246fa. [hm] 
G1247ea. = mean (2.0) ((audibly breathes out)) do you thi- why do you (. ) are you = 
G1248ea. = bordering on the three 
G1249fa. I'm I'm thinking of the of the actual middle the middle rating more than: the= 
G1250fa. = last one(. ) just (2.8) 
G125lea. >what this one< 
G1252fa. yeah (0.6) 
G1253ea. you think the cost will be higher (. ) 
G1254fa. hm:: (2.2) 
G1255ea. what it will be hundred to (. ) a thousand (. ) ok 
G1256fa. [yeah] [yeah:: 
G1257ea. yeah 
G1258fa. yeah i think that's more- 
G1259ea. [i seem to forget that we have them in bands there 
G1260fa. yeah 
G126lea. yeah er:: m and (. ) time (1.5) 
G1262ha. give that a two (. ) 
G1263ea. two (1.0) ok 
G1264fa. yeah 
G1265ea. do it yourself 
G1266fa. this was an opportunity wasn't it. 
G1267ea. [>it's as likely as not isn't it< 
G1268fa. yeah 
G1269ha. [oh yeah 
G1270fa. yeah 
G1271ha. is it probable or: (. ) 
G1272ea. is it er:: >it's an opportunity this< 
G1273fa yeah 
G1274ha. [yeah] 
G1275ea. i think: it is a very substantial cost saving > to be honest i think it is exceptional< 
G1276ea. = shall we go for the minus five 
G1277fa. it wouldn't do any harm would it (. ) it's going to be the biggest opportunity that = 
G1278fa. = you will have 
G1279ea. >PUT IT this way you couldn't be proven the other way could ya< 
G1280fa. no 
G128 lea. >you couldn't be proven < (. ) that it's a minus four (. ) 
G1282ha. we are talking about decorating (3.4) 
G1283ea. oh i tho- yeah yeah 
G1284ha. we are not going to save five grand on decorating are we ha ha ((laughs)) 
G1285fa. [yes (. ) we've go t- to be] 
G1286ha. on decorating 
G1287fa. no we need to (. ) but that is also something else we could (. ) expand on 
G1288ea. [right (. ) so as likely as not your opportunity (0.4) is going to be 
G1289fa. [of course it is we= 
G1290ea. =a two a minus two 
G1291fa. = we're getting carried away 
G1292ea. er:: m (2.0) er:: m (0.3) time (3.6) i think that's a threat. 
G1293fa. yeah 
G1294ea. this is interesting this really when you are saying about diy (. ) you know you toy with = 
G1295ea. = the idea at home do it myself and i have done it myself (. ) and we've got people in = 
G1296fa. [yes] 
G1297ea. =and i am glad we did i went out to work came back and it was done (. ) the lack = 
G1298fa. [and it was= 
G1299ha. [done oh yes] 
G1300ea. = of hassle getting someone else to do it far out weighs 
G1301ha. = done oh yeah] 
G1302fa. yeah 
G1303ea. yeah 
G1304ha. well you pay for it one way or another don't you 
G1305ea. the lack of hassle (. ) far outweighs the the fifty quid or whatever it costs you 
G1306ha. °yeah° 
G1307fa. [yeah i would have put that in a band two on that i wouldn't have said it = 
G1308fa. = it was huge (4.0) ((background noise - knocking of pen on table)) 
G1309ha. that's two that one (1.0) °a positive two° 
G1310ea. [ok (. ) i actually don't think that it would do you a lot 
G1311fa. what would you have said 
G1312ea. well::: i don't know (. ) you're not wrong you're not going to be far out 
G1313fa. no 
G1314ea. it actually tells a story that but erm:: (. ) 
G1315fa. yes 
G1316ha. [hm] 
G1317fa. well it means we have considered it and that's what we want 
G1318ea. [THE COST SAVING YEAH (. ) balances it's self out to the er: m time = 
G1319ea. = saving the time addition should i say= 
G1320fa. [yes] 
G1321ea. =moving in (. ) utility provisions (1.1) now i think this is as likely as not really the = 
G1322ea. = probability of that happening (. ) you know what they are like these new utility (. ) _ 
G1323fa. [oh yes] 
GL1324ea. = it's not like the old bt where it was spot on= 
G1325fa. yeah 
G1326ha. [yeah] 
G1327ea. = and the old gas board (. ) these other companies offer you hundred quid less a= 
G1328fa. [yeah] 
G1329ea. = year but you get less of a service 
G1330fa. course you do yeah 
G1331ea. so i think 
G1332fa. i think it er: (. ) is quite likely(. ) 
G1333ha. as likely as not yeah 
G1334ea. i think (2.7) er:: m 
G1335ha. cost: (2.0) 
G1336ea. it's going to be minor- 
G1337ha. very minor (. ) yeah 
G1338ea. it's going to be a one- 
G1339ha. [it's time delay really isn't it 
G1340ea. it's time time i think it's going to be up to seven days isn't it 
G1341fa. yeah 
G1342ha. I'd have thought so at least 
G1343ea. or do you think it's a 
G1344fa. [well we've got a band of (. ) seven to twenty one days 
G1345ha. yes that is probably (. ) ° going to be it° 
G1346ea. [-ok! ] (1.2) fu:: rniture delivery (. ) right (0.8) i think that is the = 
G1347ha. [hm hm hm] ((laughing)) 
G1348ea. = same(. ) as likely as not 
G1349fa. yeah (1.8) 
G1350ha. [hm] 
G135lea. cost (. ) ha:: ((audibly breathes out- almost exacerbated)) it er: 
G1352ha. there won't be a cost(. ) 
G1353ea. no cost as such 
G1354fa. no 
G1355ea. er: m i think it's a one 
G1356fa. yeah (. ) 
G1357ea. but the time i think you are getting into a two again 
G1358fa. [yeah] [yes i would agree with that (0.8) 
G1359ea. will it fit 
G1360fa. yeah will it fit (1.5) well 
G1361ga. [well that's down to you really isn't it 
G1362ha. it's improbable 
G1363fa. yeah i would say that's (. ) I'd say it's a minor but 
G1364ha. [if you've done your] [properly] 
G1365ea. COULD happen 
G1366ha. yeah 
G1367fa. [yes] 
G1368ea. COULD happen error (. ) human error- 
G1369ha. [ yeah sure] 
G1370ea. >what is the cost i think it could < be:: (. ) substantial (0.9) it could be serious (. ) it could be = 
G1371ea. = between a thousand and well what are you going to spend actually (0.4) 
G1372fa. hm: 
G1373ea. for an office a thousand should nail it shouldn't it 
G374ha. shoud do 
G1375fa. [hm: ] 
G1376ea. yeah er:: m (. ) shall we say (. ) it's marginal (0.9) >horses for courses< (. ) isn't it 
G1377fa. yeah 
G1378ha. [yes] 
G1379ea. yeah (1.0) not like a generator going yeah (1.2) 
G1380fa. hm:: 
G1381ea. shall we say a two 
G1382fa. i think two is ok: 
G1383ea. [and your ti:: me err:: (1.3) a three 
G1384fa. [well that's] [no i don't think it is as- 
G1385ea. no_! no:! it's not is it(. ) 
G1386fa. no 
G1387ea. well (. ) 
G1388ha. if it doesn't fit you have to re-orde: r! 
G1389fa. well 
G1390ha. long delay (. ) at least twenty eight days (1.2) 
G1391fa. [we: llJ 
G1392ea. yeah- 
G1393ha. got to re-order your furniture 
G1394ea. I'd say it could oh::: shall we say three (. ) i don't think it comes in the realms of critical 
G1395ha. [three:: ] 
G1396fa. no (. ) 
G1397ea. yeah 
G1398ha. hm 
G1399ea. or do you think it does 
G1400ha. no ° it's just° 
G1401fa. [well:: i just in the scheme of things i am just thinking about(. ) i mean that = 
G1402ha. [yeah] 
G1403fa. =worst case it would be is that you would be marginally out on something that doesn't = 
G1404ea. [bu-] [ye-] 
G1405fa. = go through the door or something like that 
G1406ea. yeah 
G1407fa. so what do you do you take the door frame out you take the window out you do something = 
G1408ha. [yes: ] 
G1409fa. =i can't believe you would have (. ) °your furniture re-made° you wouldn't a project of = 
G1410ea. [it's weird th-] [it's a weird = 
G1411fa. = that scale you'd get ready made- 
G1412ea. = one this] [if it's late delivery 
G1413fa. yeah 
G1414ea. yeah (. ) if it is a delivery and it's only a week or two late (. ) but for a piece of = 
G1415fa. [yeah] 
G1416ea. =furniture that genuinely doesn't fit you've got another thirty days on your hands 
G1417fa. hm: yeah 
G1418ea. i think that could be more of a problem than your delivery being late 
G1419ha i mean your- 
G1420ea. [>these are already ordered< 
G1421fa. yeah 
G1422ea. yeah it's only (. ) a week or two from when they should have been- 
G1423ha. as you say the alternative is you actually (. ) pay money (. ) to have the door taken out = G1424fa. [yes] 
G1425ha. =or whatever (. ) yeah (. ) right which reduces your time but increases your costs 
G1426fa. [yeah] [of course it does yes.. 
G1427ha. so there's a- 
G1428ea. [we're up to a thousand and i think a thousand will take it 
G1429ha. course it would yeah 
G1430fa. [go with that then 
G1431ha. yeah (. ) yeah ok (1.6) 
G1432ea. [alright] [are we doing whole project 
G1433ha. we've got those to do have we 
G1434fa. yeah 
G1435ha. got those to do have we 
G1436fa. yeah but it doesn't which order we do them in does it 
G1437ha. no:: 
G1438ea. finance (. ) err:: m (0.6) use individual sub-contractors it's as likely as not 
G1439fa. yes it is an opportunity isn't it 
G1440ea. yeah 
G1441fa. this is the one where we felt there was the most significant cost 
G1442ea. [yes] [i think = 
G1443ea. = it's exceptional (. ) 
G1444fa. yeah 
G1445ea. it's a minus five (. ) 
G1446fa. yes: 
G1447ea. time it's going to take you longer so it's a threat time wise 
G1448ha. yes 
G1449fa. [yes it will (. ) a lot more organisation also- 
G1450ea. [but i don't know (. ) i only think it is a er:: m four (1.7) 
G1451ha. yes just over a month 
G1452fa. yeah 
G1453ea. yeah 
G1454ha. yeah 
G1455ea. because time is not critical so: (. ) 
G1456fa. [no] 
G1457fa. change that to a () (1.8) 
G1458ea. tax benefit potential (1.5) it could happen 
G1459ha. [( )]((audible intake of breath)) 
G1460fa. it could yeah 
G1461ha. [yes] 
G1462ea erm: it ah:: ((audible expel of breath)) (0.5) i think it's only a significant (. ) opportunity = 
G1463fa. [yeah:: ] 
G1464ea. = it's only a minus two (. ) time (. ) ah: it's insignificant (. ) as a as an opportunity isn't it 
G1465fa. [ye:: s] 
G1466ha. [hmm] 
G1467fa. that's right yes 
G1468ha. no bearing on it so 
G1469ea. no 
G1470fa. [no] 
G1471ea. company sponsorship (1.0) could happen 
G1472fa. yeah (. ) potentially (. ) yeah 
G1473ea. [how much would they give you (. ) i think (2.1) minus three (2.4) minus four 
G1474fa. [hm:: ] 
G1475ha [hm:: ] 
G1476ea. three grand ain't a great deal and i () i could see them giving it you that (. ) 
G1477fa. yeah 
G1478ea. they would do it on a five year plan possibly wouldn't they (1.4) 
G1479fa. [yes] [yes 
G1480ha. [hmm] 
G148lea. time () erm:: has no significance it's a minor isn't it 
G1482ha. [no] [hm: 
G1483fa. [no] [yes] 
G1484ha. that is just arrangement time isn't it 
G1485fa. Yeah 
G1486ea. circumstances change 
G1487fa. we've gotta be- 
G1488ea. [potential.. 
G1489fa. we have to change that slightly and define what the change is 
G1490ea. erm:: (2.2) 
G 1491 ha. unemployed (1.2) 
G1492fa. redundancy () just put that it's good enough () we don't have to put everything (1.1) 
G1493ha. >[redenudancy]< 
G1494ea. xeah! but it's like some of the risks o: on your jobs you know (. ) you still = 
G1495fa. [hm: ] 
G1496ea. = but you know the risks () you see 
°this is all about culpability really here yeah 
G1497fa. [hm: hm: ] 
G1498ea. = go ahead with them it's about none of the directors signing off on 
it do you = 
G1499fa. [hm:: ] 
G1500ea. = know what i mean ° you know (. ) it's making everyone responsible isn't = 
G1501fa. [hm:: ] 
G1502ea. = it you know 
G1503fa. yes: 
G1504ea. >well you knew about it< 
G1505fa. yes exactly- 
G1506ea. circumstances change (. ) now i think it could happen i think this is a two really (2.1) 
G1507fa. [hm: ] [yes] 
G1508ea. i think: 
G1509fa. i don't think it'- 
G1510ea. [the threat () it's a five 
G 1511 fa. yeah 
G1512ha. [hm] 
G1513ea. well actually it's a (1.6) a tombstone (0.4) 
G1514fa. well: yes it is 
G1515ha [it is yes 
G1516fa. that's a good one to get in there 
G1517ea. er:: m (1.5) and the time (2.4) 
G1518ha. it's: 
G1519ea. [>it's a tombstone again < 
G1520fa. yeah (. ) 
G1521ea. do you think (. ) was there tombstone's (0.4) there's tombstones and there's er:: 
G1522ha. black flags (. ) 
G1523fa. yes 
G1524ha. but it is not a threat to the company 
G1525fa. no 
G1526ha. it's a threat to you isn't it (1.4) t- timing is not of. (0.3) any value there is it 
01527ea. >what's the black flag for< 
G1528fa. black flag is for damaging to the company 
G1529ha. [black flag is] 
G1530ea. hm: 
G1531fa. only you've got to try and read this in: (0.5) 
G1532ea. shall we put another tombstone (1.2) well it's- 
G1533fa. [erm:: 
G1534ha. it's timing it's not relevant once (. ) once you're (. ) once you're (. ) dead in the water = G1535ha. = the timing is no relevance 
G1536ea. >it's one< (. ) a one then isn't it it gets the lowest mark doesn't it 
G1537ha. [ha yes ] [it's-] 
G1538ea. ok it's a one ((sighing the words as he breathes out)) erm: (1.1) finance (2.0) _ 
G1539ea. = finance not granted (1.5) er:: m (. )well it's as likely as not 
G1540fa. >YEP< 
G1541ea. you know it's a fickle world (4.7) t:: hree 
G1542fa. yeah 
G1543ea. er:: m (. ) cost (0.8) 
G1544fa. °cost impact (. ) y:: eah° (1.6) 
G1545ea. cost impact (. ) i:: s (. ) >well it's minor really< (. ) it just doesn't go ahead does it 
G1546ha. hm: (0.9) 
G1547a. [hm: ] 
G1548ea. i: - i-: - it's minor it- it's a threat but cost wise it's it's minor isn't it (. ) >it's insignificant<- 
G1549fa. yes because it happens 
G1550ea. [you might as well just waste a hundred pounds- 
G1551fa. [that happens early in the process doesn't it 
G1552ea. = in administration really 
G1553fa. yeah (0.3) 
G1554ea. er:: m and time it's a one as well 
G1555fa. [again it's the same thing yes 
G1556ea. yeah 
G1557fa. yeah 
G1558ea. yeah interest rate changes (. ) now (2.4) phew ((breathes out audibly)) it's as likely = 
G1559ea. = as not it's a three- 
G1560fa. [but this can be a positive and a negative we have to split it haven't we = 
G1561ea. [hm:: 
G1562fa. = at this point (7.3) 
G1563ha. is the tombstone death of the project (0.8) 
G1564ea. >well it would b-< 
G1565fa. it would if you were: 
G1566ha. [if you didn't get finance would that be tombstone (0.4) 
G1567ea. yep 
G1568ha. hmph ((snorts)) (1.0 
G1569ea. yep 
G1570ha. it's death to the project isn't it 
G157Iea. yeah (0.7) 
G1572fa. yes that's true (6.4) 
G1573ea. so it's two threes (1.4) ha:: ((breathes out audibly)) do the top ones first (0.8) your financial = 
G1574ea. = impact (1.5) >sorry< (2.2) 
G1575ha. °interest rates go up° (2.5) 
G1576ea. lifecycle of your mortgage it could be quite significant 
G1577fa. ye: s (3.0) 
G1578ea. i know what happens if my mortgage goes up even a quarter of a percent (4.3) 
G1579fa. is it another three (2.2) 
G1580ea. yeah (( breathed)) it it's a tough one this because over the over the life = 
G158Iea. = cycle (. ) >it's catastrophic really< 
G1582ha. [it could be] [yes:: (2.3) 
G1583ea. well it depends on how long you are borrowing the money over doesn't it (. ) 
G1584ha. and it also depends on how your income keeps in step with: 
G1585fa. yeah- 
G1586ha. interest rates (. ) 
G1587ea. >should we hit it middle of the road a three< 
G1588ha. it's serious 
G1589fa. it is serious yes (. ) 
G1590ha. yeah 
G159Iea. er:: and time (0.5) 
G1592ha. it's not really applicable (. ) 
G1593ea. so it's a one isn't it 
G1594ha. hm:: (1.4) 
G1595ea. interest rate drops (1.0) it's a three again (0.9) 
G1596fa. yeah: 
G1597ha. [hm: ] 
G1598ea. because it goes ether way doesn't it (2.2) and it's a minus one because there is no time (. ) G1599fa. [yeah ha ha] ((laughing)) 
G1600ha. [hm: ] 
G1601ea. and it's a minus 1(1.3) there is no time 
G1602ha. there's no time 
G1603fa. hm: (1.7) 
G1604ea. no not on the duration of the job no (1.8) 
G1605ha. [hm] [hm] 
G1606ea. er:: m (. ) do you want to use this timing of interim stage payments one ((audibly sniffs)) (4.7) 
G1607ha. no 
G1608ea. no (1.7) 
G1609ha. °no we'll leave that° (0.6) 
G1610ea. it's not bad it's the only one that has come out so far you know ((audibly sniffs)) (1.0) 
G 1611 fa. yeah 
G1612ea. er:: m alternative fund arrangement (2.6) it's a- 
G1613fa. [yeah this we er: saw as an opportunity = 
G1614fa. = didn't we 
G1615ea. yeah it's a two (. ) could happen 
G1616fa. yeah: 
G1617ea. er:: m (3.2) the (. ) opportunity could be exceptional (2.5) or do you want to say = 
G1618ea. = very substantial (1.3) 
G1619fa. i don't think it would °come into that very substantial° (0.6) depends upon what you are = 
G1620fa. = talking about if you are negotiating with anther company to lend you the money (. ) we = 
G1621fa. = are talking about (. ) you know (. ) are we talking about a few quid month aren't we (. ) or = 
G1622ha. [yeah hm hm] 
G1623fa. = whatever you know it' s not (1.2) 
G1624ea. is that what you mean alternative fund going to some- 
G1625fa. [yeah i mean is it likely we are going to = 
G1626fa. = get it else where (0.7) or are we going to say it's: 
G1627ea. >different lenders have different policies is that wha-< 
G1628fa. [yeah what what about your company 
G1629fa. = >bearing in mind that we are going down the route of saying that it's our 
G1630fa. =company that < is- 
GI631ea. [>yeah well we have not gone down the lines of sponsorship yet have we< 
G1632fa. no 
G1633ea. no this is not it yet (. ) right ok (. ) 
G1634ha. it's either significant or substantial i think (. ) 
G1635fa. yeah (1.8) 
G1636ha. if you saved what (. ) ten percent (1.5) on your finance 
G1637ea. [ah-] [yeah that's minus three then minus three (4.3) 
G1638fa. [hm] 
G1639ea. ah:: m (. ) and the time is it a one (. ) a minus one isn't it 
G1640ha. hm (1.2) 
G1641ea. ok then that is that one done (3.3) 
G1642fa. [ye: s] 
G1643ea. what others have we got left now (. ) just that one there isn't it the: 
G1644ha. [planning 
G1645ea. the planning permission one (. ) wasn't it right then well (. ) 
G1646fa. [planning permission] [yes 
G1647ea. right well it's er::: m (1.2) 
G1648fa. well that's a tombstone isn't it 
G1649ea. it's a to- (. ) it's a tombstone () and that's a one (1.2) that's how we work it isn't it 
G1650fa. yeah 
G1651ea. >ground conditions unsuitable< (1.1) 
G1652ha. improbable (3.9) could happen 
G1653ea. [>it could happen< 
G1654ha. [could happen (. ) 
G1655ea. >IT'S A TWO < (. ) now your cost (. ) i mean people get hung about this i me- lets = 
G1656ea. = just say you can't do your normal strip foundations you got to put a raft in 
G1657fa. [yeah] 
G1658ha. [yeah] 
G1659ea. = how much is that going to cost you to put a raft in on a single (. ) story er-.: m = 
G1660ea. = thirteen by thirteen extension 
G1661fa. hm: (1.5) 
G1662ha. [hm: ] (. ) i don't know (. ) a couple of grand (. ) i don't know (. ) 
G1663ea. probably an extra grand on top of what you were originally going to spend (0.8) 
G1664fa. [yes] [might be yes] 
G1665ea. = so it is going to be a:::: mar: - (3.2) a marginal threat (1.1) 
G1666ha. hm hm: 
G1667fa. [yes i would say it is only a marginal threat (. ) 
G1668ea. time (. ) i don't think it will take you any longer than a week =(0.3) 
G1669fa. no: (. ) probably not 
G 1670ea. = to put a raft in 
G1671ha. additional time yeah 
G1672ea. to be honest (1.3) pa::: ((audibly breathes out)) 
G1673ha. it's probably easier- 
G1674ea. [it is actually easier to cast a raft than put your strips in 
G1675ea. = er::: it's an insignificant (. ) 
G1676fa. yes it is 
G1677ea. >or do you want to go for a marginal two< 
G1678ha. two:: 
G1679fa. >yeah because if you know you found that it was a problem< (. ) you would have to = 
G1680fa. = go back and get your plans: (. ) amended 
G1681ha. [that's right yeah] 
G1682ea. [opposition from neighbours (. ) 
G1683fa. does that not come (. ) in:: (0.4) linked in with the first one (0.8) because there is = 
G1684fa. = two things (. ) one of the reasons council wouldn't wouldn't grant planning permission = 
G1685fa. = because your neighbours objected (6.9) 
G1686ea. sigh ((audible sigh)) (. ) well put it this way if they do oppose it could be a tombstone (0.4) 
G1687ha. hm:: (2.4) 
G1688fa. [yeah] 
G1689ea. and it could happen 
G1690fa. yeah (3.3) 
G1691ha. [yeah] 
G1692ea. because no amount of money you throw at it is going to make a blind bit of difference- 
G1693fa. [i was just wondering if-] [there= 
G1694fa. = is a duplication of effort there because i think it's the same thing as number one (2.1) 
G1695ha. yes it- 
G1696fa. [it doesn't matter why it's not granted it's not granted is it 
G1697ha. [no] [that's it] 
G1698ea. i'll have that (1.2) delay (0.6) 
G1699fa. yeah that's a bit- 
G1700ea. [is a two it could happen (. ) ah:: m (1.4) c o:: st (1.9) it's a time delay isn't it (. ) 
G1701fa. [yes] 
G1702ha. [ho] 
G1703fa. yes it is (. ) it isn't significant in terms of cost (0.3) 
G1704ea. it's a one (0.8) and (1.9) >it's a three< (0.5) i would say (. ) it's pretty serious (0.7) it = 
G1705ea. = could be anything up to a month (0.9) 
G1706ha. >well yeah because< (. ) you've got to meet the planning (. ) >what is it four week = 
G1707fa. [yeah that's a point it it it is] 
G1708ha. = cycles months< 
G1709ea. >is it more than< i- is it 
G1710ha. [four week cycles is it for (1.2) i think it is isn't it 
G1711fa. [ye:: ah what have we got on time we've another thirty days or: 
G1712ha. yeah serious 
G1713fa. or thirty to forty two 
G1714ha. so it's serious it's a: three yeah (1.2) 
G1715fa. [hm: ] 
G1716ea. ok it's three (. ) right we've done that now we need to plot it 
Red Team Verbal Transcription 
R562aa. the only thing that worries me is which risks are they talking about 
R563ca. top five risks is it (2.7) 
R564aa. top five () our top five 
R565ca. yeah (3.4) 
R566da. we have to break them up rate them all 
R567aa. do we (. ) 
R568da. rate all the risks and then find which is the top five (6.2) 
R569aa. didn't he say look for the catastrophic ones look for the minor first and then = 
R570aa. = the others will fall into place (2.0) 
R571da. yeah but he was saying about pounds wasn't he () er: improbable (2.1) less = 
R572da. = than ten percent (1.5) cost in po: unds (3.6) *ten quid* (4.6) 
R573ca. ten (. ) 
R574da. ° yeah° 
R575ge. >if you had a twenty thousand pounds< (. ) project what do you think would be = 
R576ge. = an insignificant risk (. ) up to what (3.4) 
R577ba. °hundred pounds° 
R578ge. hundred pounds yeah 
R579ca. is that right 
R580ge. well it's your project so pencil it in and see (. ) you can always change = 
R581ge. = it later (. ) so: anything a hundred pound or less "is is ()°and then think = 
R582ge. = about the worst case (1.0) don't forget this is about any one risk so: what = 
R5 83ge. = would be a catastrophic disaster or an exceptional opportunity (1.1) the = 
R584ge. = worst case (. ) 
R585aa. *ten grand I'd have thought° 
R586ca. that would finish it off completely (0.8) 
R587da. °you're into your project bill so what is going to cost you: * (1.9) 
R588aa. ten grand more 
R589da. yeah but that is a huge amount- 
R590ge. yeah it is 
R591da. that that's an absolutely huge amount (2.2) i mean i would personally say (. ) two = 
R592da. grand w- w- would would be er:: (0.5) i mean if i had twenty grand to spend- 
R593aa. >ten percent< (0.6) 
R594da. yeah ten percent 
R595ge. the rule of thumb is between ten and thirty percent o- o- on a cash rich- 
R596aa. would say most you would deal with on a sub-contract would be more than ten percent 
R597ge. yeah it would be a disaster wouldn't it () so somewhere between two and five k is the = 
R598ge. = answer we always get on this course 
R599ca. yeah 
R600ge. so it's up to you (. ) it's what you're comfortable with as a group (. ) but don't forget = 
R601ge. then somebody will turn around and say two thousand what if a find a risk that = R602ge. = costs me five thousand because i might find one 
R603da. [yeah] 
R604ge. so we say greater than (. ) anything greater than two grand () stop the = R605ge. = risk management process (. ) let's deal with it 
R606da. hm:: 
R607ge. so you might find () b- because the problem you get with this (. ) if you put = R608ge. = five in there then this becomes so coarse that you don't start to get the = R609ge. = granuality ((? )) so you you want something that is big enough to take all = R610ge. = comers () and if you put greater than that will do it (. ) but you want enough = R611ge. = scale in there so you can decide which ones to tackle first 
R612aa. *hm: * 
R613ge. and some put two some put five and a half but there or there abouts is not = R614ge. =a bad figure is would suggest that would be one to a hundred (. ) that = R615da. [hm: ] R616ge. = would be thousand to two thousand (. ) greater than two thousand and you = R617ge. have a good scale 
R618da. [hm: ] 
R619ge. don't get too hung up here what we are saying is big risk small risk (. ) i'll = R620ge. = manage that first and that second- 
R621aa. [call it ten percent anyway 
R622ge. >yeah< 
R623aa. ten percent of six weeks or whatever 
R624ge. ok (. ) you've got it (. ) >leave you with it< 
R625aa. ok (3.8) 
R626da. so a minor time would be a: (. ) °day° (4.5) 
R627ba. s: six month project is it 
R628aa. yeah (2.1) 
R629ba. i would say two week delay is minor (0.7) 
R630aa. minor two weeks no (. ) i would say two weeks is a disaster 
1Z63 Ida. yeah i would say that a highly exceptional delay would be er:: two weeks and above = R632da. = and you are in big shit aren't you (0.4) 
R633aa. i would have thought so yeah (2.4) two out of six (0.3) 
R634ba. six fours are twenty four lets say twenty six weeks (3.1) so what's that in percentage = R635ba. = terms (. ) that's ten (. ) 
R636aa. two out of ten 
R637ba. yeah i suppose two out of ten (2.9) i- I JUST DON'T () it'll be a bloody miracle if they = R638aa. [well let's put three then if we want 
R639ba. = finish within that (4.3) 
R640aa. well we'll put it in pencil we can always come back 
R641ba. what about two and a half weeks (. ) split it (. ) 
R642ca. °ng (. ) greater than° 
R643aa [is it an exception 
R644ba. it's an exception (. ) two and a half (0.4) 
R645da. so it's two and a half weeks (1.3) 
R646aa. what about a minor then (2.2) days (. ) a week; i don't know 
R647ba. oh hang on time in days two and a half that's er. (5.0) 
R648da. well it's working days isn't it (. ) not weekends (1.2) 
R649ba. thirteen (. ) 
g650da. unlucky for some (. ) right yeah (. ) °so we're looking at (. ) what ° (0.9) 
R651aa. two days (1.4) 
g652da. yeah (1.3) yeah two 
R653aa. two as a minor (1.0) 
R654da. °two to four (. ) yes (. ) four to six (. ) is substantial (6.6) that's a week isn't it 
R655da. five to ten° (0.3) 
R656ba. substantial is five 
g657aa. >four to five yeah we've got to use a band< (. ) got to put a band in there 
R658da. °four to si: x (. ) six to twelve (. ) six to thirteen ()° 
R659aa. no you can't (1.6) no you can't have- 
R660da. °we've got a problem there° 
R661aa. no you can't have six to twelve weeks (. ) it's thirteen hours int it 
g662da. °right (. ) thirteen hours° (3.7) 
R663ba. °let's just check we've got the same thing° (. ) er substantial what have you = 
R664ba. = got for substantial (1.6) four to five 
g665da. four to four to six- 
g666aa. [six days (5.8) six to twelve and thirteen onwards (7.5) 
g667ba. si- six 
g668aa. [now all we've got to do is pick which risk is in there (2.8) 
g669ba. hang on we can't have overlaps surely (. ) if it's minor it's two (. ) significant is three 
g670aa. no it's between (. ) i- i- it's between two and four (. ) 
g671ba then it'll fall into two categories won't it 
R672da. °that's less than two isn't it° 
g673ba. no i've got les than two 
R674da. [yeah that's it 
g675ba. [next one has to be three 
R676da. the next one can be two because it's less than two (. ) the first is less than two = 
g678da. yeah (1.0) so you are talking less than two less than a hundred pounds 
g679ba. oh: (. ) all right 
R680da. a hundred pounds upward yeah 
R681ba. [a hundred pounds (. ) oh i see what you mean 
R682da. so it's less than two then it's two to four (2.1) 
R683ba. two to less than four (2.0) 
R684da. Xes (. ) yes 
R685aa. that's what i was struggling at (. ) because i did the hundred (. ) you see i have = 
R686aa. = done the hundred pounds or less: (. ) 
R687da. yeah 
R688aa. WEL IF YOU LOok what they have done on their side look (. ) they have done ten = 
R689aa. = to thirty then thirty to fifty so: (. ) you know (3.0) 
R690da. but is it these risks here that we are then (. ) ah: looking at each one of those (0.4) and we = 
R691aa. [yes we use those risks] 
R692da. = are scoring it now are we (7.8) 
R693ca. is that the first one 
R694da. yeah (. )what does p stand for (1.2) 
R695aa. p: was:: >probability< an impact that's the words impact 
R696da. >right< (. ) >ok< (. ) so failure to obtain planning permission (2.4) is er: m (1.6) 
R697aa. exceptional catastrophic call it what you like int it really 
R698da. er:: m 
R699aa. we don't go anywhere 
R700da. the probability of it (2.0) 
R701aa. well it wouldn't cost us anything 
R702da. [slightly improbable is it] [well no 
R703ba. er:: (3.7) 
R704da. the threat is catastrophic (. ) yeah (. ) but it is not terribly likely that we will 
R705aa. [hm hm] 
R706ba. COULD happen i- 
R707da. you reckon it could happen (. ) yeah it could happen (. ) ok 
R708ba. it could happen 
R709da. so it is a two times five yeah (0.6) 
R710ca. but it is not gonna cost you any money if it goes wrong then so it is not going to be = 
R711ca. = catastrophic is it (. ) 
R712aa. wha- 
R713ca. [cause it's not going to cost you anything 
R714aa. well it is because you can't have a building 
R715da. you can't do the building 
R716ca. you can't start the project 
R717da. yeah (0.5) yeah so: do we give that a ten (. ) do we score it on here (. ) so it's going to be = 
R718ba. [°yeah°] 
R719ca. [you see that p and i bit] 
R720da. = planning pl one 
R721ca. yeah yeah sorry yeah 
R722da. so do we put it in here 
R723ba. er yeah (. ) er yeah 
R724aa. () 
R725ba. that's where it goes 
R726da. what (. ) probability (. ) probability is (2.1) er two 
R727aa. [probability's] 
R728ba. [herm] ((audibly breathes out)) 
R729ca. yeah (0.8) 
R730da. an: d the:: 
R731ca. impacts about five 
R732da. [impact is five 
R733ca. yeah 
R734aa. [yeah] (0.6) 
R735da. and we need a score somewhere do we (. ) ten (1.8) 
R736ca. yeah i- 
R737ba. [>h- hang on< i- if it could happen why are we saying it's catastrophic 
R738ca. because the project is knackered before you even start (. ) it's totally and utterly done = 
R739aa. [because you can't have a building] 
R740da [you can't have a building] 
R741ca. = it cannot get any worse (. ) 
R742aa. if it fails they don't give it ya (3.1) 
R743ba. yeah you're right if it to- yeah you're right I'm thinking about going back to yeah you're right 
R744da. [yeah] [you see = 
R745da. = if it is a restrictive permission it is going to cause us a problem but it's not going to be = 
R746da. = catastrophic or critical (1.6) er: m it could be a serious problem 
R747aa. yep 
R748da. so i would put that down as being a serious (1.0) a three (0.8) 
R749ca. the impact yeah 
R750ba. yeah 
R751da. yeah 
R752ba. yeah i agree 
R753da. and it could be a could happen (. ) as well couldn't it 
R754ca. yeah it could be a two yeah 
R755da. it could be a two (0.5) 
R756ba. >yep< 
R757ca. yeah 
R758da. right (. ) additional requirements ie landscaping (1.4) well again that's going to be a two = 
R759da. = isn't it (. ) it could happen they could ask us (1.7) 
R760aa. i think that's er: (. ) a bit higher than that 
R761da. as likely as not 
R762aa. hm:: 
R763ba. but landscaping drain upgrading i think that is highly unlikely 
R764da. wel- well we can still put something 
R765aa. you think that's unlikely 
R766ba. yeah 
R767aa. do ya (3.8) 
R768ba. well f- for a small extension i agree if it was a big one 
R769da. that's right you see (. ) you see people who build extensions and leave builders = 
R770ba. [but not for a little extension like this one] 
R771aa. [right ok then] 
R772da. = rubble around their houses 
R773aa. [put it a one_ then (. ) put a one; then 
R774da. yeah (. ) right ok 
R775ba. a- 
R776da. [we'll give it a one (0.4) er:: m 
R777aa. and if it happened what would happen then (. ) 
R778da. we: ll (. ) if it happened it would cost us a few quid to put it right 
R779ca. [ ()] [yeah 
R780aa. marginal 
R781da. say: 
R782ba. two 
R783da. two yeah 
R784ba. yeah 
R785da. so it could cost us a couple of hundred quid to put it right (. ) 
R786ca. yeah 
R787da. right (0.4) 
R788aa. bank restrictions on loan 
R789da. bank restrictions on loan 
R790ca. [there's gonna be restrictions isn't there (0.6) 
R791da. ((sharp in take of breath)) 
R792aa. i think that is likely as not that (. ) definitely (2.3) 
R793da. ((sharp out breath)) yeah::: 
R794aa. mind it's only a twenty grand loan int it 
R795da. twenty grand 
R796ba. °twenty grand it's° 
R797da. yeah : it depends what the equity is on your home (. ) whether its °negative or something = 
R798da. = like that doesn't it° 
R799aa. °a ha° 
R800da. could be a two or a three (. ) 
R801ba. three (. ) >as likely as not< 
R802da. yeah:: 
R803ca. i don't know 
R804da. i don't know they they yeah: >°sometimes they put restrictions on °< 
R805aa. i think they'd always put a little bit of restrictions on you (. ) as likely as not = R806aa. =i think you know 
R807da. this is the whole thing with risk though isn't it (. ) is that we have to decide (. ) whether = R808aa. [yeah] 
R809ca. [whether = R8I Oda. = or not it is going to happen 
R81 Ica. = or not it is going to happen yeah 
R812da. yeah so (. ) it is not a hard and fast rule 
R813ba. [it could (. ) it could happen] 
R814aa. i mean (. ) what we've got to decide at the end of the day is which risks we want to = R815da. [yeah] 
R816aa. = tackle first 
R817ca. [yeah (. ) >which are the most important risks 
R818aa. [yeah 
R819da. [if ] [if the bank put a= 
R820da. restriction on the loan we could go somewhere else to another mortgage company = 
R821da. = (. ) yeah (. ) get some money from somewhere else 
R822aa. yeah it wouldn't be- it wouldn't be a big problem would it 
R823da. [SO:: ] [SO IT WOULDN'T BE- (. ) no but it could happen 
R824aa. yes (. ) 
R825da. so we we think it could happen (0.3) 
R826aa. °yeah° 
R827da. >two< 
R828ba. yeah 
R829aa. an ok an ok 
R830da. [BUT! if it does happen 
R831aa. it would only be marginal i would have thought (. ) 
R832da. marginal 
R833ba. ye: ah 
R834da. yeah 
R835ba. we could go somewhere else (. ) > but it could cost us< 
R836aa. [well if we were looking at five hundred quid that is all it would costs us 
R837da. well yes it would cost us another one percent yeah (0.6) 
R838ba. yeah that could work 
R839da. so it could cost us another one percent on the whole thing (. ) so what is one percent = 
R840da. of twenty thousand pounds (. ) two grand (2.3) no that's ten percent beg your pardon it's = 
R841 aa. [yeah] 
R842ba [yeah] 
R843da. = two hundred quid so it is going to be a two then (3.5) 
R844aa. [it- its-] 
R845ba. yeah (1.3) 
R846da. TURNED DOWN for the loan (. ) well that is catastrophic isn't it or is it (. ) >or is it just (. ) 
R847ca. [well i-] 
R848da. if we are turned down for the loan wherever we go 
R849aa. lets do the probability first (0.4) 
R850ca. oh it's go to be improbable hasn't it (1.5) 
R851da. HO- 
R852aa. improbable 
R853ba. improbable yes (1.9) 
R854ca. if if you're even considering to do the thing you've got to- 
R855ba [IT'S SO SUBJECTIVE THIS = 
R856ba. = BECAUSE IT DEPENDS IF YOU'VE GOT EQUITY IN THE PROPERTY THEY= 
R857aa. [I WOULD SAY IT'S (. ) improbable] 
R858ba. = WILL BLOODY JUMP AT YOU 
R859da. we haven't got probably sometimes enough detail to be able to make that judgement 
R860ba. [yeah sure] 
R861aa. i think it's improbable they will turn you down 
R862da. yeah 
R863ca. yeah () give it a one yeah 
R864da. yeah 
R865ca. yeah (1.9) 
R866da. we're a big company but on the other hand we said we would do it ourselves (. ) 
R867aa. and if they did what would it be then () critical: (0.8) 
R868da. [hm:: ] c- could have serious implications 
R869aa. no well we've just said on the other that- 
R870ca. [are we just talking about from the one place here (0.7) 
R871da. well: 
R872ca. or are we talking about in total (2.7) 
R873da. °i don't know () we could go somewhere else° (1.6) 
R874ca. no so () it's not going to be a great- 
R875da. no 
R876aa. ah:: 
R877da. [>so< (. ) turned down for a loan of any description (. ) 
R878aa. is mo: re- 
R879da. [is improbable 
R880aa. it is yes (0.5) 
R88 Ida. right (1.0) 
R882aa. but but if we were 
R883da. [if we were] 
R884aa. >it's catastrophic< 
R885da. it could cost us- 
R886ba. [catastrophic yes] 
R887aa. [well we couldn't build () we couldn't build so it'd be a five (0.8) 
R888da. yeah but it is highly improbable that we will get turned down for any kind of loan (1.0) 
R889ca. ar: but if we did (0.4) 
R890da. if we did 
R891ca. [if we did 
R892aa. [the impact to the project that is what we are saying 
R893da. ok () if we did 
R894ba. [to the project it would be catastrophic (. ) we couldn't do it 
R895da. unless granny died (. ) 
R896ba. unless granny died 
R897ca. that that's the next one 
R898aa. [na: ] 
R899da. ok () all right then (. ) so it is going to be a five then (2.3) 
R900aa. [a five] 
R901ba. yeah 
((DISCUSSION ABOUT KILLING GRANY)) (113.6) 
R902da. interest rates alter (1.2) 
R903ba. three (. ) 
R904da. yeah as likely as not i'll agree with that 
R905ca. [it just depends what way it is going to go though 
R906da. but (. ) we then said (. ) or they said didn't they (. ) erm: that we should put that it = 
R907ca. [yeah] [yeah yeah] 
R908da. = would go up (. ) and that it would go down (1.1) so we are talking three for up and three= 
R909da. = or less than three for down 
R910aa. no i think it's more for going down int it 
R91 Ida. yeah (. ) so we could have it three minus three perhaps (0.5) 
R912aa. [()] ((mumbles something)) 
R913ba. yeah 
R914da. ok so: 
R915aa. what's the others though (. ) 
R916da. if erm: 
R917ca. the impact of it going up (0.7) 
R918da. wha- a- (. ) if it goes down then it is going to be a minus score isn't it 
R919ba. >yep< 
R920da. so: (. ) er: m (1.5) >it's not going to be a huge amount is it< 
R921aa. no i wouldn't have thought so no (. ) 
R922ba. [no] 
R923da. it's going to be a minor (. ) a minor one 
R924ba. yeah minor 
R925aa. [yeah minor one 
R926da. yeah 
R927ca. and then a one above that then oh- 
R928da. and then (1.2) 
R929ba. insignificant 
R930aa. [it's going to be both same int it surely 
R931ba. so: (. ) if it is going to be an insignificant increase (. ) then it is going to be just an ordinary = 
R932aa. [yeha it'll-] 
R933ba. one 
R934ca. yeah 
R935aa. [yeah 
R936da. yeah 
R937ba. certainly less than a hundred isn't it (2.1) () 
R938da. builders work (2.3) delivery times on materials (0.3) 
R939aa. phew ((audibly breathes out)) 
R940da. well that's as likely as not could happen (. ) 
R941aa. that could happen (0.4) 
R942da. er: m (. ) as likely as not though is it 
R943aa. yeah 
R944da. is it a three 
R945ca. yeah give it a three 
R946da. give it a three 
R947aa. yeah: i think so (0.9) 
R948ca. >and it could it be critical< 
R949ba. a- 
R950ca. [serious (6.1) 
R951aa. we're talking about four to five four to six (. ) six days here (1.5) 
R952da. yeah 
R953aa. if the material doesn't come in four to six days: 
R954ba. well we've only got- 
R955aa. [it's got to be serious and we can't start 
R956da. yeah (1.0) 
R957aa. if we don't get the material we can't start for four to six days (0.5) 
R 958ba. yeah 
R959da. [so it's three 
R960aa. [that's what we are saying (. ) three times three i would have thought = (1.1) 
R961aa. = and all we can do is hope he can make that up (0.6) 
R962da. >BUILDER< unable to start on time (. ) so that could be again up to a week (2.0) 
R963aa. a:: well i would say it's improbable if we've chosen the right builder (. ) we've = 
R964da. [or even two weeks] 
R965aa. = discussed it with him you know 
R966ca. it's not a great start from his point of view is it 
R967aa. a- 
R968ca. [we've agreed a date 
R969da. [i would say it could happen though (. ) because he he- might = 
R970da. = have turned round to him and said (. ) you know (. ) look you've got defects on my= 
R971da. = property and if you don't fix them i aint going to pay you any more money at all 
R972aa. ok lets loo- 
R973da. [yeah so it could happen 
R974ba. °yeah° 
R975da. could happen 
R976ba. yeah i agree there 
R977da. two (. ) two (. ) so if it could happen it could delay us by (. ) up to (. ) a couple of weeks 
R978aa. yeah 
R979da. or a week (1.2) 
R980ba. yeah ii would say more than that (0.3) 
R981aa. no it's days were talking- 
R982da. [days so it's up to 
R983ba. a week (0.4) 
R984da. up to:: (1.3) a three >which is a serious one< (. ) just over a week 
R985ca. yeah 
R986aa. i wouldn't say it's serious i would say it's marginal really (1.4) two to four days out of a= 
R987aa. = six months 
R988da. [but what happens if we go- 
R989aa. [what 
R990da. what happens if we go over our six months period (3.6) 
R991 aa. w- what does happen (1.9) 
R992da. perhaps we should have categorised it for: a: (. ) month (. ) catastrophic (3.7) but = 
R993da. = we we have said it is over a week to two weeks haven't we (1.7) how long would= 
R994da. =a builder be delayed (2.0) 
R995aa. ha ha ((laughing)) easy two and a half weeks 
R996da. we- 
R997ba. [that's easy 
R998da. well it could be couldn't it 
R999ca. yeah (1.5) 
R1000ba. i think a month (. ) it could easily be a month a month is: (2.4) 
R1001da. we we haven't allowed (. ) so it could be over (. ) so it could be a five (1.0) 
R1002ba. but what we haven't said is the builder if we choose wisely could (. ) take the point you = 
R1003da. [yeah tha- that's-] 
R1004ba. = made (. ) draw in additional people and put 
it back on programme wouldn't he (0.3) 
R1005da. we're not using a two bit organisation so you (. ) so you choose wisely 
(0.8) so (. ) but- 
R1006ba. [no] 
R1007aa. having discussed it firstly with the builder (. ) and you are quite happy that he has = 
R1008aa. = got the men and the manpower a- a- you 
know the materials to do it (. ) you would = 
R1009da. [yeah] 
R101Oaa. = be quietly confident but (. ) it could 
happen (0.3) 
R1011da. it could happen (. ) 
R1012aa. so i think (. ) it would still be a marginal i- i- i- in it's impact really 
(1.3) cause we make = 
R1013aa. = it limit- limited to them 
R1014da. well yes but we could then ask him to increase his programme 
(. ) 
R1015aa. correct (0.3) 
R1016da. or his labour force 
R1017aa. his manpower 
R1018da. increase his labour force () so a two (. ) >we all agree< 
RIO19ca. yep sure 
R1020da. yeah (0.6) right weather conditions 
R1021aa. [we've got to have both sides of the equation ant we 
R1022da. weather conditions (. ) well as likely as not they are going to be changing aren't they 
R1023ca. yep 
R1024da. i would have thought (. ) so we're er:: >but exceptional ones< well_ i still think it's = 
R1025da. = middle (. ) middle of the road category (1.7) 
R1026ba. b- but this is an exceptional 
R1027da. ye: ah (. ) 
R1028ba. i- is it likely that 
R1029ca. it's gonna be () 
R1030ba. could happen 
R103Ida. are we talking summer here (. ) are the expecting nice fine weather or are they (. ) in= 
R1032da. = six months building time you're gonna bridge through a couple of seasons aren't you 
R1033ca. °yeah° 
R1034da. so: (3.0) 
R1035ba. °you see° i can't help thinking six months for a building extension (. ) christ all = 
R1036ba. = mighty (. ) that's terrible for a single story (0.8) 
R1037da. so are we saying that the er: time restraints on (. ) on the building of the extension = R1038da. = are er: (. ) *is not° (1.2) six months form start to finish (. ) that was the concept though = R1039da. = wasn't it (. ) that was thinking about it 
R1040ba. that's right 
R1041da. so we- 
R1042ba. [the building phase i don't think- 
R1043da. [so do you know what the building phase is actually going to = R1044da. = be then 
R1045ba. six weeks 
R1046da. six weeks 
R1047ba. if that (1.6) it's not going to be great- 
R1048aa. [yeah but we are only looking for the risk elements = 
R1049aa. = within the bands we have chosen really 
R1050ba. yeah 
R1051aa. so we (. ) we are not looking at how long it is going to take it's just looking at the = 
R1052aa. = bands aren't we (. ) 
R1053da. so the weather: (. ) weather could (2.3) could change 
R1054ba. yeah 
R1055aa. [yeah (. ) i still think it could change- 
R1056ba. it could change to- 
R1057da. [so it could change (. ) which would be a two (. ) and if it does = 
R1058da. = change it is going to be (1.3) marginal: (2.0) 
R1059ca. yeah (. ) 
R1060da. what's a couple of days loss of labour (. ) is that five hundred quid (1.2) 
R1061aa. °yeah° 
R1062da. so it could be a three (0.9) 
R1063ba. of course so soon as he's got the roof on (. ) it doesn't matter about the weather 
R1064da. [hm- hm-] ((in agreement)) 
R1065ba. = it is only when he is doing the outside and and it's the painting 
R1066aa. [i think it could be a three serious that me (. ) impact (. ) it could be serious 
R1067da. [yeah] 
R1068da. yeah (. ) serious impact (. ) financially it could be a thousand pounds (2.0) er:: m 
R1069ca. only if it's frost you could be held up for a week at a time 
R1070da. [but bu- but would we be liable (. ) we are saying that we would be liable (1.2) 
R1071aa. ah no the builder is liable because i challenged that if you recall (1.0) I'm not sure the = 
R1072aa. = builder can be liable 
R1073da. i:: from from what we were saying- 
R1074ba. [how can he be if it's exceptional 
R1075aa. [how can he be (. ) no (1.8) 
R1076da. er: m you only get paid for an extension of time for exceptionally incremental weather = 
R1077da. = but you don't get paid you get time (2.3) 
R1078aa. [you get the time] 
R1079da. you get time yeah 
R1080ba. oh i see (1.9) 
R1081aa. you get the time but you don't get the money for it 
R1082da. [so it is the builder then (. ) because (1.7) he: (2.1) 
R1083aa. yes but he'll not he'll not get paid for it 
R1084da. no 
R1085aa. but we will give him the time for it 
R1086da. so: 
R1087aa. >[SO WHAT will it cost us for it< (0.3) well it could cost us erm: putting the furniture = 
R1088aa. = into store (. ) couldn't it (. ) cause it's not ready 
R1089da. we could just defer erm: if it was only going to be (0.5) a week (0.5) we could ask them = 
R1090da. =- to def- delay their (0.4) delivery (. ) °maybe°.. 
R1091ba. are we agreed that it IS BETWEEN MARGINAL and serious then 
R1092aa. [two (. ) it's a two] 
R1093da. yeah 
R1094ba. we have honed it down to two items then (2.5) 
R1095da. yeah (. ) two or a three (1.3) two 
R1096ca. two yeah 
R1097aa. ah ha (4.1) 
R1098da. below ground problems (2.4) could require ilin () ohh:: 
R1099aa. i think there is a serious threat there (0.6) 
R1100ca. yes (2.6) 
RI 101da. it depends if the ground survey had been done before hand and whether you had = 
RI 102da. = anywhere to go with the problem (1.4) having a having a 
RI 103aa. [i think it should be a could happen and = 
R1104aa. = it could be critical (2.1) 
RI105ca. yes 
RI106ba. [yeah] 
R1107da. could happen () it could happen yeas (0.9) 
RI108ca. it could cost you a fortune to put it right 
RI 109ba. it certainly will cost money 
R1110da. [er:: it could be a four] [yeah 
Rl ll laa. yeah (5.0) 
RI I12da. ok 
RI 113ca. it could even be catastrophic (3.7) 
RI 114da. er: m (2.5) chances are they built the house on something didn't they- 
R1115aa. [well again in the band] [you're now = 
R11l6aa. = looking at two grand which is (1.5) 
RI I17da. if you take that- 
R1118aa. [WE'RE LOOKING AT THE BAND AREN'T WE REALLY (5.3) 
R1119da. ok () so decorations (4.0) ok (. ) building not drying out (1.1) er:: 
RI120aa. i think that is as likely as not (. ) 
RI 121da. well i probably would agree with you () you always see dehumidifiers and what = 
RI 122da. = have you so the chances are you are going to have to go and buy or rent some = 
RI 123da. = dehumidifiers to dry the building out (. ) put the heating on earlier (1.3) 
R1124ba. [yeah] 
R1125aa. insignificant really isn't it 
RI126ba. insignificant 
R 1127da. insignificant 
R1128ba. they can sort it out 
R1129da. yeah it's a one 
R1130ca. it's not going to take long is it 
R113Ida. a one () maybe a two () a one 
RI132aa. [a one] 
R1133da. a one ok (4.3) long delivery on carpet (1.1) ok (. ) so: when you choose the carpet i= 
R1134da. = would have thought that they were gonna say: (2.8) we stock one or it will be = 
RI 135da. = two to four weeks so you could say four weeks is significant 
RI 136aa. [it could happen but it is insignificant 
RI137da. ye: ah () so it could happen () it is going to be a two (0.4) 
R1138aa. and a one 
R1139ca. [and a one 
R1140da. and at the end of the day () if you haven't got a carpet to walk on 
R1141aa. you can still go to work can't you 
RI142da. yeah (. ) you are going to have to move your desk out again but hey (. ) insignificant 
R1143ca. it would affect your door 
RI144da. well yes (. ) so one 
RI145aa. one yes (1.2) 
RI146da. and building () drying out (. ) too quickly and cracking (1.6) 
RI147aa. that's could happen 
R1148ca. yeah 
RI 149ba. it could yeah 
RI 150da. [it could happen () especially if you got a heat wave 
R1151aa. could be marginal that 
R1152ca. yes 
R1153aa. i think it's: 
R1154ca. >two and a two< (0.8) 
R1155ba. yeah 
RI156da. yeah () two and a two (. ) °ok° (4.4) right 
RI157aa. because you can't move in you can't decorate (1.7) 
R1158da. ok (. ) er:: moving in (6.0) 
R1159aa. *ha ha ha° ((laughing )) 
R1160da. ok (. ) final connections of utilities (5.1) 
R116lba. yeah (. ) highly probable ((laughing)) (1.7) 
RI 162da. i don't know(. ) bt have this erm (2.8) 
RI 163ba. isdn lines (. ) killer streams huh (. ) bloody disaster 
RI 164aa. [if i was looking for risk i would cover that risk me (. ) i think they = 
RI165aa. = could be late connecting you up and you could be not be able to use the- 
R1166da. [but would = 
R1167da. = you not have one in your home (. ) if it was bt 
R1168aa. you would but you know 
R1169ca. [you see that is the problem they are good whe- 
R1170da. [extension (. ) extension = 
RI171da. = lead 
R1172aa. you could yeah () but you haven't got your dedicated line or anything like that 
R1173ba. [( )] 
R1174da. yeah your isdn or your direct link to your server in head office or or whatever (. ) 
R1175ba. are we saying probable (. ) have we got that little faith in them (1.3) 
RI176da. erm:: (0.9) 
RI 177aa. I'm saying probable i think so yes (. ) 
RI 178da. you are saying probable 
RI179aa. ° hm: ° (6.3) 
R1180da. yes right ok i- 
R1181aa. [i also think it could be serious 
RI 182da. ok even if it is probable you think it could be serious do you 
RI183aa. yeah; i do because if we can't u- utilise the office we are loosing money aren't = 
RI 184aa. = we (. ) I'm having to go back and forwards to work 
R1185da. [if you were: a:: >trader< (2.3) _ 
R1186da. you know (. ) trading on the stock exchange then yes i would totally agree with= 
R1187da. = you (. ) but at the end of the day have we decided what end client user we are- 
R1188aa. we have got round to saying that we are doing a job that you want to do from home so: 
R1189ca. but the thing is at the moment as well he was managing to do his job right up till = 
RI190ca. = then so (1.5) the phone line will be in 
RI 191aa. no he's he he's working in his office in the (. ) that is why he is having it built 
RI192ca. yeah- yeah- (1.0) 
R1193da. so can he not stay at his office (. ) for another week (0.5) 
R1194aa. well yes he can but is that not costing him in petrol and thing as like that 
RI 195da. yes but is that then (. ) a: serious (0.4) 
R1196ca. it's not going to cost him much more than a hundred quid is it 
R1197da. unless his season ticket's expired but then (. ) *his season ticket for this travel" 
R1198ba. i am just wondering shall i start doing the er: chart whatever it's called 
R1199da. yeah 
R1200aa. WELL OK THEN IF YOU THINK SO let's say probable then and er: an = 
R1201aa. = insignificant as an (0.7) impact 
R1202da. well we can go probable (1.4) and a marginal because it might because it might = 
R1203da. = go between one hundred and five hundred quid 
R1204aa. °ah: right ok then° 
R1205da. right ok so we can go: four 
R1206aa. four and two yeah (1.2) 
R1207da. yep (2.3) restricted access (6.7) er: restricted access (3.7) i would say (2.1) you 
know what = 
R1208da. size of a doorway is: 
R1209aa. yeah (. ) improbable i would have thought- 
R 12 1 Oda. yeah so we are saying it is an improbable and: so we are saying one and we are = 
R1211da. saying er: (. ) well even if it could it could only be a marginal (. ) yeah one = 
R1212da. = and two 
R1213aa. yeah (2.3) 
R1214da. problem with the furniture 
R1215aa. could happen 
R1216da. yeah could happen (0.5) 
R1217aa. but insignificant (. ) i think we could get something in (. ) to work on (1.2) 
R1218da. >yeah< (. ) >yeah< (3.2) one and a two (. ) right ok (2.6) whole project (3.0) 
R1219aa. well that is not a risk is it (. ) it's a minus really (. ) what we are saying is use a portacabin (1.1) 
R1220da. er: m (0.3) well that could be a plus side couldn't it 
R1221aa. hm: 
R1222da. it could be a significant (1.4) 
R1223aa. it certainly could yes (1.0) 
R1224da. er:: m (. ) 
R1225aa. >i think it could happen and it could be a minus five< (. ) we can only go up to five can't we 
R1226da. it is still going to cost you some money isn't it but (. ) yeah ok (3.3) you could make a= 
R1227da. = saving of greater than two thousand pounds (. ) 
R1228aa. °yeah° 
R1229da. minus five (1.1) and the probability of it (. ) is: (4.9) 
R1230aa. °i think it is a two ° 
R1231da. two (. ) 
R1232aa. yeah 
R1233da. yeah (2.2) two times minus five is minus ten (2.1) 
R1234aa. the only thing with that is it doesn't gives us (1.3) a risk (. ) it gives us a high risk or or 
R1235aa. = it's the lowest really in't it 
R1236da. yeah because you got the minus value 
R1237aa. °yeah° (2.2) 
R1238da. er:: (. ) >shared additional space for rent< (. ) well again (. ) that is as likely as not = 
R1239aa. [°could be a minus°] 
R1240da. =could happen- 
R1241aa. yes (. ) 
R1242da. because: you could do that so that could be a three (0.4) 
R1243aa. yeah 
R1244da. and that again is going to be a plus side isn't it so: 
R1245aa. it is 
R1246da. = so you are going to be looking at maybe (1.6) er: m- 
R1247aa. what a four (3.2) 
R1248da. what: very substantial: (4.9) oh what financially (0.5) what thousand to two thousand R1249aa. yeah (3.1) 
R1250da. oh:: go three minus three 
R1251aa. yeah (8.9) 
R1252da. convert garage 
R1253aa. °yeah° 
R1254da. well again you could do it (. ) 
R1255aa. yeah it could happen- 
R1256da. >why not< (. ) it's a possibility (1.6) 
R1257aa. and it's significant i think 
R1258da. yeah (1.4) 
R1259aa. it could be substantial (. ) minus three again i think (2.1) so it could happen as = 
R1260aa. =a two and a three (. ) 
R1261da. yeah (. ) would it not be more than a couple of grand (0.8) are we saying what did = 
R1262da. = we say (. ) we said a portacabin was minus five 
R1263aa. yes (0.5) 
R1264da. because we were saying it was greater than two thousand pounds 
R1265aa. because you could load it straight in there but the garage (0.6) 
R1266da. the garage is going to cost you (. ) what you have got to put a floor in it brick up = 
R1267da. = the front of it (. ) see yeah (. ) you are not going to be saving as much as a= 
R1268da. = portacabin perhaps (1.3) 
R1269aa. why (. ) you're buying a complete portacabin when you think about it (. ) 
R1270da. yeah (. ) true (. ) and they are not cheap are they (. ) 
R1271aa. no it might be the other way around (. ) 
R1272da. it could be six- i don't know (. ) it could be five or six grand (. ) I'm still thinking = 
R1273da. = if we spend five or six grand on converting your garage 
(0.9) 
R1274aa. °yeah° 
R1275da. yeah (0.9) so: possibly slightly more on converting your garage 
because it is an integral = 
R1276da. = part of your house isn't it 
R1277aa. yes (. ) it could be or: 
R1278da. so lets make it slightly less minus four: (0.6) and still call it a two 
R1279aa. yeah 
R1280da. yeah (2.3) er: family problems due to stress (1.0) well i would say er: as likely as not she's= 
R1281da. = going to get fed up with it (0.3) and er: m she's going to move out and she's going to = 
RL1282da. = say I'm not living with granny because i really cannot afford to granny (. ) I'm = 
R1283da. = sorry it's going to become a serious problem a: nd (. ) if you don't put me in an hotel = 
R1284da. = for six months (. ) although it's not a whole six months- 
R1285aa. [we are counting in days aren't we 
R1286da. yeah 
R1287aa. it's either (. ) what did we say (. ) so we are talking about four to six days (0.8) erm: so: (1.4) 
R1288da. no three is as likely as not cold happen 
R1289aa. yeah but 
R1290da. erm: (. ) but it is financial isn't' it (. ) you don't have to look at it in time do = 
R1291da. = you (1.0) you could look at it as purely as cost (1.3) 
R1292aa. °yeah ok° 
R1293da. so it could be: (0.4) it could cost you five hundred- 
R1294aa. [a thousand pounds 
R1295da. yeah (4.5) increased property value enables upgrade (1.5) 
R1296aa. this is a minus again in't it 
R1297da. yea: h (2.0) 
R1298aa. it could happen (2.1) 
R1299da. it could happen (. ) a two 
R1300aa. and it could be significant (. ) yeah i think an all (. ) two (. ) but that is only five hundred quid = 
R1301aa. = .. it will be more than that 
(. ) substantial_ 
R1302da. substantial well it's got to be:: (0.9) greater than two thousand then (. ) so it's got to be a= 
R1303da. = minus five (. ) its got to be an exceptional thing 
for it to happen 
R1304aa. yeah 
R1305da. right (. ) ok 
